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Negotiating Suspicion, Obligation, and Security  
in Contemporary Political Asylum Regimes
BRIDGET M. HAAS AND AMY SHUMAN
 Asylum seekers are increasingly the focus of global  debates 
surrounding humanitarian obligations on the one hand and concerns sur-
rounding security and border control on the other. Asylum seekers are at 
turns portrayed as innocent victims in need of humanitarian protection and 
as “queue jumpers” or threats to the body of the host nation. Recent coverage 
of the European migration crisis illustrates these competing representations 
of asylum seekers.
 On September 2, 2015, newspapers across the globe carried the sober-
ing image of the lifeless body of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian boy 
who had washed up on a beach in Turkey. He, along with his mother and two 
siblings, had died fleeing their homeland in search of safety in the European 
Union (EU). This incident served to reframe the narrative of the migrant 
crisis that had started earlier that year and had reached immense proportions 
by this time. The view of migrants, and Syrian ones in particular, began to 
shift from suspicious Other or potential terrorist to humanitarian victim.
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 If coverage of Kurdi’s death represented a shift in the narrative of the mi-
grant crisis, it was short-lived. On November 13, 2015, a series of coordinated 
terrorist attacks in Paris transfixed the world. It was soon revealed that one 
of the terrorists held a fake Syrian passport and had entered France through 
the migrant trail that flowed from the Middle East, passing through Greece, 
Macedonia, and Serbia and into Western Europe. The global response to the 
Paris terrorist attacks was swift: borders closed and the processing of refugees 
was slowed or temporarily ceased at EU countries’ borders.
 The shifting public narratives and policy responses concerning the 
EU migrant crisis represent a new iteration of tensions between humani-
tarian ethics and security concerns that are generated by international mi-
gration. This tension between humanitarian obligations and the security 
of the state have been evident since the inception of international refugee 
policy, though events such as the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the November 13, 2015, attacks in Paris bring these tensions to 
the fore, as they are acutely experienced and debated. Indeed, in a post-9/11 
landscape (and now reinvigorated after 11/13), volatile debates have taken 
place pitting humanitarian ethics against notions of security and border 
control.1 To be sure, at the time of completing this introductory chapter, 
US president Donald Trump issued an executive order barring refugees and 
immigrants from seven predominantly Muslim countries from entering the 
United States. The travel ban, quickly dubbed a “Muslim ban” by media and 
opponents of the measure, was soon met with widespread protests and legal 
challenges across the country. Months later, in October 2017, Trump laid out 
a new immigration strategy that focused on overhauling the US asylum 
system, including narrowing the standards required to gain asylum and im-
posing penalties on asylum seekers who file claims deemed to be “fraudulent.” 
The strong divisiveness of the debate surrounding these measures speaks to 
the enduring and entrenched nature of the tensions between humanitarian 
obligations and concerns over national security.
 The “paradoxical preoccupation with globalization and domestic se-
curity” manifests in an increase in the circulation of goods and technologies 
with the simultaneous attempt to constrain human mobility (Fassin 2011; 
Muller 2004, 52). The asylum seeker emerges as a central figure in this de-
bate, exposing the fragility of modern sovereignty (Muller 2004) and chal-
lenging “both the norms and the exceptions of the state” (Squire 2009, 3). 
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As Giorgio Agamben (2000) asserts, “If the refugee represents such a dis-
quieting influence in the order of the nation-state, this is primarily because, 
by breaking the identity between the human and the citizen and that be-
tween nativity and nationality, it brings the originary fiction of sovereignty 
into crisis” (20–21). Yet, as Nyers (2003, 2006) reminds us, the state is still a 
powerful entity, and it is through the construction of “the refugee” that “the 
citizen” is simultaneously created and maintained.
 Indeed, it is the liminality of the asylum seeker, as a figure “betwixt 
and between” (Turner 1967)—neither fully included in nor fully excluded 
from a host country—that offers a critical lens into the workings of the 
state. Close attention to contexts of liminality and marginalization can pro-
vide important observations into larger political and cultural forces (Das 
and Poole 2004; Fassin 2015, 3). In providing fine-tuned analyses of political 
asylum systems and the adjudication of asylum claims across a range of so-
ciocultural and geopolitical contexts, this volume offers critical insights into 
the processes by which tensions between humanitarianism and security/
border control are negotiated and enacted at the local level.
 Although asylum seekers have vastly different situations, political 
asylum is a global policy, requiring the collaboration of nations with dif-
ferent resources and different attitudes toward both refugees and economic 
migrants. Research on political asylum has always relied on in-depth un-
derstanding of the complex situations people are fleeing, including the par-
ticular forms of persecution and corruption. In this book, we integrate the 
particulars with the larger issues of policy. We are writing at an important 
moment in time in terms of forced migration and increasing numbers of 
asylum seekers. This particular cultural historical moment is defined by a 
global war on terrorism, in which suspicion has supplanted compassion and 
trust in many cases. The rise of an ethos or culture of suspicion as a defining 
characteristic of asylum regimes is evidenced, for example, by an increase 
in the rates of denial of asylum claims in the United States (TRAC 2016), 
the closing of borders to asylum seekers in the EU, and the rise of anti- 
immigration—particularly anti–asylum seeker—sentiments and rhetoric 
across the globe. 
 While we opened up this introduction with a discussion about the per-
ceived threat of terrorism that underlined global fears of the asylum seeker, 
the contributions to this volume do not focus on asylum seekers as terrorist 
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threats. Rather, we use this description of the contemporary political land-
scape to highlight two key themes, or aims, of this volume. First, recounting 
the shifting narratives surrounding asylum seekers in the EU and United 
States illustrate both the constructed nature of suspicious subjects and the 
fluidity and malleability of these constructed categories. This volume pro-
vides detailed ethnographic analyses of how categories of suspicious asylum 
subjects are produced in disparate locally and culturally specific ways. This 
framing turns our attention to how migrants are often produced as suspi-
cious subjects by the very asylum regimes to which they appeal for protec-
tion. Second, a focus on the widespread tensions between protection and 
control, between humanitarian obligations and national security, brings to 
the fore the dominance of a lens of suspicion regarding asylum at this par-
ticular moment in time and place. Our contention in this volume is that this 
broader ethos or lens of suspicion comes to bear in powerful ways on the 
everyday adjudication of asylum claims, albeit in uneven and locally contin-
gent ways and very often with deleterious consequences for those who claim 
a need for protection.
ASYLUM SEEKER: VICTIM VERSUS THREAT
 Part of the recent fear of refugees fleeing the Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghan 
conflicts is attributed to the possibility that terrorists are mingling with 
refugees and crossing into Europe with them. Many of our discussions in 
this book address the consequences resulting from the more general suspi-
cion of refugees for people seeking asylum. These issues are not new, and as 
many political asylum scholars have observed, what we are calling a lens of 
suspicion has been part of the assessment of disparities in the asylum system 
since its inception (Macklin 2009), often described in terms of questions of 
credibility determinations (Daniel and Knudsen 1995; Einhorn 2009). In 
her discussion of lesbian political asylum applicants, Claire Bennett (2014) 
describes a “culture of disbelief ” by decision-makers. She writes, “Question-
ing a person’s credibility is a legitimate line of enquiry as stipulated under 
Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act of 
2004. This clearly states that suspicion should be raised if individuals fail to 
answer specific questions, hide or provide misleading information, produce 
false documentation, or file an asylum application later than is reasonably 
expected” (Bennett 2014, 151).
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 Asylum seekers are refugees who are fleeing their homelands and 
whose cases have not yet been assessed by national systems designed to 
consider whether or not they qualify for protected status. At the end of 
2016, there were 2.8 million asylum seekers worldwide (UNCHR 2017).2 
To qualify for asylum, one must prove he or she meets the definition of a 
refugee under international law, as outlined in the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. Article 1A of the convention, as amended by the 1967 protocol, 
defines a refugee as
a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UN 
General Assembly 1967)
In addition to meeting the definition of refugee as specified in international 
law, one must also meet the requirements of the particular domestic asylum 
laws of the country within which one is seeking asylum. While the refugee 
convention undergirds domestic asylum laws, the postconvention develop-
ment of asylum bureaucracies took different forms, and there is a lack of 
uniformity in asylum adjudication across national boundaries.
 When focusing specifically on asylum claims and asylum systems, 
scholarly attention has been primarily on the adjudication of asylum cases 
that occur in countries where national asylum systems are in place, namely 
within the forty-four “industrialized countries” of first asylum identified by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR 2015). 
These are the nations of Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (with Western European 
countries, the United States, and Canada receiving the highest proportion 
of asylum claims and also much scholarly attention). There is sometimes 
a theoretical and empirical distinction made between refugee status deter-
mination (RSD) hearings conducted by the UNCHR in settings where 
asylum systems are not in place and the adjudication of asylum claims that 
are lodged within and processed by individual nation-states.
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 In this volume, the majority of contributors analyze the adjudication 
of asylum claims by various individual nation-states, though some address 
RSD processes in contexts where a national system of asylum is nonexis-
tent. We consider these under the same analytical lens because both sets 
of processes engage in the assessment of legitimacy of migrants and rely, 
in theory, on similar criteria. Moreover, we see the tensions between 
humanitarian imperatives and security concerns as central to all asylum- 
adjudication contexts. We are interested in the situated practices and logics 
that are variously deployed in the assessment of these claims, as these ten-
sions are negotiated in locally contingent ways.
 The ways in which asylum seekers have been understood and acted 
upon, in both academic and policy arenas, has shifted over time. Scholars 
and activists who have held an interest in human rights have focused on asy-
lum seekers as rights-bearing individuals within the context of international 
law (Edwards 2005; Hathaway 1991). Yet this human rights framework has 
been increasingly supplanted by the discourse of humanitarianism, whereby 
participating actors increasingly appeal to compassion and moral senti-
ments (Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Feldman 2007; Ticktin 2006, 2011). In 
this framework, the asylum seeker is reconfigured, moving from a strictly 
rights-bearing individual to that of humanitarian victim.
 This deployment of humanitarianism has been complicated, however, 
by a rise in the criminalization and securitization of asylum and asylum 
seekers, particularly in the Global North (Adamson 2006; Anderson 2013; 
Bigo 2002; Coutin 2011; Gibney 2004; Kerwin 2005; Squire 2009). Indeed, 
migration, and asylum in particular, is increasingly seen as foremost an 
issue of security. Victoria Squire (2009) has examined the exclusionary 
politics of asylum in Europe and the United Kingdom, arguing that the 
state, in constructing the asylum seeker as a threat to be managed, “ef-
fectively generates the ‘problem’ or ‘threat’ to which it is opposed,” thereby 
engaging in an endless cycle of restriction and control (3). The increasing 
dominance of the securitization paradigm of asylum has produced “the 
‘criminal/terrorist’” as “another figure along the refugee-migrant spectrum” 
(Holmes and Castañeda 2016, 18).
 The criminalization and securitization of migration has also meant 
the emergence and implementation of an array of restrictive border-control 
measures, ranging from the collection of biometric data to detention, inter-
diction, and deportation (Bigo 2007; Broeders 2007; De Genova and Peutz 
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2010; Fassin 2011; Huysmans 2006; Mountz 2010, Schuster 2003). The 
discourse of national security has been mobilized by states to repress the 
rights of migrants or to justify the infliction of violence upon them (Carens 
2003; Fassin 2011; Mountz 2010; Schuster 2003; Squire 2009).
 If the asylum seeker as potential terrorist represents one kind of threat 
that needs to be addressed through the adjudication of asylum claims, 
then the asylum seeker as economic siphon or threat to cultural identity 
represents another iteration of security threat (Innes 2010; Mountz 2010; 
Schuster 2003). To be sure, media representations of transnational migrants 
as “queue jumpers” or otherwise “bogus” asylum seekers abound, so much so 
that the dominant public perception of asylum seekers is that the majority 
of them are not truly humanitarian victims but rather those (illegitimately) 
seeking economic opportunity (Anderson 2013; Kmak 2015). The “bogus” 
asylum seeker has become a central figure in the debates surrounding secu-
rity, migration, and humanitarian ethics (Zimmerman 2011). The putative 
distinction between the economic migrant and the humanitarian/political 
refugee lies at the heart of asylum adjudication. While the distinction be-
tween these two categories of migrants has been shown to be untenable, 
it remains a cornerstone of policies and discourses surrounding asylum 
seekers (Bohmer and Shuman 2010; Dauvergne 2004; Essed and Wesen-
beek 2004). The presumptive distinction between proper (humanitarian/
political) and improper (economic) reasons for mobility becomes a way of 
“morally delineating the deserving refugee from the undeserving migrant” 
(Holmes and Castañeda 2016, 13).
 The fear that political asylum seekers might actually be economic 
migrants, that they might overtax fragile economic systems, or that they 
might be terrorists is not new (Gibney 2002). Some asylum and refugee 
scholars have argued that the system has always been vulnerable, that it 
was designed initially to offer safe haven to people fleeing Soviet countries 
rather than to refugees from the Global South and the Middle East (Pir-
ouet 2001, 124–26). The association between asylum seekers and terrorists, 
however unfounded, was intensified after 2001, and these concerns have 
been applied not only to people seeking asylum in Europe, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States but also in East Africa, 
where, Monica Kathina Juma and Peter Mwangi Kagwanja (2008) write, 
“Refugees, generally perceived as a liability, are likely to become pawns in a 
wider geopolitical game in which they are redefined as agents of insecurity 
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and terrorism” (225). Whether seen as a threat to the nation-state, the wel-
fare state, and/or liberal democracies (Schuster 2003), asylum seekers often 
bear the brunt of public and political anxieties.
ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AS CRITICAL LENS
 If asylum systems produce migrants as legitimate (humanitarian ref-
ugees) or illegitimate (unqualified or fraudulent) applicants, then we must 
understand the mechanisms by which this production happens. As this 
volume underscores, it is of vital importance to more fully understand who 
becomes understood as a threat, how they emerge as suspicious (or not), 
and how these categories of inclusion and exclusion shift, temporally and 
spatially.
 In this volume, we emphasize an understanding of asylum systems as 
not solely political-legal institutions but also ones that comprise systems 
and practices that are inherently sociomoral. That is, in declaring—and 
thus producing—an asylum seeker as either an illegitimate/“bogus” asy-
lum seeker or a legitimate “true refugee,” asylum systems confer a moral 
standing for these particular individuals. Asylum seekers, like other pre-
carious subjects managed by state institutions, can “easily slip from one side 
of this moral line to the other, from the role of suspect to the status of victim 
and vice versa” (Fassin 2015, 2). Is an asylum seeker a suspect and dangerous 
Other—a terrorist posing as a vulnerable figure or a fraudulent malingerer 
trying to siphon the economic and social resources of the host country? Or 
is the asylum seeker a “true refugee,” a victim of political persecution who 
deserves protection and care?
 This volume posits in-depth anthropological attention to multiple sites 
of asylum adjudication as a critical lens in which to interrogate the broader 
sociocultural, historical, and political-economic forces shaping refugee and 
asylum policies and practices. It is in these microlevel contexts—courtrooms, 
offices of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) interviews—that asylum seekers 
are produced as either legitimate or illegitimate subjects and their fates are 
decided. By providing an array of accounts of how global and national dis-
courses and policies regarding asylum are “locally reckoned” (Willen 2012), 
the contributors to this volume add to our understanding about the disparate 
and uneven nature of asylum adjudication. That is, while it is not new to 
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recognize the inequitable and uneven outcomes of asylum and RSD systems 
both across and within borders (Einolf 2001; Hamlin 2014; Legomsky 2009; 
Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007; Schoenholtz 2005), the mechanisms, technolo-
gies, and everyday interactions that produce such uneven outcomes warrant 
more attention ( Jubany 2011, 2017).
 Below we discuss three overarching themes that inform contemporary 
political asylum systems and the analyses of the contributors to this volume: 
obligation, suspicion, and security. These thematic domains are not discrete 
and should not be taken to be clearly delineated areas of inquiry but rather 
constructs with which to think, as applied to various ethnographic and tex-
tual material. Indeed, these domains are intersecting and interdependent, 
and most contributions to this volume speak to more than one of these 
themes.
Obligation
 We posit obligation as a central concept to our analyses of political 
asylum. More specifically, we borrow from Nadia El-Shaarawi (this volume) 
the idea of an “ethics of obligation,” by which we mean to underscore the 
moral character and implications of claims to protection and obligations to 
protect. While El-Shaarawi explicitly offers the ethics of obligation as her 
primary intervention, many other contributors to this volume—Ilil Benja-
min, Bridget M. Haas, John B. Haviland, and Charles Watters—highlight 
the ethical relationships involved in the struggle over the meaning of the 
“obligation to protect.” 
 It is not sufficient on either a theoretical or a policy level to merely 
claim that states are obligated to protect refugees and asylum seekers. Rather, 
this claim is our point of departure—it is the assertion of the obligation to 
protect asylum seekers that the contributors to this volume interrogate. For 
example, while the decisions of states and other institutions to adjudicate 
and admit asylum seekers are legally based upon the Geneva Convention, 
the issue of whom to admit and the processes for assessing this are issues 
that are locally and subjectively negotiated and informed by moral assump-
tions. “In order to substantiate obligation,” Claudia Tazreiter (2004) asserts, 
“the moral standing of a person or people must be articulated” (29). In asy-
lum adjudication, institutional actions have direct implications for human 
suffering. Asylum seekers, as opposed to refugees, pose a different kind of 
ethical challenge: “What gives asylum seekers a vital moral claim, however, is 
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the fact that their arrival involves the state directly and immediately in their 
fate” (Carens 2003, 101).
 Ultimately, asylum is about states’ obligations to protect certain catego-
ries of persons deemed vulnerable. But to whom states are obligated emerges 
as a contentious, shifting, and muddy question. The question of to whom 
states and other institutions are obligated is also a matter of geopolitical 
interests and ideologies, which shape which groups are seen as deserving of 
protection at a particular place and moment in time (Coutin 2011; Holmes 
and Castañeda 2016). Attention to circulating discourses and authoritative 
claims concerning asylum politics can offer critical insight “about how the 
responsibility for suffering is shifted; how fears of cultural, ethnic, and reli-
gious difference are mobilized; and how boundaries of social categories are 
made and unmade,” thereby creating a “hierarchy of deservingness” (Holmes 
and Castañeda 2016, 13, 19).
 Yet, as the contributions to this volume elucidate, the question of who 
deserves protection is just as much a matter of locally specific factors as it is 
larger geopolitical factors. Asylum is a socially and culturally shaped process 
and set of institutions, and conceptions of legitimate subjects (those de-
serving asylum status) are always historically and socioculturally contingent. 
Asylum adjudication, while informed by broader discourses and ideologies, 
is also a thoroughly intersubjective and interpersonal process, and the colli-
sion of logic systems—between the culture of asylum adjudicators and the 
culture of asylum seekers—has been well documented (Blommaert 2001; 
Bohmer and Shuman 2007, 2008, 2018; Jacquemet 2009, 2011; Rousseau 
et al. 2002). The local, as much as the global, is key here. For example, 
categories of deservingness are often highly contingent on affective and 
narrative performance within adjudication arenas (Bohmer and Shuman 
2008; McKinnon 2009), what El-Shaarawi (this volume), drawing on Jar-
ret Zigon, deems “local moralities.”
 States’ obligations to its own citizens must simultaneously be privileged 
in asylum politics and practices. As the opening discussion of responses to 
the current EU migrant crisis illustrated, the very question of who is under 
threat is far from clear and often lacks consensus. Asylum seekers are at 
turns constructed as the threat and the threatened (Innes 2010).
 It is important to acknowledge the multiple stakeholders and myriad 
actors involved in political asylum systems. While asylum adjudication some-
times involves simply a claimant and an adjudicator (asylum officer, UNCHR 
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official, immigration judge), it is more often the case that asylum claims in-
volve the participation of many mediating actors. Thus, legal aid advocates, 
immigration attorneys, and human rights or other NGO members often play 
an integral part in asylum systems and processes. Given these different stake-
holders, it is essential to consider the competing conceptions of asylum seekers 
that may be at play at any given time during the adjudication of asylum claims. 
The role of NGOs in the asylum process is framed as one of asylum claimant 
advocacy, though on the ground their effects appear more complex (Cabot 
2013, 2014; Ticktin 2011). Naomi Millner (2011), for example, challenges the 
view that NGO refugee advocates can subvert dominant, pejorative represen-
tations of asylum seekers by enacting an ethos of hospitality precisely because 
these humanitarian actors are drawing on the same discursive and conceptual 
logic of the state, thereby reproducing the same categories of belonging and 
exclusion as the state. She describes these moments of categorization as “ethi-
cal framings which invest such governmental orders with legitimacy” (Millner 
2011, 321). Ilil Benjamin’s essay in this volume vividly illustrates the complexity 
of the relationships between aid workers and asylum claimants—a context in 
which obligation to protect is by no means straightforward.
 The contributors to this volume examine the ways in which the con-
cept of obligation is engaged both directly and indirectly, bringing to the 
fore the complex ways in which a dominant ethos of suspicion works on 
both a global and local level to reshape questions of to whom we are obli-
gated and how that obligation is determined and legitimated. The chapters 
by Haviland and Watters, drawing on very different ethnographic material, 
shed light on how the construction of particular categories of migrants 
mobilize a sense of obligation over other categories of migrants.
Security
 Political asylum and national and international security have always 
been intertwined, but the connection has intensified in recent years. In es-
sence, asylum adjudication is the negotiation of two sets of anxieties about 
security: the asylum seeker’s quest for physical or existential security and 
anxieties about the economic, physical, and/or cultural threat that asylum 
seekers pose to national security. We have emphasized throughout this in-
troduction the tensions between humanitarian obligation and national se-
curity / border control. As Daniel M. Goldstein (2007) has pointed out, 
rights can be revoked in the name of security.
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 Yet security and obligation are inextricably linked, in that fulfilling an 
obligation—be it to asylum seekers or the state—is a prerequisite for secu-
rity. On the one hand, meeting humanitarian obligations to protect deserv-
ing refugees is necessary to ensure asylum seekers’ personal and existential 
security. Indeed, the life-or-death stakes of asylum decisions are recognized 
not only by asylum claimants and their advocates but also by asylum adju-
dicators who wrestle with making these decisions, as the ethnographic data 
presented in Haas’s chapter reveals. On the other hand, recognizing the ob-
ligation to protect citizens from outside threat is seen as essential for na-
tional security. Put differently, getting obligation “right”—protecting those 
who need protection and denying those who do not—is framed as necessary 
to security on a broad level.
 Security always incorporates and references its inverse: insecurity. 
Matthew Gibney (2002) underlines the irony in viewing asylum seekers 
as a threat since by definition they are victims of insecurity. Jef Huysmans 
(2006) highlights the inequities regarding security that arise in political 
asylum processes. Framing asylum seekers’ claims as “alternative security 
claims,” Huysmans notes that the asylum seekers’ requests for protection 
“often remain subordinated to the security of the State and its citizenry” (6). 
Thus, a central question in asylum adjudication is, whose security matters? 
The shifting and contextual definitions of who is deemed morally deserving 
expose the fact that security (and insecurity) itself is socioculturally and his-
torically constructed. As Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal, and 
Nadine Voelkner (2014) note, “For something to become a security concern, 
institutional, political, technological, and various other work is performed 
that makes it a matter of insecurity” (3; see also Huysmans 2006). Security 
and insecurity, therefore, must be understood as situated practices that re-
quire the anticipation and subsequent control of perceived risks (Amoore 
2013; Goldstein 2007). These threats and perceived risks are themselves so-
cial constructions, often reflecting broader ideological and political agendas, 
as several of the essays in this volume make clear (Rachel Lewis, Sara McK-
innon, Watters).
 This volume examines the struggle over claims for security and pro-
tection as they are deployed in contexts of political asylum. We consider 
how the idea of security or insecurity comes into play on many levels in 
political asylum. We ask: Whose security is at stake, and how is the security 
of asylum seekers measured against the security of the state? Who needs 
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protection? Who gets to decide this? Further, we ask how insecurity is 
configured, especially in the expectation that asylum seekers will articulate 
their vulnerability as a central part of their claims. In fact, the articulation 
of vulnerability could be considered the primary “currency” in asylum ad-
judication ( James 2004, 2011). Many of the contributions to this volume 
attend to the struggle over claims for protection—between adjudicators 
and claimants (El-Shaarawi, Lewis, McKinnon, Amy Shuman, and Carol 
Bohmer), between aid workers and asylum seekers (Benjamin), and between 
“objective” sources of evidence and “subjective” narratives of asylum seekers 
(Haas, Marco Jacquemet, Benjamin N. Lawrance). The contribution from 
Haviland is particularly noteworthy in this regard in that he turns the prob-
lematic of “a politics of protection” on its head and asks what happens when 
those who do not understand themselves in need of protection get defined 
as such by the state.
Suspicion
 Though we are framing suspicion as its own conceptual domain here, 
this is, as the volume’s title indicates, an overarching theme of the book as 
a whole. Indeed, suspicion is the primary point of organization for this 
volume. The ethical quandaries and challenges that underlie the control 
of borders have long been recognized by scholars (Carens 1992; Gibney 
1988). However, in this volume, we argue that the rise of suspicion as the 
dominant ethos of asylum adjudication—the stance that asylum seekers 
are “always already untrustworthy”—is reconfiguring notions of who can 
claim protection and who is obligated to protect (Holmes and Castañeda 
2016, 19; see also Bohmer and Shuman 2007; Griffiths 2013; Jacquemet 2011; 
Maryns 2006).
 Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman (2009) describe refugees as “ob-
jects of suspicion,” tracing their emergence as perceived competitors in the 
labor market. Asylum policy, then, was subordinated to the economics of 
migration (256). Following this, they argue that the “hunt for bogus refu-
gees became a leitmotif in public discourse, used to justify the increasing 
harshness of adjudications” (256). Our discussion of suspicion examines 
both the larger conceptual framework of suspicion and particular, localized 
discourses of suspicion in the political asylum process. Though the adjudi-
cation of asylum is an individualized process, its effects are much greater: 
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“the discredit of asylum seekers as individuals signifies the delegitimation of 
asylum as an institution” (Fassin 2011, 220).
 Suspicion generates technologies to measure and assess deservingness 
and, more specifically, credibility, and several essays in this book discuss 
these various “technologies of suspicion” (Campbell, 2004), including chap-
ters by Haas, Jacquemet, Lawrance, and Lewis. This volume’s contributors 
ask: What are these technologies of suspicion? How and when are they de-
ployed and by whom? What are the effects, both intended and unintended, 
of these technologies? While recognizing suspicion as a dominant ethos of 
asylum systems, contributors also attend to its slippages, ambivalences, and 
indeterminacies.
 While asylum adjudication and RSD processes are putatively con-
cerned with “getting at the ‘truth,’” the contributions to this volume under-
score the ways in which asylum systems actually engage in the production 
of truth (Fassin 2013). Thus, technologies of suspicion are simultaneously 
“technologies of truth” (Merry and Coutin 2014). For example, in many 
cases, as Lawrance’s chapter demonstrates, outside expert witnesses or state- 
produced country condition reports are granted ultimate authority over the 
testimony of the asylum seeker herself (see also Good 2007; Lawrance and 
Ruffer 2015). Our contention in this book is that asylum systems are not 
just contexts in which certain categories and performances are rewarded and 
legitimated but also contexts in which these very categories of personhood 
are themselves produced.
 A key effect of these technologies of suspicion is a narrowing of the 
lens of who can be considered morally deserving. That is, if states are obli-
gated to protect “true refugees” who are worthy of protection, then by nar-
rowing the criteria by which this deservingness is met also serves to limit 
the number to whom the state is obligated. This allows for states to restrict 
migration while keeping their claim to humanitarian obligation intact. This 
is reflected in the assertion by asylum institutions that a rise in asylum de-
nials reflects a rise in “bogus” asylum seekers. We agree with Fassin (2015), 
who suggests that this instead reflects a rise in the production of suspicious 
subjects rather than a rise in their presence (see also Kmak 2105, 396). In-
deed, numerous essays provide fine-grained analyses of the production of 
suspicious subjects across a variety of settings (Haviland, Lewis, McKinnon, 
Shuman and Bohmer, Watters).
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OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
 All of the contributors to the book engage with concepts of obligation, 
security, and suspicion, albeit from different theoretical, geopolitical, and 
methodological perspectives. As we have been elaborating in this introduc-
tion, these concepts shift across time and space, and the essays in this book 
investigate their localization and their impact on the security and well-being 
of asylum seekers.
 The essays that constitute part I, “Asylum and Protection as Con-
tested Categories,” lay important groundwork for the volume and the 
subsequent chapters. These three chapters address different cultural and 
geographical contexts but cohere around an engagement with the ways 
in which asylum as a category can be murky and contested. Each of these 
chapters richly illuminates disparate examples of disconnection between 
asylum bureaucracies’ claims to protect and migrants’ experiences of these 
bureaucratic procedures. They show that asylum regimes and their associ-
ated notions of obligation and protection are often at odds with migrants’ 
experiences of the asylum process and of migrants’ conceptions of them-
selves, including their desires, goals, sense of agency, and understandings of 
dignity. The contributors to the chapters in part I focus on how politics of 
suspicion mediate culturally complicated—and often conflicting—notions 
surrounding asylum on the ground. Moreover, these chapters reveal import-
ant insights surrounding the sociocultural, political, and experiential conse-
quences of these contestations.
 Part I opens with Nadia El-Shaarawi’s chapter focusing on the politics 
of obligation as it relates to US refugee policy toward Iraqi refugees in the 
wake of the Iraq War. As she notes, the RSD of Iraqi refugees was informed 
by an explicitly moral framework whereby preferential access was given to 
those whose persecution could be traced directly to their association with 
the American forces or other allied organizations in Iraq. El-Shaarawi urges 
us to think about how questions of moral responsibility intervene in ten-
sions between humanitarianism impulses and security concerns and further 
trouble the category of asylum. Though notions of moral responsibility, as 
other essays illustrate, are not usually as explicitly outlined in asylum poli-
cies, El-Shaarawi’s emphasis on obligation as a necessary category of analy-
sis is highly instructive. Her data reveal the multiple and conflicting ways in 
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which obligation is imagined and experienced within a broader politics of 
suspicion—a theme that resonates across essays in this book.
 Charles Watters’s essay examines the moral economy of deservingness 
that is at play in the management of asylum seekers broadly, as well as within 
the specific research site of Zeebrugge, a port city in Belgium through which 
migrants seek to pass en route to the United Kingdom. Watters importantly 
attends to how refugees themselves interpret and respond to institutional 
and/or governmental tensions between protection and control as they cre-
atively navigate “problem spaces.” The disconnect between migrants’ under-
standings of themselves and their institutional categorization can result in 
the effacement of particular aspects of refugees’ narratives and experiences. 
For instance, articulations of aspiration or agency are viewed as suspect and 
delegitimated, as such characteristics fail to conform to the role of the pas-
sive refugee, deemed most deserving of protection within asylum regimes.
 John B. Haviland’s essay, which concludes part I, likewise considers 
the tensions that arise when subjects are recognized in ways that are at odds 
with their own self-understandings. It is unique to this volume in two ways. 
First, Haviland richly draws on his complex role as both ethnographer and 
interpreter in immigration cases involving Tzotzil speakers. This dual role 
allows Haviland a rare opportunity to observe the multiple actors and “dif-
ferent orders of engagement” involved in the construction of suspicious sub-
jects, which he presents via deep analyses of transcripts between multiple 
actors (himself, a migrant in US custody, a US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agent, a social worker). Second, as noted earlier, Haviland sets 
out “to stand the notion of ‘suspicion’ upside down,” focusing on migrants 
who did not identify as refugees or asylum seekers but instead found them-
selves as objects of what he terms “coerced asylum.” He examines the con-
sequences for migrant minors from Central America and Mexico as they 
become the subjects of American “ideologically driven legal resolutions” 
whereby the US government positions itself as morally obligated to protect 
vulnerable and victimized (Other) children.
 Having established asylum as a contested and cumbersome category, 
part II, “Technologies of Suspicion,” looks more specifically at forms of 
knowledge production within asylum systems. The contributions in this 
section provide critical analyses of new and dominant technologies of pu-
tatively getting at the truth of asylum claims. Whether conceived of as “tech-
nologies of suspicion” (Campbell 2004), “technologies of truth” (Merry and 
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Coutin 2014), or “technologies of morality” (Kmak 2015), these new forms 
of assessing truth, legitimacy, and deservingness—and their flip sides of 
disbelief and illegitimacy—are reconfiguring not only how one becomes 
seen as worthy of protection but also who becomes worthy of protection. 
While many other contributors in this volume address various technolo-
gies of suspicion deployed within asylum adjudication, the three essays of 
this section take specific and/or emergent technologies of suspicion as their 
primary focus.
 Bridget M. Haas’s chapter ethnographically explores asylum officers in 
the United States and the ways in which these adjudicators wrestle with the 
dual imperative to protect both the state and legitimate, deserving asylum 
seekers. Asylum officers, who conceive of themselves as “moral gatekeepers,” 
are acutely aware of the humanitarian imperative facing them and of the 
life-or-death stakes of their decisions. Yet concerns over and commitments 
to national security are also seen as moral issues. Thus, asylum officers must 
weigh their obligation to the state against their obligation to a foreign, un-
known Other. To do this, asylum officers engage various technologies of 
truth in their adjudication of claims, including credibility assessments, the 
use of corroborating material or other “objective” evidence, and the evalua-
tion of psychological affidavits. Haas traces the unevenness of the imple-
mentation of these technologies and the ambivalence with which asylum 
officers approach them. Such ambivalence, along with the fact that asylum 
officers rely on their own emotions to make asylum decisions, reveals the 
fissures in these technologies of truth. Haas also underscores the adjudica-
tion process as one that constructs particular categories of personhood and 
deservingness, challenging the putative notion that categories such as “hu-
manitarian victim,” “security threat,” or “bogus” asylum seeker are self-evident 
or exist prior to one’s involvement with the asylum process.
 Benjamin Lawrance, in his chapter on magical African asylum claims, 
argues that the politics of suspicion that characterize political asylum results 
in the increasing emphasis on the importance of empirical research in estab-
lishing asylum claimant credibility. In particular, Lawrance examines the use 
of country of origin information (COI), such as State Department reports 
and reports crafted by other national and international organizations. Adju-
dicators view COI as authoritative, thus offering legitimacy to cases that can 
effectively use these data sources to support their claims. Lawrance uses case 
examples from West African women refugees who invoked various forms 
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of witchcraft in their persecution narratives to illustrate that that claims of 
magic and witchcraft were unable to find support in COI. Consequently, 
lawyers recrafted these women’s testimonies, reformulating witchcraft asy-
lum claims into claims of gender violence, which could be more suitably 
supported by expert evidence and COI. While Lawrance acknowledges that 
this legal strategy may serve to increase the chances of a successful outcome, 
he pushes us to consider the human and social costs of this legal move, 
framing it as an example of bureaucratic violence. Lawrance’s chapter urges 
consideration of which technologies and information get understood as 
authoritative and why, as well as how this production of knowledge shapes 
who gets recognized (or not) as deserving of protection.
 The final chapter in this part addresses emergent digital and Web-
based technologies that are transforming asylum systems. In his examination 
of the affordances and limitations of asylum going digital, Marco Jacquemet 
describes the technologies used in asylum hearings, including on-site imme-
diate examinations of Google Earth websites, search engines, and machine 
translation to corroborate or dispute applicants’ assertions. While on the 
surface these new techniques may seem benign, even beneficial, to asylum 
adjudication, Jacquemet suggests that they are in fact power technologies 
that serve to implement the ideology of suspicion in the asylum process. 
Although these new technologies may help “speed things up,” they also carry 
the “risk of communicative breakdown and bias against asylum seekers.” 
Along with the other contributions to this volume, Jacquemet’s essay allows 
for an understanding of asylum systems and their associated technologies as 
both producing suspicion and governing suspicious subjects. Thus, asylum 
systems work to bring into existence the very suspicions that they then pre-
sumptively need to control and manage.
 The chapters in the third and final part of the volume, “Enacting and 
Navigating Suspicion,” offer analyses of the micropolitics of asylum adju-
dication, with particular attention to how these technologies mediate in-
teractions between adjudicators or advocates and asylum claimants. These 
chapters shed light on how asylum seekers navigate the technologies of 
suspicion introduced in the previous section and how broader global and 
national discourses, ideologies, and policies come to be locally enacted in 
varied and complex ways. Contributors highlight how notions of deserving-
ness are both performed and assessed within arenas increasingly character-
ized by an ethos of suspicion.
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 Ilil Benjamin’s chapter addresses the complex yet highly influential 
roles that NGO advocates play within asylum regimes. Using data col-
lected at a refugee legal aid organization in Israel, Benjamin explores the 
difficulties that confront NGO workers as they try to help refugees re-
frame their asylum testimonies to fit the requirements of the asylum sys-
tem. Benjamin’s analysis reveals multiple iterations of the tension between 
suspicion and responsibility. Within the Israeli asylum regime, there are par-
ticular categories—economic migrant, for example—as well as certain na-
tional affiliations or kinds of narrative performances that are deemed more 
suspicious than others. Benjamin argues that while asylum advocates try to 
mediate these factors, over time they often “parted with many illusions of 
honesty and good faith in the asylum system.” And as Benjamin shows, they 
too are sometimes confronted with their own suspicions about particular 
asylum seekers, posing personal moral dilemmas for these NGO workers.
 The essay by Sara McKinnon keenly illustrates an analytic tacking 
between macro- and microlevel politics of asylum. Important to her project 
is her assertion that a close examination of local-level responses to new 
forms of incorporation—here, transgender asylum claimants—reveals 
much about US anxieties and aspirations. In particular, McKinnon con-
siders shifts in the framing and language of asylum claims for transgen-
dered women, noting a rhetorical separation of gender and gender identity. 
As McKinnon explicates, this microlevel shift produced significant (nega-
tive) changes in outcomes of these claims and served “to create boundaries 
around a suspicious and fearful figure in US law and politics—the figure of 
the reproductive brown woman.” McKinnon’s chapter reveals not only the 
geopolitical shaping of who can be considered “incorporable as an immi-
grant subject” but the highly gendered and racialized aspects of this process 
as well.
 The final two chapters shed important light on how the complexities 
and contradictions of asylum systems are navigated by asylum seekers 
themselves. Rachel Lewis’s chapter deftly examines how particular groups 
of subjects—in her case lesbian asylum claimants—are configured as sus-
pect. Her analysis critically connects local practices of credibility assessment 
to larger discourses surrounding gender, sexuality, race, and class. Lewis 
demonstrates the mechanisms by which these larger cultural and discursive 
forces are locally enacted to construct queer asylum seekers as deportable 
subjects, echoing McKinnon’s observations of the gendered and racialized 
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nature of the construction of suspicious subjects. The issue of credibility 
and its local negotiation on which Lewis reflects is a key theme in other es-
says as well. For Lewis, accounting for the intersections of race, class, gender, 
and sexuality as they shape credibility assessments for gay and lesbian asy-
lum claimants is a necessary step in conceptualizing effective forms of queer 
antideportation activism.
 The final essay of part III, by Amy Shuman and Carol Bohmer, con-
tinues the investigation into credibility assessments and the enactment 
of suspicion in their examination of the tensions between asylum seekers’ 
trauma narratives and asylum officials’ cultural expectations of narrative 
performance. Beginning with an analysis of the case of Rwandan Paul Rus-
esabagina, Shuman and Bohmer highlight the highly contested nature of 
claims to protection, obligation, and security. Continuing with the obser-
vation that political asylum hearings are both interrogations and narrative 
performances, Shuman and Bohmer investigate three dimensions of narra-
tive that are used as tools in asylum claimant credibility assessments: orien-
tation, positioning, and narrative logic. Through a detailed narrative analysis 
of an asylum case, they demonstrate the incompatibility of interrogation 
and trauma narratives. Shuman and Bohmer pay particular attention to the 
fact that asylum seekers’ experiences are saturated with contradictions. Of 
necessity, asylum seekers often occupy multiple and contradictory subject 
positions in order to survive, and they must create a coherent narrative to 
persuade asylum officials of their credibility. These “narrative failures” can 
have devastating results, ranging from the delegitimation of personal and 
collective suffering to the forcible removal of migrants back to situations of 
existential insecurity.
 We close with a conclusion in which we reflect on the contributions of 
the volume, especially as they relate to ongoing and emergent discourses and 
practices surrounding asylum. In particular, we examine the insights gleaned 
from the volume’s essays on the relationship between credibility and legibil-
ity. Further, we reflect on the role of ethnography, cultural analysis, and the 
positionality of scholars in the study of asylum regimes.
 Ultimately our intent in this volume is to emphasize the very human 
stakes involved in the adjudication of refugee and asylum claims. That the 
contemporary landscape of humanitarian crises and forced migration de-
scribed in the opening pages of this introduction is increasingly dominated 
by an ethos of suspicion does not just provide a case for theoretical inquiry. 
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The tensions and slippages between humanitarianism and border control 
surrounding political asylum, whereby suspicion often supplants protec-
tion, has profound human and social consequences. A more robust un-
derstanding of how these broader forces and tensions come to be locally 
enacted in ways that differentially shape the lived experiences of those 
fleeing persecution and claiming the need for protection is essential if we 
are to compassionately respond to the scope of suffering and mobility in the 
contemporary moment.
NOTES
1. According to Marisa Cianciarulo (2006), political asylum has become “a lightning 
rod for the national immigration debate, forcing the country to balance the traditional hu-
manitarian interests against weighty security concerns” (110). See also Hamlin (2014, 5).
2. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that at the end 
of 2016, there were 65.6 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide. Of this total, 22.5 
million were refugees, 40.3 million were internally displaced people, and 2.8 million were 
asylum seekers (UNCHR, 2016).
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Troubling the Ethics of Durable  
Solutions in the Age of Suspicion
Iraq War Refugees and the Politics of Obligation
NADIA EL-SHAARAWI
 “ In  f ron t  o f  I r aq i  peop le  I  am now a  t r a i to r ,  hav ing  chea ted 
my country, and in front of Americans I don’t have a case.” As Mustafa and 
I sat in the waiting room of a Cairo refugee legal aid organization, his angry 
condemnation filled me with shame. That afternoon, I had noticed him 
come into the clinic carrying a thin folder of paper and drop onto a seat in 
the waiting room, visibly upset. Around him, the hustle and bustle of work 
went on as usual: clients waited to be seen as legal advocates interviewed 
refugees, filled out forms, and entered data. I, the ethnographer, had been 
encouraged to speak with Mustafa by the director, who noted in hushed 
tones that Mustafa had just been rejected for resettlement to the United 
States and “needed to talk.” While Mustafa could appeal the decision, we 
knew how difficult it would be and how unlikely it was to be successful.
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 Resettlement rejections often came with almost no explanation for why 
a case had been refused in the first place, making appeals challenging. And 
while the legal aid clinic provided its clients with assistance before and after 
the resettlement interviews, refugees were almost never allowed to bring a 
legal advocate to the interviews that would decide their fate. A conversation 
with an anthropologist in a moment like this felt inadequate, empty of com-
fort. I knew that the director had asked me to speak with Mustafa because 
there was nothing substantive to offer him in that moment. Mustafa, who 
had been forced to flee Iraq because of his association with the Americans, 
had, in his estimation, risked reidentifying himself as a “traitor” in exile by 
applying to be resettled to the United States. Yet because his affiliation with 
the United States in Iraq had not been judged to fit the specific criteria of 
the US resettlement program, his application was rejected. Mustafa, like 
many Iraqis I met in Cairo, was caught in between: he didn’t quite fit the 
bureaucratic specificities of the programs designed to provide protection to 
Iraqi refugees, despite believing himself to be in need of such protection.
 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), there are 25.4 million refugees in the world today. Refugee status 
is, by definition, intended to be temporary. Yet displacement is increasingly 
protracted, with a global average length of displacement of twenty years. 
Nonetheless, the framing of displacement as a “temporary crisis” demands 
a solution, and the conventional framework employed by international or-
ganizations and states includes three discrete, so-called durable solutions: 
repatriation to the country of origin, local integration, and third-country 
resettlement. The framework of durable solutions may be less familiar and 
pressing in contexts where national asylum systems lead to permanent resi-
dence or citizenship for people granted asylum, but in states where national 
asylum systems are absent and where refugees are allowed to reside on a 
temporary basis only, like in Egypt, the question of a durable solution to 
displacement takes on urgency for refugees and humanitarians alike.
 This volume focuses on the ways that discourses of humanitarianism 
and securitization play out in a wide range of asylum adjudication contexts. 
In this chapter, I focus on Iraqi refugees’ experiences of adjudication—not 
of asylum but of third-country resettlement, one of the durable solutions. 
Resettlement involves the selection and transfer of refugees from the coun-
try where they have sought refuge to a new country that has agreed to pro-
vide them with residence and, usually, a pathway to citizenship. Once the 
Troubling the Ethics of Durable Solutions in the Age of Suspicion  31
preferred solution to the “refugee problem” (Loescher and Scanlan 1998), re-
settlement has become the least-used durable solution. Only approximately 
1 percent of refugees are resettled. Resettlement is typically only a possibility 
for people who have already been granted refugee status. It is often intended 
as an additional form of protection when asylum is insufficient. Yet, as in 
asylum, resettlement adjudication decides who is included and who is ex-
cluded. Both processes are complex arenas of contestation in which questions 
of obligation, security, humanitarianism, and protection are played out.
 While resettlement and asylum processes share some similarities, 
there are key differences. First, while theoretically people who meet the 
definition of a refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 protocol have the right to claim asylum, no such 
right to resettlement exists. Resettlement is entirely at the discretion of the 
resettlement state, which decides which refugees to admit and the manner in 
which they will be admitted. The United States has for a long time resettled 
the most refugees of any of the twenty-eight resettlement countries and has 
the most nationally independent program of any resettlement state (Van 
Selm 2014). Second, persons can claim asylum when they reach the territory 
of the state to which they have fled. Resettlement, on the other hand, allows 
states to select the refugees they would like to admit before they travel to the 
resettlement country. It is therefore not surprising that states often hold up 
resettlement programs as “orderly” against the uncontrolled, and therefore 
suspicious, mobility of asylum seekers (Van Selm 2014), who are often stig-
matized as dangerous or illegitimate “queue jumpers.” But this is not always 
the case. For example, populist politicians in the United States have recently 
used versions of both of these discourses as justification for restrictions or 
moratoriums on refugee resettlement.
 Scholars, as well as politicians, have deliberated at length about what 
responsibilities states have to admit refugees (Gibney 2004). In this chapter, 
I move away from an approach grounded in the ethical underpinnings or 
policy implications of inclusion and exclusion that, while important, tend 
to center the state in their analysis (Aleinikoff 1995). Instead I argue for an 
anthropological approach that focuses on Iraqi refugees’ lived experiences of 
the resettlement process and the ways in which the logics that underpinned 
resettlement were negotiated locally in Cairo. This method pays attention to 
the ways in which these larger geopolitical questions are made and remade 
in everyday encounters during the resettlement process. How do refugees 
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like Mustafa experience, understand, and engage with questions of obliga-
tion in the context of the resettlement process?
 Although resettlement has become an exceptional solution, its impact 
reaches far beyond the few refugees who are resettled each year. Yet research 
on resettlement often does not include a focus on refugees’ own hopes, plans, 
and experiences related to resettlement. Much scholarship on resettlement 
instead focuses on the integration of resettled populations, especially in the 
United States and Canada, and not on the process of resettlement itself, 
with important exceptions (e.g., Thomson 2012; Jansen 2008; Horst 2006). 
In addition, as Katy Long (2013) notes, the durable-solutions framework 
itself has rarely been subject to scholarly critique.
 This chapter draws on several periods of ethnographic fieldwork with 
Iraqi refugees in Egypt from 2007 to 2012. During this time, I conducted 
interviews with refugees and humanitarians and engaged in participant ob-
servation in a refugee legal aid clinic and other key sites for the Iraqi com-
munity in Egypt. When I began my research, the resettlement process was 
not a primary focus of my project. However, over time I came to realize how 
centrally resettlement figured in the daily lives of my interlocutors, many of 
whom were seeking to be resettled to a third country, such as the United 
States. The lived experience of urban exile could not be understood without 
attention to the bureaucratic process that characterized much of their lives 
during this period.
DISPLACEMENT AND THE IRAQ WAR
 In order to make sense of Iraqis’ experiences with the resettlement 
process, it is essential to consider why they became refugees and how they 
experienced life in exile. In 2007, when I began my fieldwork, the flight of 
Iraqis from their country was at its apex. The 2003 Iraq War and the vio-
lence and unrest that followed led to the displacement of 4.7 million Iraqis. 
Some 2.7 million were internally displaced, while 2 million lived as refugees, 
mostly in countries in the region such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. 
Although it would soon be eclipsed by the forced migration caused by the 
Syrian Civil War, at the time the Iraqis represented the largest mass migra-
tion in the Middle East after 1948 (Fagan 2007).
 The March 2003 invasion of Iraq, dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
was justified by the premise that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of 
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mass destruction, a rationale that was later demonstrated to be false. In 
April of that year, Baghdad fell, ending the twenty-four-year rule of Saddam 
and the Ba’ath Party. US troops would remain in Iraq until their official 
withdrawal in 2011. There was significant protest and public criticism of the 
war, which many likened to that of the Vietnam War. Criticism focused on a 
number of different issues, including the legality of the invasion, the human 
costs and financial costs, which have been estimated at more than $823 bil-
lion (Crawford 2014), abuses by the armed forces and private contractors, 
and failure to plan for the transition of power.
 Immediately following the toppling of Saddam’s regime, policymakers 
expected large-scale population movement both into and out of the country. 
However, the initial refugee movements did not materialize. Instead, begin-
ning in 2005 and reaching its apex in 2006–7, escalating sectarian violence 
led to the mass displacement of millions of Iraqis, catching policymakers 
and practitioners unaware. After the fall of Saddam’s regime, the absence of 
a strong state and a climate of insecurity further encouraged Iraqis to turn to 
other groupings, including tribal, sectarian, ethnic, and regional allegiances, 
in order to provide security and protection (Al-Mohammad 2010; Boyle 
2009). This built on patterns of allegiance under the previous regime in 
which the stifling of political opposition was such that Iraqis identified with 
religious, tribal, and ethnic leaders for authority separate from that of the 
state. However, in a climate of fear and uncertainty, this plurality of groups 
led to great insecurity. In 2005, the number of militias, insurgent groups, 
tribal groups, and criminal gangs carrying out attacks exceeded one hundred 
(Filkins 2008). At the same time as the military, police, and other organs of 
the state were disbanded, weapons and ammunition became widely available 
in the marketplace, leading to well-armed civilians and militias and the 
absence of governmental authority (Sahlins 2011).
 Many people fled Iraq after experiencing death threats, kidnappings, or 
other forms of violence in the climate of escalating sectarian violence and un-
rest. A smaller number of Iraqis were forced to leave the country when they 
were targeted as a result of their work (or their perceived affiliation) with the 
US war effort. Iraqis who had worked for the Americans were identified as 
collaborators by militias and subject to threats, kidnapping, or murder. At the 
same time, some Americans who had worked in Iraq and later received pleas 
from their terrorized interpreters and other Iraqi associates were actively 
pressing the US government to assist Iraqis who were in danger because of 
their association with the American war effort ( Johnson 2013).
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IRAQI REFUGEES IN EGYPT AND THE HOPE FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS
 At the height of their displacement, a population of approximately 
150,000 Iraqis sought exile in Egypt (Yoshikawa 2007), primarily in urban 
Cairo. Although Egypt is a signatory to the 1951 refugee convention, it is 
difficult if not impossible for refugees to realize their rights in practice due 
to reservations Egypt has entered to the convention and a lack of imple-
menting domestic legislation. These reservations limit the state’s legal ob-
ligations to refugees, passing most of the administration and management 
of refugee populations onto the UNHCR and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), in an example of what Aihwa Ong (2000) has referred to as 
graduated sovereignty.
 Because of the state’s “benign neglect” (Sadek 2010), Iraqi refugees 
could not work or access public education in Egypt, and they lived with 
precarious residency status, granted on the basis of their refugee claim but 
requiring renewal every six months. Citizenship is conferred on the basis of 
descent in Egypt and thus is not available to refugees. As a result, I found 
that Iraqis did not conceive of Egypt as a home but often spoke of their time 
there as “a station,” “a temporary place,” or “a problem to be solved,” and 
conditions in Egypt contributed to Iraqi refugees’ inability to settle more 
permanently in the country. In visits to my interlocutors’ homes, I often saw 
the material evidence of this existential limbo (Haas 2017): the temporari-
ness of life in Egypt combined with the uncertainty of the resettlement pro-
cess often meant that people lived with their bags packed and ready to go, 
just in case. As my work has illustrated and as has been documented in 
a number of other asylum and migration contexts (El-Shaarawi 2015; Grif-
fiths 2013, 2014; Haas 2017; Horst and Grabska 2015), living in protracted 
waiting can have deleterious effects on refugees’ well-being.
 If any type of meaningful integration into Egyptian society was not 
possible, return was also not an option. By 2010, the UNHCR had assisted 
some three thousand Iraqis to return to their country from countries of 
asylum, although they simultaneously did not formally encourage return 
to Iraq (UN News Service 2010). In 2010, a UNHCR survey found that 
the majority of Iraqi refugees who had returned to Baghdad regretted their 
decision to go back. Among the main reasons cited for this regret were in-
security, economic hardship, and a lack of basic services (UN News Service 
2010). Many who had returned reported being forced to do so because they 
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could no longer afford to live in the countries where they had sought asylum, 
not because they felt that the situation in Iraq had improved.
 As a result, many Iraqi refugees were “stuck” in host countries such as 
Egypt—unable to return to Iraq, integrate in their host societies, or estab-
lish residence elsewhere. These circumstances, combined with policies that 
facilitated the resettlement of Iraqis, led to the importance of resettlement. 
Resettlement promised an escape from a difficult present and an uncertain 
future. It also provided opportunities to imagine an escape to the “Western 
world” (Horst 2006; Jansen 2008) in a context where other possibilities for 
such travel were foreclosed or dangerous. In Cairo, where residency, edu-
cation, health care, and employment were unstable for refugees, the hope 
for resettlement was for more than protection but included the ability to 
rebuild lives following displacement.
RESETTLEMENT AND OBLIGATION
 When I first met Mustafa in 2009, he and other Iraqi refugees were 
in the strange position of seeking protection, in the form of resettlement, 
in the country that arguably was responsible for their displacement in the 
first place. At that time, there were two main ways that Iraqi refugees could 
be resettled to the United States. The first, the US Department of State’s 
so-called Direct Access Program, provided priority processing to Iraqis who 
had aided the US war effort and had been persecuted as a result. This was 
the program from which Mustafa had just been rejected when we met. The 
second was through UNHCR referral, which prioritized refugees who had 
exceptional protection needs in their country of asylum: victims of violence 
and torture, refugees with medical needs that could not be treated in Egypt, 
unaccompanied children, and others who for various reasons could not live 
safely in Egypt. If we think of morality as relational, the first mode of reset-
tlement found its moral logic in allegiance and recompense for sacrifice, while 
the second is based on a more traditionally impartial humanitarian logic 
that privileges need and vulnerability. Both resettlement programs combine, 
in various ways, the securitized and humanitarian logics that increasingly 
characterize the refugee system. Although in many cases these logics repre-
sent a shift from a rights-based, legalistic approach to a humanitarian, moral 
one (Fassin 2005), this shift does not fully account for the dynamics of con-
temporary or historical refugee resettlement. With resettlement, we see a 
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third logic in operation as well, one more clearly associated with a sense that 
the resettlement state is responsible for causing harm and displacement. In 
this chapter, I am interested in considering how the logic of obligation plays 
out in the resettlement process for Iraqi refugees in Egypt.
 Resettlement primarily serves the humanitarian function of “pro-
tection”—it is often intended to be the solution of last resort for refugees 
whose human rights cannot be protected in their current location in exile. 
Yet resettlement policy and practice is not just humanitarian. It often serves 
specific political goals at the same time that it espouses humanitarian aims. 
For the United States, which resettles the largest number of refugees world-
wide, a sense of moral obligation frequently plays into decisions about which 
refugees will be offered the possibility of resettling to the United States and, 
eventually, becoming American.
 From a theoretical perspective, I introduce the question of obligation 
partly to trouble our ideas of the ethics of humanitarianism and human 
rights. Both ethics make universalist claims that are sometimes in conflict 
with one another and are often invoked in tandem, especially in discussion 
about asylum seekers or refugees. As Ilana Feldman and Miriam Ticktin 
(2010) have noted, anthropologists have contributed to our understand-
ing of these universalist claims by offering evidence of the particular and, 
more recently, by turning to the effects of universalist claims making. In 
this chapter, I consider questions of obligation as a bridge between gift and 
entitlement, between humanitarianism and human rights. Questions of 
obligation, in a sense, introduce particularism into universals by creating 
categories of people who might make certain moral claims to humanitarian 
goods—that is, who might be entitled to the gift. Yet the claims of Iraqis 
who worked with the US forces and other organizations in Iraq trouble easy 
distinctions between “us” and “them” based on seemingly clear-cut notions of 
citizenship and inclusion.
 Anthropologists have recently considered how universalist claims, 
transmuted into action, often have particularist effects. Humanitarian or-
ganizations, with limited mandates and means, face what Peter Redfield 
(2013) has termed “the troubling logic of choice.” In some contexts, medical 
and psychological suffering, often developed into evidence through expert 
knowledge and documentation, serves as a proxy to identify “true” refugees 
or asylum seekers (Ticktin 2011; Fassin and d’Halluin 2007). While other 
analyses have focused on the political or antipolitical (Ticktin 2011) effects 
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of these shifts in the context of asylum, I am interested here in thinking 
through the effects of moral claims of obligations on the subjective experi-
ence of refugees seeking resettlement as a lens to considering the connec-
tions between gifts, entitlements, and obligations. To do so, I consider the 
local moralities, to borrow Jarrett Zigon’s (2008) term, surrounding Iraqi 
refugees’ subjective experiences of the Direct Access Program.
 An investigation of the local moralities associated with refugee reset-
tlement reveals the important but contested role that questions of obligation 
play in people’s lives. Michael M. J. Fischer’s (2003) approach to understand-
ing the interaction of people and larger moral systems of societies is a useful 
starting point for considering how the ethics of obligation are experienced, 
negotiated, and constituted through social relations. In order to consider 
these questions in more detail, I turn first to a brief historiography of the 
US resettlement program, with a focus on obligation, and then to some in-
sights from fieldwork with Iraqi refugees as they navigated the resettlement 
program in Cairo.
RESETTLEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
 In US law, the term “refugee” refers specifically to people who have 
been brought to the country through the official government resettlement 
program. Any person who arrives in the United States of his or her own 
volition is categorized as an asylum seeker and, if their claim is granted, they 
become an asylee. While asylees and refugees may have identical claims and 
may undergo similar status-determination procedures, resettled refugees 
must prove their case before they ever reach US territory. They also typi-
cally must meet additional resettlement-specific criteria in addition to being 
determined to fit the definition of a refugee. When asylum seekers enter the 
United States, their presence and their request for asylum triggers certain 
legal obligations on the part of the state. Resettlement is not governed by 
any such entitlements. Refugee resettlement policy in the United States has 
been characterized by a tension between self-interest and humanitarianism 
since its inception. While the 1951 UN refugee convention, the 1967 pro-
tocol, and the United States Refugee Act of 1980 all require that the deci-
sion to provide refugee protection should not be governed by foreign policy 
objectives (Waibsnaider 2006), a brief survey of US refugee resettlement 
indicates that geopolitics play an important role in policy decisions.
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 The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the first US refugee policy, allowed 
for the admission of people who had entered Allied zones in Germany, 
Austria, or Italy prior to 1945—essentially limiting the number of Jewish 
refugees who could claim protection following World War II (Waibsnaider 
2006). The act was described by President Harry S. Truman as “flagrantly 
discriminatory. It mocks the American tradition of fair play” and met with 
sharp public criticism (Bockley 1995). It was subsequently revised twice, 
once in 1950 to include refugees from communist China, and once in 1951 to 
allow for the admission of European refugees who had been displaced after 
1945 (Waibsnaider 2006). By the second half of the twentieth century, the 
United States was focused on admitting refugees from communist countries 
as a way of showing that the citizens of those countries were fleeing, while 
also propping up its image in the world (Waibsnaider 2006). Refugees from 
countries that the United States supported, meanwhile, were rarely granted 
refugee status, instead being cast as “economic migrants” (Bockley 1995). Be-
fore the 1980s, more than 90 percent of refugees admitted to the United 
States were from communist countries.
 The 1980 Refugee Act adopted the United Nations definition of 
a refugee. The act was designed to develop a more uniform resettlement 
process and move US refugee policy away from an emphasis on communism 
and Europeans. However, in 1980 and afterward, the United States contin-
ued to “prioritize refugees who “had close ties to the United States,” whose 
resettlement would further US foreign policy objectives and for whom the 
“United States has stood uniquely as a symbol of freedom from oppression” 
(Espiritu 2014; Tempo 2008). After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there 
was a decline in the numbers of refugees admitted to the United States from 
communist countries but no comparable increase in refugee admissions 
from noncommunist states (Waibsnaider 2006).
 Prior to the resettlement of Iraqi refugees, there were two key in-
stances where the United States admitted refugees in response to a sense 
of moral obligation. In both situations, those resettled were portrayed as 
refugees created by the United States as the direct result of unsuccessful 
interference in foreign countries: Hungarian refugees in 1956 and South 
Vietnamese refugees after the Vietnam War. In 1956, after the Soviet Union 
invaded Hungary to quash an anticommunist popular uprising, the United 
States sent military aid and the Central Intelligence Agency sent weapons 
to support the Hungarian resistance against the Soviet Army. Hungarian 
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fighters were portrayed as “heroes” in the American media (Waibsnaider 
2006; Bockley 1995). Once the revolt was put down, the United States had 
a more subdued response. It eventually admitted more than forty thousand 
Hungarian refugees, more than any other country. While to a certain degree 
one could understand the admission of Hungarian refugees as fitting part 
of the Cold War pattern of refugee admissions, there was a different logic 
at work here. The Hungarians were admitted not just because they feared a 
communist regime but also because they were the “victims of false expecta-
tions about US policy” (Loescher and Scanlan 1998, 54).
 Somewhat similar to that of the Hungarian case, the rationale for the 
admission of South Vietnamese refugees was largely based in a sense of obli-
gation to the former South Vietnamese allies who had fought alongside US 
forces and then were abandoned. In this case, the rationale for their admission 
was less an opportunity to score an ideological victory and more an admis-
sion of moral responsibility. President Gerald Ford explained resettlement 
following the war to the American public in terms of obligation when he said 
that “to do less would have added moral shame to humiliation.” In some ways, 
the large-scale resettlement of South Vietnamese refugees who were associ-
ated with the United States following the end of the Vietnam War would be 
the inspiration and precedent for efforts to resettle so-called Iraqi allies.
 In the first years following the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the numbers of Afghan and Iraqis admitted as refugees to the United States 
were very low, despite the wars both creating new displacement and exacer-
bating existing displacement (Waibsnaider 2006). The rationale for the 
decrease in resettlement from these countries was explained in terms of 
security but may also have been related to a desire to show the American 
public that the United States was “winning hearts and minds.” However, 
as the displacement crisis in the region worsened over time, and as stories 
emerged that demonstrated the threats facing the Iraqis who had worked 
with the US war effort ( Johnson 2013; Packer 2007), public opinion and 
sustained advocacy led to policies to resettle Iraqis, especially those who had 
been harmed because of their support for the US-led occupation.
DIRECT ACCESS TO RESETTLEMENT
 In the years shortly after the US invasion, high-profile advocacy 
campaigns ( Johnson 2013) and media coverage (e.g., Packer 2007) publicized 
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the cases of interpreters who worked directly with the American forces and 
were threatened, kidnapped, or murdered because of their affiliation. Iraqi 
labor was essential to the US military efforts. However, it soon became clear 
that the people who were supplying the expertise and labor were not being 
protected from retribution by those who saw their work as treachery. As a 
result of advocacy efforts, the US government passed the Refugee Crisis in 
Iraq Act in 2008, which included provisions for the resettlement of Iraqi 
allies who had been forced into hiding or exile as a result of their association 
with the American forces. The act was likewise described in terms of obli-
gation. Sen. Ted Kennedy, who sponsored the bill, argued, “America has a 
special obligation to keep faith with the Iraqis who now have a bull’s-eye on 
their backs because of their association with our government.”1
 For Iraqis, the implementation of the act created two parallel paths 
through which they might seek resettlement. They could seek it the tradi-
tional way by approaching the UNHCR, which might then refer them to 
one of about seventeen resettlement countries. I have written in other loca-
tions about how resettlement in this context is typically allocated to refugees 
who are the most vulnerable, such as those with severe medical issues, survi-
vors of psychological trauma, and women and children at risk (El-Shaarawi 
2015). Those who worked with the American forces and were persecuted as a 
result could have what is termed “direct access” and apply for resettlement to 
the United States through an intermediary, the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), bypassing the UNHCR. Iraqis who applied through 
direct access had to prove affiliation with the Americans and then pass a 
number of interviews with the IOM and the Department of Homeland 
Security and undergo security and medical checks before being approved or 
denied for resettlement to the United States. The entire process could last 
months or years and was impenetrably bureaucratic. In itself, the resettle-
ment process was a source of suffering for refugees (El-Shaarawi 2015), and 
its duration and difficulty were likely implicated in the conscious attention 
that refugees brought to the question of obligation.
 The program to resettle Iraqis got off to a slow start. Section 1059 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 initially 
allowed for up to fifty special immigrant visas (SIVs) for Iraqi or Afghan 
translators/interpreters who worked with the US forces in Iraq or Af-
ghanistan and their spouses and children. In 2007, President George W. 
Bush extended the law to authorize five hundred visas for fiscal years 2007 
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and 2008 only. SIVs are classified as permanent employment–based im-
migrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act, even though in this 
case they are not admitted for employment but rather to provide residence 
to individuals who worked with the Americans. While a separate category 
from refugees, the SIV holders would receive the same benefits as reset-
tled refugees on admission to the United States. However, unlike refugees 
who must wait a year before they can apply for permanent residence, SIV 
holders are granted permanent-resident status immediately upon admission 
to the United States. The program expired in 2013, although the application 
process was extended into 2014. From 2007 through the end of 2015, 17,561 
Iraqi individuals, including principal applicants and dependents, had been 
granted SIVs. A second immigrant classification was subsequently intro-
duced in 2008 that provided the opportunity for individuals employed by, 
or on behalf of, the US forces to apply, providing that they had experienced 
“an ongoing, serious threat” as a result of their employment.
 The burden of proof was onerous. In order to be eligible, applicants 
had to have worked with the US forces for at least twelve months, have 
received a favorable written recommendation from a general or flag officer 
from the US unit for which the applicant worked, have passed a background 
check, and not be otherwise inadmissible. For many Iraqis, this was an in-
credibly difficult standard to meet.
MUSTAFA’S CASE
 Prior to 2003, Mustafa had been a police officer in Baghdad. The 
Coalition Provisional Authority did not disband the police after the fall of 
Baghdad, as it did with many other arms of government. However, in the 
period following the war, the police forces and the larger Interior Ministry 
became sites of unrest, with the desertion of large numbers of officers, the 
infiltration (and sometimes outright takeover) of forces by militias, and the 
crystallization of sectarian tensions within the force itself.
 Mustafa recounted assisting the American forces in the early period 
following the invasion, when he felt optimistic that things would change 
in Iraq. When his branch of the police forces was taken over by Shi’a mili-
tants associated with the Mahdi Army, Mustafa, who was Sunni, quickly 
became persona non grata. At that time (2006), hundreds of police offi-
cers were being killed, more than members of the American and Iraqi forces 
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combined. When Mustafa’s own life was threatened, he decided to flee to 
Egypt. Bitterly he said, “I tried to help my country and because of that I 
had to leave.”
 The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act presents a story of obligation to the 
Iraqis who supported the American effort and were persecuted by militias as 
a result. However, Iraqis had a much more complicated accounting of their 
affiliation with the Americans. While association with the Americans might 
bring with it access to the resettlement program, it was difficult to prove and 
also carried social risks. Iraqis had to verify their employment by providing 
a working email access for an American service member or employee of an 
American government organization who could vouch for their service. For 
Iraqis who were directly employed by the American forces, this information 
could be hard to procure, but for those whose affiliation was looser, the chal-
lenge was even greater. Mustafa, whose dealings with the American forces all 
took place while he was working as a police officer, this proof was even harder 
to establish. Mustafa spent a year acquiring a working email address of an 
American who could attest to his assistance, only to subsequently be rejected 
because he had never been directly paid by the Americans. My field notes and 
interviews are full of Iraqis who likewise felt that they had been persecuted 
because of their association with the Americans and who argued they should 
be eligible for resettlement as a result but who did not fit the specific criteria 
for resettlement. There is the man who helped Americans navigate his neigh-
borhood but was never employed by them. There is the family whose home, 
used by American soldiers to pick off snipers along the main road to the 
airport, was identified as the place from which the American bullets came. 
And so forth. All of these individuals said that their association with the 
occupying forces put their lives at risk. To whom does obligation extend?
 Service providers and adjudicators often told me that all refugees 
wanted to be resettled, but in my fieldwork I found that refugees expressed 
much more complicated, and ambivalent, ideas about resettlement to the 
United States. Iraqis often did not tell others, even good friends, that they 
had applied for resettlement. At times, this was because, even in Egypt, they 
did not want to be identified as being associated with the American effort. 
Those who were unsuccessful in their pursuit of resettlement, such as Mus-
tafa, often felt stuck in between. As Mustafa said, “In front of Iraqi people 
I am now a traitor, having cheated my country, and in front of Americans I 
don’t have a case.” While many Iraqis sought resettlement, there were also 
Troubling the Ethics of Durable Solutions in the Age of Suspicion  43
those who found the idea of being resettled to the United States perverse. 
Iraqis routinely approached the organization at which I did much of my 
fieldwork asking to be resettled “anywhere but America,” even if they 
might have worked with the Americans in Iraq and perhaps been eligible 
under the Direct Access Program. Some Iraqis felt deep ambivalence about 
resettling to the United States, a country that they held at least partly re-
sponsible for the fact that they had been forced out of their country. At 
the same time, other Iraqis accused some in the community of fabricating 
claims and affiliations in order to be resettled to the United States. While 
Iraqis’ reasons for seeking resettlement and attitudes toward resettlement 
are topics I take up elsewhere, these examples illustrate the complexity of 
association. On the one hand, affiliation with the Americans created the 
space to make certain claims and possibly receive resettlement. On the other 
hand, there were concerns that working with the Americans might render 
one a “traitor” in the eyes of other Iraqis, as Mustafa feared, as well as some 
ambivalence about resettlement itself.
THE POLITICS OF OBLIGATION
 Mustafa’s case highlights both the challenges of proving obligation 
and his experience of feeling caught in between when his case was rejected. 
However, I would also like to briefly turn to questions of obligation beyond 
the Direct Access Program that emerged in fieldwork. Many Iraqis who 
had not worked with the Americans and so were not eligible for the pro-
gram nonetheless used a rhetoric of obligation to argue for resettlement. In 
some cases, they argued that the United States’ obligation extended beyond 
those who had directly assisted the Americans to all Iraqis who had been 
forced to flee their country because of the war. In other cases, obligation 
was extended beyond the United States and was understood in terms of 
justice. One man with whom I spoke repeatedly articulated a desire to be 
resettled in order to get what he “deserved.” For him and others, resettle-
ment as obligation was not about protection but about their ability to live 
what they determined to be good and fulfilling lives, lives that were not 
possible for them in Egypt.
 In this chapter, I have considered an example of how one man, Mus-
tafa, experienced and engaged with questions of obligation related to refugee 
resettlement. I also introduced questions of obligation as a way of adding 
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nuance to our understanding of the solutions available to address refugee cri-
ses through attention to how processes of status determination are experi-
enced by those who seek to be recognized. Resettlement, more so than other 
humanitarian goods, is limited and available to very few refugees. Also unlike 
other humanitarian goods, resettlement offers the possibility of permanent 
residence, and eventual citizenship, in the country of resettlement. It is often 
assumed that all refugees want to be resettled, an assumption that in some 
ways undergirds the suspicion and mistrust refugees face as part of the re-
settlement process. However, just as obligation is deployed as a rationale for 
resettling some refugees and not others, it is also redeployed by refugees as 
they understand, engage with, and experience the resettlement process.
 The narratives of resettlement policy portray the United States as a 
nation of refuge, belying a more complicated, implicated geopolitical rela-
tionship between refugees, the conflicts that produce them, and the states 
where they ultimately settle. Attention to these complex and often unclear 
relationships troubles simple portrayals of resettlement as an unqualified 
good that all refugees desire. In this way, attention to the complex politics 
of displacement and resettlement may provide a different kind of correc-
tive to the politics of suspicion in which refugees and asylum seekers find 
themselves. Instead of assuming that all refugees want to be resettled, an 
ethnographic lens helps us see how resettlement is influenced by complex 
local and geopolitical relationships.
 A central tension in the literature on asylum, frequently discussed in 
terms of the tension between human rights and humanitarianism and secu-
rity, is that between a state’s obligation to its citizens and its obligations to 
noncitizens. However, the question of to whom states are obligated is a par-
ticularly difficult one to disentangle, depending as it does on time, position, 
who is understood as deserving of protection, and who is understood as a 
potential threat. On the face of it, the resettlement of Iraqis who worked with 
the US forces can be read as a simple morality tale. However, attention to the 
ways in which resettlement was administered and experienced suggests that 
questions of affiliation and obligation are much muddier in practice.
NOTE
1. See Johnson 2013 for a thorough account of the campaign to pass the Refugee 
Crisis in Iraq Act.
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Chapter 2
Geographies of Aspiration and the Politics of  
Suspicion in the Context of Border Control
CHARLES WATTERS
 A t  f i r s t  g l a n c e ,  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s e e k  a s y l u m  m a y  a p p e a r 
unproblematic and unambiguous. Its genealogy can be traced back to the 
right of sanctuary in ancient Greece and similar practices in imperial Rome 
and early Christian civilization (Goldman and Martin 1983). It is enshrined 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 14(1) pro-
vides that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy asylum from perse-
cution in other countries.” However, while signatory countries are normally 
keen to confirm their support for the principles behind the convention, this 
right has been steadily eroding as increasingly hard-line and restrictive asy-
lum policies and practices have been introduced. The rapidity and diversity 
of new measures in the field recalls Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) argument 
that a “state of exception” is present as a practice of government. He defines 
the state as “a point of imbalance between public law and political fact” that 
exists at an “ambiguous, uncertain borderline fringe between the legal and 
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the political” (1). Commenting on the situation in Europe up to the present 
time, government “instead of declaring the state of exception prefers to have 
exceptional laws issued” (21). In the case of asylum seekers and refugees, a set 
of political considerations, not least those construed as linked to terrorism 
and security, routinely provoke the development and implementation of in-
creasingly draconian laws and policies.
 The present chapter examines the gap that has opened between the 
formal right to seek and enjoy asylum and the lived experiences of asylum 
seekers. Far from exercising a clear and legitimate right, those seeking asy-
lum find their very quest for legitimacy called into question. To examine 
this gap, it is helpful to distinguish between entitlement and access and to 
examine asylum seekers’ journeys in the context of what I have defined as 
“geographies of aspiration.” Entitlement and access may be distinguished, 
with entitlement relating to formal conventions, laws, and policies applica-
ble to those seeking asylum, while access relates to the lived experiences of 
asylum seekers within countries of reception, including opportunities for 
education, housing, legal support, and health care (Watters 2008). More-
over, while considerable volumes of literature have focused on legal dimen-
sions of the so-called right to asylum, usually seen as the right to refuge 
or “to seek” asylum, little has been written about the correlative right “to 
enjoy” that asylum (Edwards 2005, 302). In emphasizing the right to enjoy 
asylum, the UDHR itself draws attention to a consideration not only of 
legal entitlements but also, arguably, to questions of access and the quality of 
the lived experiences of asylum seekers as they strive to realize these rights.
 The questioning of the legitimacy of asylum seekers is often repre-
sented as underpinned by two primary concerns. Firstly, asylum seekers may 
raise the specter of a modern-day Trojan horse. Just as the mythological 
horse conveyed a benign image and was welcomed into the city, only for 
enemy combatants to appear in the dead of night to undermine the city’s 
security, so present-day asylum seekers are seen as potential terrorists. US 
president Donald Trump described German chancellor Angela Merkel’s de-
cision to accept more than one million refugees from Syria as a “catastrophic 
mistake,” adding that “people don’t want to have other people coming in and 
destroying their country” (Times [UK], January 16, 2017). Thus, present-day 
asylum seekers may be constructed symbolically as a threat to Western in-
terests and as potentially embodying primitive zealotry and barbarism an-
tithetical to Western values (Morgan 2016). Secondly, while asylum seekers 
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may not necessarily be viewed as would-be terrorists, they are often regarded 
as simply economic migrants using a pretense of persecution as an excuse to 
try to seek more prosperous lives elsewhere.
AGENCY, ASPIRATION, AND THE CIRCUMSCRIBED  
SPACE OF LEGITIMACY
 As noted elsewhere in this volume, political discourse surrounding 
forced migrants in industrialized countries creates a sharp division between 
“genuine refugees” deserving of the support and protection of host countries 
and what are variously referred to as “economic migrants,” “scroungers,” or 
“queue jumpers,” terms used to refer to migrants who are seen as arriving 
spontaneously and who may seek asylum. The first category and the one 
associated with the deserving poor who should be entitled to the host so-
ciety’s support, consists of those who are seen to have fled persecution. As 
such, they are viewed de facto as not exercising agency in choosing a country 
of destination. To suggest that they may have exercised a degree of rational 
choice has the potential to undermine their asylum claims. There is, as such, 
an overriding focus on the predominance of factors that have compelled the 
migrant to leave his or her home country, and this underpins the Dublin 
Convention within the European Union (EU), explicitly in place to deter 
economic migrants from “shopping around” to find a country in Europe with 
the best living conditions. The logic behind this convention is that if asylum 
seekers are genuinely fleeing persecution, they will be happy to have their 
claims considered by the first safe country they arrive in. They will be grate-
ful to be free from persecution and not seek to pick and choose countries of 
destination. Within this context, to talk of those seeking asylum as having 
aspirations toward life in particular countries and not only preoccupied with 
questions of their own safety is to potentially undermine the arguments that 
are the basis of their asylum claims.
 In my view, this polarization between a view of “genuine” refugees who 
lack agency and “bogus” refugees who are making choices with respect to po-
tential destinations is deeply flawed. This dichotomy presupposes that clear 
distinctions can be drawn between those who flee persecution and simply 
aspire to reach any location that offers safety and those who aspire to bet-
ter lives. To evoke a well-known theoretical model from migration studies, 
legitimate asylum seekers are driven completely by “push factors”: real and 
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present dangers that drive them from their homes, communities, and coun-
tries. The idea that asylum seekers may be making a choice in terms of safe 
destinations reveals a preoccupation with pull factors propelling them to 
particular countries and indicates lack of authenticity in asylum claims. A 
binary thus governs perceptions of the legitimacy of asylum seekers: they 
are seen as either passive victims or calculating opportunists. According 
to this logic, the manifestation of agency and aspiration among would-be 
asylum seekers discredits potential asylum claims. For example, the thou-
sands of migrants congregating in northern France desperately seeking 
passage to the United Kingdom cannot be legitimate asylum seekers. Nor 
are those dissatisfied to remain in an EU country such as Malta while 
their claims are being assessed. A legitimate asylum seeker is, according to 
this view, one who is content to reach a destination that is “safe” and thus to 
have escaped danger.
 Arguably this circumscribed view of the asylum seeker raises ques-
tions about the extent to which countries of reception support the right 
to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution enshrined in the UDHR. The 
reference to “enjoy” here suggests more than the realization of immediate 
safety and evokes the quest for a more fulfilled life. This quest is etched ter-
ritorially into what I refer to as “geographies of aspiration,” whereby routes 
are established to take asylum seekers toward destinations that are perceived 
not only as offering safety but also the potential for substantially enhanced 
lives. Routes are generated through intermingling of urgent needs for se-
curity and simultaneously aspirations to lead lives that are valued. The 
so-called Jungle in Calais is one example where in recent years around ten 
thousand migrants have been based at any given time, many from major 
refugee-producing areas such as the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 
Their journeys have taken them across many “safe” countries to the pe-
riphery of Western Europe to seek passage to the United Kingdom.
LEGITIMACY AND THE MORAL ECONOMY
 While a shift away from a politics of compassion toward refugees can 
be discerned in Western Europe in the past two decades, what I have re-
ferred to as a dialectic of belongingness and otherness has a genealogy dis-
cernible in notions in medieval England of deserving and undeserving poor, 
with the latter legitimized through the wearing of “pauper badges” assigning 
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them as appropriate subjects for charitable parish support (Watters 2007; 
Hindle 2004). The deserving poor exist in poverty through no fault of their 
own, either because of illness, accident, age, or lack of available employment. 
The undeserving poor are identified as able-bodied individuals who refuse 
to work and have no justification for doing so (Hindle 2004). The view of 
migrants as constituting a large body of undeserving poor is underpinned 
by ubiquitous representations of them wishing to enter Western countries 
to exploit benefits systems and to engage in criminal activities.
 A contemporary shift toward a discourse of human rights in relation 
to forced migrants can be detected in reductions in the numbers of asy-
lum seekers receiving full refugee status in many industrialized countries 
but simultaneously having enhanced opportunity to be allowed to remain in 
countries of asylum under very specific humanitarian provisions. For asylum 
seekers, the quest for legitimacy rests increasingly on a moral economy in 
which deservingness is associated often with medical, and specifically, men-
tal health problems. Applications for full political asylum are rarely success-
ful, but evidence of health and mental health problems may form the basis 
for the achievement of temporary leave to remain on humanitarian grounds. 
The moral economy is, in this sense, somewhat different from the Aris-
totelian idea of relationships between members of a group or community 
bounded by moral codes and mutual obligations. It is rather crucially linked 
to ideas of the “deserving” or “undeserving” (Watters 2007). Those seeking to 
support asylum seekers are often aware of the importance of emphasizing 
mental health and victimhood (Watters, 2001). Didier Fassin writing on the 
situation of illegal immigrants in France, observed the declining numbers 
receiving political asylum while noting that concomitantly similar numbers 
were receiving leave to remain on the grounds of ill health and in particular 
mental illness (Fassin 2001). Asylum seekers thus occupy specific “problem 
spaces” in which it is not their political bodies—the traditional route of 
legitimation—but their “sick bodies” that offer avenues of access toward 
legitimacy in receiving countries.
 In this sense, the forced migrant represents what Agamben (1998) has 
termed “bare life.” His or her rights are not those of a citizen but reside in 
the sphere of human rights. The rights thus accorded are viewed by Han-
nah Arendt as residual, only available as a result of the most fundamental 
of human attributes—being human (Arendt 2013). Those seeking asylum 
are not accorded legitimacy as potential citizens but as vulnerable and sick 
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populations deserving of compassion only in circumscribed contexts where 
they are eligible for medical and psychological programs of support.
 Within these circumstances, those working as advocates for would-be 
refugees adopt processes of “strategic categorization” in which they respond 
to these predefined opportunities for bio-legitimacy by highlighting the 
problems forced migrants face that are most likely to achieve successful 
outcomes (Watters 2001). In practical terms this may involve, for exam-
ple, constructing legal cases in asylum appeals that point to the presence of 
mental health problems, specifically in many instances posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) in asylum seekers. It is important to point out that this 
should not be seen as an attempt to counter the politics of suspicion by 
inventing problems to enhance legal cases. Rather, those supporting asylum 
seekers are alive to the circumscribed and predetermined avenues to legiti-
macy available within a culture of mistrust and strategically categorize their 
problems to enhance their opportunities for support.
 This is a dimension often missed by authors preoccupied by the po-
litical issues underpinning the ubiquity of diagnosis of PTSD and other 
mental health problems among refugee populations (Fassin and Rechtman 
2009, Bracken, Giller, and Summerfield 1997; Summerfield 2001). Critiques 
have often focused on characterizing global mental health programs for 
forced migrants as manifestations of neocolonial dynamics of a medical 
model and of the power of psychiatry. However, the identification of mental 
health problems among refugees by psychiatrists and other mental health 
professionals may highlight the impact of policies of deterrence and serve 
as a powerful corrective to harsh regimes of detention and deportation. It 
can also act as a counter to the implementation of policies such as lengthy 
asylum processes (Silove, Steel, and Watters 2000; Steel and Silove, 2000).
ENTITLEMENT AND ACCESS
 As noted above, it is important to be mindful of the potential distinc-
tion that may exist between entitlement and access. I have elsewhere defined 
entitlement in this context as referring to the right, enshrined in law and 
policy, to receive a service. Access here refers to the practical, on-the-ground 
reality of migrants’ experiences in seeking and receiving services and support 
they are entitled to (Watters 2011). As such, the concepts have referents at 
a macro level at which law and policy are formulated and at a micro level 
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at which they are implemented. European comparative studies have rou-
tinely failed to distinguish between these two concepts, leading to confused 
judgments to the effect that some countries may be doing well in terms of 
humanitarian responses to asylum seekers and refugees simply because they 
have good, explicit laws and policies in these domains. Stating simply that 
in country X all asylum seekers have a right to all forms of health care may 
tell us little about the real day-to-day experiences of asylum seekers present-
ing themselves at health clinics and trying to see a doctor. Access, in this 
sense, can only be properly analyzed with reference to firsthand experiences 
of local situations.
 Methodologically, it suggests an integrative approach is essential, in-
corporating both documentary research into laws and policies and on-the-
ground, lived engagement with the day-to-day realities of asylum seekers 
themselves. The ongoing situation in Zeebrugge, a port in Belgium through 
which undocumented migrants seek to pass en route to the United King-
dom, is illustrative. The issue of migration through the port came to in-
ternational attention in June 2000 when fifty-eight Chinese migrants were 
discovered dead, having suffocated in the back of a Dutch-registered truck 
intercepted at the Port of Dover in England. The truck had passed through 
the port of Zeebrugge without detection. In another incident, in 2001, the 
bodies of eight Kurdish migrants were discovered in a freight container 
in Wexford, Ireland. Again the truck carrying it had passed through Zee-
brugge, and according to an investigation by the Irish police, the migrants 
had arrived in Ireland “by mistake” as they had intended to go to the United 
Kingdom (Irish Times, December 10, 2001). The horror of these incidents 
added impetus for port authorities to implement measures to detect what 
those working at port authorities euphemistically refer to as “illegals.”
 I made the following record of the process following the detection of 
migrants in trucks in Zeebrugge:
Once discovered, the “illegals” were taken to an annex of three rooms close to the 
police headquarters. The immediate impression was of the dilapidated furniture 
and lack of decoration. One room had two or three desks with ripped coverings 
and a few uncomfortable wooden chairs that looked as though they may have been 
discarded by a local primary school, while in another there were two bedsteads 
covered with thin and dirty looking old mattresses and an old blanket. The walls 
were undecorated, grey and austere save for one which had a surprising and 
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initially incongruous graffiti display that centred on the image of a frightened 
looking young bald figure with bloodshot eyes. The police explained that they 
had involved the local primary school in this, as they “wanted them to feel part 
of things.” The rooms carried an almost tangible atmosphere of fear and sadness 
and the image of the figure seemed strangely appropriate. A third room was used 
for filming, photographing and fingerprinting the “illegals” and included some 
rudimentary equipment for these purposes. Thinking about the migrants’ physical 
needs after a long an arduous journey I made an enquiry about washing facilities. 
The police advised that there used to be a shower but it wasn’t practical to retain 
it. “Who would wash the towels?” one policewoman remarked drawing her hand 
over an imaginary pile of towels with a look of disgust. The minimal facilities did 
not include access to health care and the police experienced considerable difficulties 
in getting a doctor to attend to sick migrants. One migrant had recently arrived 
with an injured leg, and the police recounted spending all day on the phone trying 
to get help without success. Within the resources available to them, the police did 
try to give intercepted migrants a cup of tea and a little food, supplied by the Red 
Cross before they went on their way.
 The police advised that if migrants asked for asylum, they were to be 
told that they would have to go to Brussels to apply, and they were given an 
address to go to. This situation had changed ten years later in 2016 when 
a much more formalized procedure had been established. Migrants were 
offered the necessary documents to apply for asylum in Belgium, but in in-
terviews with police in 2016, they reported that migrants chose overwhelm-
ingly to take their chances and to continue to seek some way of getting to 
the United Kingdom, no matter what the risks involved. Migrants were con-
cerned about being “put on record” on the grounds that, if the application 
were formally recorded, this would show that they had made a claim for 
asylum in Belgium and consequently they could be returned to Belgium 
under the terms of the Dublin Convention. According to the convention, 
asylum seekers can be returned to the country in which they made their first 
application for asylum.
 Initially the police could be characterized as exercising a “light touch” 
toward would-be asylum seekers to minimize the chances of an asylum 
claim being formally made. Indeed, the processes and physical environment 
appeared designed to convey the overall message to migrants and potential 
asylum seekers that there was nothing in Belgium for them and that they 
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should get on their way to their anticipated destination. The minimal pro-
cedures adopted deterred migrants from claiming asylum, with all its legal 
and welfare implications, and indirectly encouraged continued attempts to 
reach the United Kingdom. While procedures at Zeebrugge have become 
more formalized in the past decade, this has, if anything, generated a more 
unwelcoming atmosphere. Migrants are held is stark, windowless cells, 
and the only facilities for rest is on gray concrete slabs. They are pro-
cessed in authoritarian and bureaucratized ways in which they are given 
numbers that are called out when they are released from cells. Police dealing 
with them wear protective clothing to ensure there is no direct physical con-
tact. Commenting on a parallel situation of apprehended undocumented 
children found by US Border Patrol officers, Jacqueline Bhabha and Mary 
Crock (2007) note, in a telling phrase, that “the children these officials meet 
are often physically located on US territory, but not considered legally pres-
ent” (34). They note that some of those who do not have valid visas will be 
turned away immediately before ever being admitted to the country, while 
others will be given an option of voluntary return as an alternative to ap-
pearing in court. In the case of Zeebrugge, the migrants may be seen as 
present only in a sanitized and bureaucratized context of “bare life.”
STRATEGIES, TACTICS, AND “PROBLEM SPACES”
 Suspicion of migrants in border areas may be characterized as governed 
by processes of nonincorporation (Watters 2008). As indicated through the 
employment of a framework that distinguishes between entitlement and ac-
cess, analysis of procedures and policies reveals only one dimension of this 
phenomenon. Nonincorporation is not only manifested in the tangible sets 
of rules and protocols governing the reception of undocumented migrants 
but also in the physical environments in which they are placed and in the 
bureaucratized manner of their processing. As argued above, they are gov-
erned by states of exception in which perceived threats of a mass influx of 
migrants from poorer countries leads to the introduction of specific rules 
aimed at deterrence (Agamben 1995). The desired position of “host” coun-
tries appears one in which the asylum seekers go through necessary proce-
dures with a minimal impingement on welfare and social-care institutions 
and resources. To use a phrase adopted for a study of British immigration 
controls, they may be seen as such as being “governed at a distance” (Morris 
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1998). Moreover, suspicion is ubiquitous, and strategies of nonincorporation 
are linked to a view of migrants as untrustworthy. This perspective under-
pins the routine official skepticism accorded, for example, the claims for asy-
lum made by undocumented children arriving at borders. As Nadine Finch 
(2004), a barrister working with child asylum seekers, has argued in her 
extensive study of the UK system:
There appears to be an almost universal culture of disbelief within 
the Immigration and Nationality Directorate in relation to asylum 
applications from unaccompanied or separated children and there is no 
evidence of a liberal application of the benefit of the doubt to children’s 
applications. For example, trafficked children and child soldiers are 
regularly refused asylum on the basis that their accounts of persecution are 
unpersuasive even when there is considerable corroborating evidence. (194)
 While states of exception may be seen as governing strategies of non-
incorporation, a governmentality approach is useful in the examination of 
processes of biolegitimacy and the attendant emphasis on the sick or dam-
aged refugee. A broadly conceptualized governmentality approach suggests 
an investigative and methodological orientation that encompasses the pro-
cesses whereby refugees are categorized and embedded in specific discursive 
formations. Its orientation is toward analysis of the ways in which refugee 
children are incorporated into societies through specific avenues of access 
and forms of legitimacy. This field of enquiry encompasses forms of incor-
poration identified by Aihwa Ong (2003) whereby refugees become “new 
kinds of subjects, mastering the codes and rules of bona fide refugees, com-
pliant aid recipients” (65).
 Central here is a focus on migrants and in the way they interpret and 
respond to the very problem spaces that they are placed within or, in terms 
employed by Michel de Certeau (1988), their use of tactics within the strate-
gic spaces available to them. In doing so, they demonstrate that even within 
the most controlled and bureaucratized situations, manifestations of aspi-
ration and agency are present. These may find material form through the 
setting up of informal networks of companionship and support, informal 
cafés, and artistic and educational outlets (such as libraries in the Jungle and 
a café in a large tented “open center” for asylum seekers in Malta). Not only 
migrants and refugees but also the various intermediaries—or what Ste-
phen Castles and Mark J. Miller (2009) refer to as “meso”-level actors who 
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represent migrants in various institutional contexts, be they health centers, 
social work offices, immigration courts, and so on—respond to and may 
resist political and economic structures. Like the Cambodian refugees in 
Ong’s (2003) study of the interfaces between refugees and institutions in 
California, they do not simply absorb the designations and problems as-
cribed to them but also respond to them often in astute tactical ways to 
enhance their own opportunities. Accounts of the meanings migrants 
make of the circumstances they find themselves in are, of course, nothing 
new and are pervasive in the humanities and social sciences. In the case of 
refugees where a preponderance of research has focused on mental health 
status, such accounts are emerging belatedly owing to ubiquitous represen-
tations of forced migrants as passive victims of circumstances.
ENGAGING WITH ASPIRATIONAL DIMENSIONS  
OF FORCED MIGRATION
 Is it not the case, however, that save for circumstances of immediate 
danger, such as just before or during an attack on a village, within pro-
cesses of flight there is always an intermingling of fear and aspirations? Just 
as agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
seeks “durable solutions” to refugee problems, is it not the case that forced 
migrants seek both freedom from persecution and the chance of experienc-
ing living conditions in which there are opportunities for education, jobs, 
and housing? As demonstrated here, what I refer to as this “aspirational” di-
mension of forced migration is present in the well-documented movement 
of migrants across Europe and, indeed, in the large-scale secondary migra-
tion to the United Kingdom of migrants who had received refugee status 
in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. It is also present in the highly 
controlled and bureaucratized environments of countries in which asylum 
seekers survive waiting to hear if they will be allowed to remain.
 Thus, understanding the particular flows of migrants and refugees in 
contemporary Europe and, indeed, globally requires not only analysis of the 
politics of risk and of push factors, be they political and/or economic, but 
also what I would describe as a “geography of aspiration.” Migrants experi-
encing ongoing destitution in camps in Calais or huddled in bus shelters 
and outside churches in Zeebrugge are driven by powerful aspirations of a 
better life elsewhere. To achieve this life, they will take extraordinary risks, 
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including ongoing exploitation by gangs, being rounded up and imprisoned 
by police, and having their makeshift homes burned down. This endurance 
is in the context in which would-be asylum seekers are viewed as making 
choices to move from one “safe” European country to another “safe” Euro-
pean country. Rigorous research requires engagement with the texture of 
these aspirations and dreams. Commentators have noted that far from being 
ill-informed people duped by smugglers and traffickers, many of these mi-
grants are well read and well informed (Yaghmaian 2005). Arguably, the de-
sire to move from, for example, France or Belgium to the United Kingdom 
is driven by an astute sense that, as a person from a black and/or minority 
group, one has a better prospect of leading a successful and fulfilled life in 
the United Kingdom than in other European countries. In this context, it 
is notable that many former asylum seekers who have achieved refugee sta-
tus in Nordic countries and the Netherlands have made subsequent moves 
to the United Kingdom in the hope of a better life. For example, Oxford 
University’s Migration Observatory found that of 141,000 people, 7 percent 
of those who came to the United Kingdom under EU rules were born out-
side Europe. Somalis are one of the biggest such groups, with an estimated 
20,000 coming to the United Kingdom from the Netherlands alone. Stud-
ies show that between one third and a half of the entire Dutch Somali com-
munity has moved to the United Kingdom (Guardian, January 28, 2013).
 The movement to the United Kingdom had nothing to do with an 
idea of achieving improved welfare benefits, as the countries these migrants 
had initially settled in had generally better welfare provision than the United 
Kingdom. Rather, migrants were influenced by an idea that they could lead 
a more fulfilled life for themselves and their families there, including getting 
better employment and having better access to educational opportunities 
and social mobility. Migration to the United Kingdom shows a dynamic of 
push and pull factors, with an ongoing desire to improve circumstances. The 
ubiquitous politics of suspicion governing contemporary migration views 
evidence of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers having any desire 
beyond safety as pointing to their lack of legitimacy. Evidence that journeys 
may have also been taken to fulfill dreams and aspirations is seen as indicat-
ing that the initial grounds for leaving migrants’ home countries are ques-
tionable. Until it is recognized that monumental forced movements across 
continents are governed both by desires to escape danger and dreams of a 
better life, appropriate responses to migrants’ plights will not be achieved.
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Chapter 3
A “Politics of Protection” Aimed at Mayan  
Immigrants in the United States
JOHN B. HAVILAND
 H a l f  a  c e n t u r y  a g o ,  a s  a  f l e d g l i n g  e t h n o g r a p h e r ,  I  s t a r t e d 
learning Tzotzil, a Mayan language spoken in the highlands of Chiapas, 
Mexico. I never imagined that I would spend part—sometimes all—of al-
most every year since then living in Chiapas and continuing to learn about 
the place, its people, and their social lives. By official count the absolute 
number of speakers of Indian languages in Chiapas continues to grow (from 
809,000 in 2000 to about 1,142,000 in 20101), of whom about a third are 
speakers of Tzotzil.2 Chiapas, in the far southeastern corner of Mexico—the 
last place in the country before you hit Guatemala—is one of the handful 
of Mexican states whose population is a quarter or more Indian (although 
speaking an indigenous language is a less reliable marker of ethnic identifi-
cation or ancestry than it might once have been).
 I went to Chiapas first to study indigenous stringed-instrument music, 
and I continued to return “to the field” to learn about other things, from 
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Tzotzil grammar, gossip, and gestures to prices, “positionals,” politics, pro-
cessions, and places. I still spend about a week every couple of months in 
my adopted home in the community of Zinacantán. But the “field” I went to 
first in 1966 has, strikingly, now also come to me.
 The present excursion into asylum research is hardly more than a 
footnote to activities with a quite different trajectory—namely, exploring 
the vicissitudes, both analytic and practical, of providing interpretation for 
speakers of Tzotzil, a large number of whom now live far from Chiapas 
throughout Mexico and the United States. Many are, indeed, my neighbors in 
California. When they run afoul of the law or other bureaucracies, they need 
interpretation—whether of words, gestures, experiences, or knowledge— 
and I have become one of the few people who can (at least try to) provide it. 
Interpretation, in turn, is almost always at the heart—although perhaps a 
routinely occluded heart—of pursuing and adjudicating asylum.
 To anticipate briefly: the editors of this volume proposed that we con-
sider a “politics of suspicion” that arises from a wider set of political ideolo-
gies and practices applied to the processes by which people seek, are granted, 
are denied, or are otherwise condemned to different sorts of immigration 
status, occasionally including political asylum. I intend, first, to show how 
“seeking asylum” is just one of the many interrelated sorts of activities, with 
associated legal and institutional ramifications, that my Tzotzil acquain-
tances must engage with as they traverse landscapes, cross borders, and 
search for places to live and work. More substantively, I mean to stand the 
notion of “suspicion” upside down by looking at those cases where, in a seem-
ing contradiction, under the rubric of care or “protection” (in both its more 
and less benevolent senses—for the latter, recall the notion of “protection 
racket” associated with organized crime) asylum is coerced upon perhaps 
unwilling recipients. In the cases I have worked on, these reluctant asylum 
seekers are Tzotzil children. Very briefly, I will also relate these situations to 
a distinct but, in my opinion, ideologically closely linked bureaucracy, that of 
American family law and dependency courts, and in particular how Tzotzil 
immigrants are sometimes affected by them.
IMMIGRATION HISTORY OF TZOTZILES
 Individuals from “my” village in Chiapas ventured sporadically north-
ward several decades ago. The first man that I knew personally to emigrate, a 
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godchild of mine, left in 1976 after a tumultuous marital drama. He was last 
heard from in Hollywood a little more than a decade ago, when his family 
dispatched me to Los Angeles to try, unsuccessfully as it turned out, to track 
him down. In the mid-1980s, two cousins from the village made their way to 
Oregon. One of these men immediately and inexplicably died, but the other 
remains in Oregon to this day. He brought his son to live with him in 2001, 
paying professionals to smuggle him into the country. (It took five tries.) By 
that time, a massive outmigration had begun from southern Mexico, with 
people from the poorest parts of the country coming north to cross the bor-
der in search of work: non-Indian ladinos (i.e., Spanish-speaking Mexicans) 
from throughout the state of Chiapas were joined by indigenous people, 
including Tzotzil speakers from many different Indian communities. Tzot-
zil speakers are now spread across the United States, with large pockets in 
perhaps unexpected places. Several thousand Chiapas Indians live semiper-
manently in Tampa, for example, not to mention in cities and towns on both 
coasts, and others are scattered just about everywhere in between.
 Indians have a largely invisible place in the long and complex immigra-
tion history of Mexicans and other Latin Americans to the United States. 
Because this is true even at the level of academic scholarship on immigration 
(but see Cornelius, Fitzgerald, and Fischer 2007), one can only imagine how 
much more Indians are effaced in the day-to-day practices and bureaucracies 
surrounding immigration. Whereas for Mexicans in general the distinction 
between Indian (indígena being the preferred Spanish euphemism, as opposed 
to indio) and non-Indian (mestizo or ladino) is ever-present and usually sa-
lient, for most North Americans it almost never arises—a Mexican being 
simply a Mexican (and usually poor and presumed undocumented to boot).
 Moreover, since with a few notable exceptions native North American 
Indian languages in the United States have been rubbed nearly out of ex-
istence, surviving largely in the revitalization and salvage efforts of the few, 
the fact that Latin American indigenous people speak many different robust 
first languages belonging to diverse language families totally unrelated to 
Spanish is even less familiar an idea than that there might be different “sorts” 
of people in the Mexican immigrant population. The rubrics of identity are 
complex and variegated, with different levels of resolution or granularity de-
pending on how closely one cares to look.3
 Since Tzotziles like other Chiapas Indians are relative newcomers 
among indigenous Mexican immigrants to the United States, the language 
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is essentially unknown to American authorities. Because I am almost unique 
as a fluent Tzotzil speaker who also knows English, I have over the past de-
cade moonlighted as a Tzotzil interpreter, motivated at first by a vague sense 
of responsibility to give a voice to Tzotzil speakers in contexts where they 
seemed, to their disadvantage, to lack one, and, as demand increased, taking 
on the new “profession” as an object of analytical attention in its own right.
INTERPRETING FOR TZOTZILES IN  
AMERICAN BUREAUCRATIC CONTEXTS
 Although I did forensic linguistic consultation in Chiapas after the 
infamous Acteal massacre of 1997,4 I came only gradually into formal in-
terpreting in the United States, both in courts and in other contexts (such 
as emergency health calls from hospitals and other social service agencies 
around the country), to fill a growing need. I see from my records that I 
have interpreted for Tzotzil speakers on average once or twice a week con-
tinuously for most of the past decade. The great bulk of this interpretation 
is in courtrooms, interpreting for people accused of offenses related to their 
undocumented status in the United States, although there are criminal, 
civil, and dependency cases as well. Most Tzotzil speakers in the United 
States are not only “undocumented” but also condemned both to a legal 
shadow and to poverty, with associated liabilities. They are, furthermore, 
subject to unfamiliar norms of acceptable behavior. For example, and tan-
gentially relevant to the main point of this essay, Tzotzil men and women 
are often completely ignorant of the existence of the American crime of 
“statutory rape,” which involves even consensual sexual relations with 
underaged people, who are by American law legally incapable of giving con-
sent in the first place.
A POLITICS OF “PROTECTION”
 If I interpret telephonically and am thus invisible, my Tzotzil is just 
good enough that Tzotzil speakers can perhaps convince themselves that I 
come from some distant village where people talk funny. But no amount of 
linguistic training can be enough, in the moment, for rendering into intel-
ligible Tzotzil the sorts of matters that routinely arise in most courts. My 
fragmentary, truncated, extemporaneous, and often stilted engagements 
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with emigrant Tzotzil speakers—although sometimes frighteningly con-
sequential—are also often riddled with gaps, confusions, missteps, and plain 
errors. But if this is true for me—an ethnographic old-timer—how much 
more true is it for the bureaucrats dealing with Tzotzil speakers before 
they get me on the phone? Interpreting provides a rich, if strange, source 
for ethnographic insight into other exotic folk: lawyers, judges, mediators, 
social workers, police, Border Patrol agents, professional translators—even 
doctors, nurses, insurance adjustors, prison guards, and agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
 Nonetheless, I rely on a peculiar and extraordinarily partial window 
onto the phenomena of interest, what as an ethnographer I consider a kind 
of binocular tunnel vision. (Imagine looking through binoculars turned 
around the wrong way.) It is “binocular” because, unlike other participants, 
I have access, albeit selective and imperfect, to both sides of the chasm that 
yawns between parties who have no shared language. But it is tunnel vision 
because it is randomly focused and anarchically incomplete: peering through 
a window rendered ever smaller by the fact that I do not choose my own 
cases or occasions but interpret only when I am asked to do so. What is 
more, most often my contact is limited to brief exchanges on the telephone.
 With these caveats, let me introduce my main business in this chapter. 
Limits of space prevent me from presenting the cases of interest in more 
detail, so I will largely content myself with a plain narrative of the events and 
issues rather than indulge my normal linguist’s inclination to overburden the 
reader with detailed interactional extracts.
 Predictably, the grand bulk of the cases for which I am asked to inter-
pret involve undocumented immigrants, and the results are simple and pre-
dictable. Charges are brought; threats are issued linked to the prescribed jail 
terms associated with those charges; a plea bargain is quickly struck between 
prosecutor and defender; the defendant, once he (and in almost every case 
it is a “he”) understands his options, readily agrees, pleads guilty, serves out 
a term (which ranges from “time served” to several years in jail, usually with 
fines waived, depending on the charges and the criminal or immigration 
history); and he is subsequently deported to the border or to the interior 
of Mexico. Trials are almost unheard of in the courts that employ me, and 
my main function seems to be to lend a kind of procedural legitimacy to the 
massive incarceration and deportation of certain indigenous Mexicans (see 
Haviland 2003).
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 As almost the only “qualified” Tzotzil-English interpreter in the 
United States, however, I am sometimes recruited for more unusual cases. 
Transcript 1 is a fragment from a telephone call that came to me out of the 
blue one afternoon in 2011 from an Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) agent located in Mississippi. After introducing himself and his co-
present supervisor (lines 1–10) using a kind of familiar police-like bureau-
cratese, he invited me to open a conversation with “D,” the “young man” in 
detention who had been tentatively identified as a Tzotzil speaker:
(1) D, initial call
1 ice:  if you care to .  just engage a .
2  brief dialogue .  to identify whether you can  
  communicate with=5
3    [6
4 jbh:   I will do s-
5 ice: = this . young man I would be most grateful
6 jbh: I will do so
7  uh, can you hear me alright?
8  your volume is a little bit low but I can hear you
9 ice: OK, I hear you just fine
10 jbh: OK
11 (1.4)7
As is my normal practice, I tried first to verify whether or not the person 
on the other end of the line was really a Tzotzil speaker by forcing him to 
respond appropriately to the ritualized salutation mi li’-ot-e (Q here-B2s-
CL8)—“Are you here?”—followed by what would be the correct address 
form given our relative ages, in this case the young man’s first name (line 14). 
As often happens, my abrupt and contextually unexpected shift to Tzotzil 
took D by surprise, as evidenced by the long hesitation (line 15), even after 
my double repetition (lines 16 and 20)—the first of which I think the ICE 
agent, who had no idea what Tzotzil sounds like, thought to have been gar-
bled by the phone connection. After another noticeable pause, D checked 
that he had heard me correctly (line 21), and then after another repetition 
(line 22) he responded normally in his own dialect of Tzotzil, li’-un-e (here-
B1-CL)—“I am here” (line 23):




14  mi li’ote D
  Are you here, D?
15 (2.2)
16  D, mi li’ote
  D, are you here?
17  [
18 ice: uh, it was a little broken, try it again please
19 jbh: D, mi li’ote?




22 jbh: mi li’ote?
  Are you here?
23 d: li’une
  I’m here. 
 This was, of course, all I needed to establish that D was in fact a Tzot-
zil speaker, if a somewhat reluctant one. Because this was not a regimented 
courtroom interview, I began, as is also my custom whenever given license 
to do so, to converse informally with D to try both to find out more about 
the kid (as kid he was, at least judging by his voice) and to alert him conver-
sationally to the possibility that, unlike the ICE agent, I might be some sort 
of normal, knowledgeable human being:
24 jbh: ali, buy nakalot che’e, buy lalik tal?
  So, where do you live? Where have you come from?
25 (0.9)
26 d: ali ta: 
  Uh, from-
27 (0.8)
28  ta: 
  From-
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29  ta mejiko
  From Mexico
30 jbh: ji’, jna’oj onoxe pero buy la-
  Yeah, I know that, but where are you-
31  buy laparajele, buy lateklumale
  Where’s your village? Where’s your town?
32 (0.9)
33 d: ali: 
  Um
34 (0.6)
35   chamula
36 jbh: pero bu junukal, buy parajele un?
  But from which- which hamlet?
37  ta san juan chamula xkaltik




40 jbh: a pero k’usi parajel un, buy nakal latot lame’ un
  Ah, but from which hamlet? Where do your mother and father live?
41 (1.4)
42 d: ta V**
  In V**.
43 jbh: buy la
  Where did you say?
44 d: V**
  V**
45 jbh: a bweno, pero te ta mero chamula un ma’uk ta
  Ah, ok, but that’s really in Chamula, not-
46  te- ma’uk ta jobel
  not in San Cristóbal
47 (0.5)
48 d: ma’uk, ta mero chamula
  No, in real Chamula. 
 D’s responses were cautious and characteristically uninformative 
(Haviland and Haviland 1982, 1983), although I pressed him for details in 
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part to let him know that I actually knew something about what sort of 
person he was and where he must come from. However, when I started to 
get into real identifying details—his full name and especially his age—he 
once again began to stonewall. Note the nearly two second pause following 
my question at line 50. 
49 jbh: a
50  k’usi ora latale ali-
  So when did you come? Uh-
51  k’usi lek labie, mi ja’ onox k’u cha’al yaloj li vinik naxe?




 Once we actually launched the routine interrogation of personal infor-
mation, D paused only briefly when calculating his age and birthdate:
54 jbh: k’usi lek labie, mi ja’ onox
  What’s your real name, is it the same
55  k’u cha’al yaloj li vinik naxe?
  as what the man said earlier?
56 d: ja’
  Yes.
57 jbh: ali, k’usi sjol abie?
  So, what’s your family name?
58 d: D**** P. G.
59 jbh: D. ma’uk domingo?
  D., not Domingo?
60 (2.2)
61  Bueno, este...
  OK, so-
62 (0.5)
63  i albon lek noxtok, k’usi ora vok’emot, jayib ajabilal?
  Tell me the truth, when were you born, how old are you?
64  (0.7)







68 jbh: pero mi ch’unbil, k’usi ta jabilal lavok’ che’e?
  But is that believable? What year were you born then?
69 (0.9)
70 d: ta 1990
  In 1990.
71 jbh: a . bueno
  Ah OK.
72  mala to
  Wait a second. 
The ICE agent, who had been waiting patiently for me to verify that I could 
speak with the kid and who was trying his best to pick out any familiar 
Spanish loans from the stream of conversational Tzotzil, had clearly at this 
point understood that I was asking about D’s age. He stopped me, with a 
chuckle, when he heard the boy state his supposed birth year, saying that the 
boy had been “coached” to claim he was about five years older than computer 
databases—and his appearance—indicated. He then began to let me, the 
interpreter, in on a few details of his own investigation of the case:
73 ice: (hehh hehh)
74  (hhh) yeah, he’s been— he’s been coached 
75  to say that, he originally gave
76  1994 as his date of birth
77 jbh: aha
78 ice: and he was previously arrested
79  um
80  uh, down on the border
81  where he gave 1995 as uh
82  date of birth
83 jbh: right
84 ice: but I believe he’s 
85  beginning to see 
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86  that this . uh .status as a juvenile is 
87  beginning to cause him more headache than he cares for 
 The ICE agent—being observed by his superior—had a prepared 
script from which he must work. He also had a specific goal: to get D, who 
he thought was an undeportable minor child, onto an airplane to a holding 
facility within a matter of a few short hours. D was potentially “undeport-
able” because he was probably underage and had (as far as the agent had 
been able to determine) no responsible adults who could vouch for him in 
the United States or guarantee his safety should he be returned to Mexico. 
On the other hand, D had his own “agenda”: to break through the coercive 
structure of his engagements with the migra (as the border-protection peo-
ple are called in Mexican Spanish), who were forcing him to talk about his 
age and contacts in the United States. By contrast, what mattered most to 
him—at least when he finally began to talk to me (see transcript 2, line 9 
below)—was his debt (money borrowed for his transport north, which had 
to be paid off to moneylenders in his community at 15 percent monthly in-
terest), and his need to work to pay it off.
MULTIPLE ENGAGEMENTS AND ORDERS  
OF ENGAGEMENT IN INTERPRETING
 The minimal interpreting context is necessarily one of multiactivity: it 
is logically triadic, involving minimally three bundled participants: a speaker 
in language 1, an interpreter, and a recipient in language 2. The interpreter 
is mechanically a kind of pivot, whose transparency as a ratified participant 
varies widely with the micropolitics of the institution in question. (Further 
decomposed roles in Goffmanian participant structure [Goffman 1979] are 
variably transformed in such engagements, with different roles sometimes 
erased, as can be seen in the play of pronouns in many of my extracts.)
 All engagements, of course, alter or transform the entities engaged or 
call them into question—blunting or erasing distinctions (between per-
sons and objects, for example) or enhancing or widening categorical dif-
ferentiation. In the case of interpreting encounters, such transformations 
include converting Latinos into Mexicans and then into Indians, speakers 
into mutes, possible citizens into aliens, and persons into (various sorts of ) 
nonpersons. Interpreting, paradoxically, sometimes renders speakers of a 
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disadvantaged language totally deaf and dumb (as interactions between in-
terpreter and speakers of the dominant language may begin to predominate, 
as we shall see).
 There is a further conceptual multiplicity, since the people for whom 
the interpretation is required are usually not very much alike, neither with 
respect to their experiences and background nor their aims and purposes in 
the business at hand. For example, the immigration agent needed to con-
firm D’s basic biography before sending him to juvenile detention. D, on the 
other hand, had quite different concerns that he was itching to put on the 
discursive table. Here is a further brief fragment, when the agent asked me 
to confirm when D had come to the United States:
(2) Feb 21, 2011– “when did you leave to come from there?”
1 jbh: k’usi ora lalok’- lalok’ tal te yo une?
  What time did you leave there to come here?
2 (0.8)
3 D: mu’yuk to jal
  It hasn’t been long.
4 jbh:  mu’yuk to jal?
  It hasn’t been long.
5 D:  ch’abal to jal
  It’s not yet long.
6 jbh: k’usi van- k’usi van k’ak’alil,
  About what- About what date? 
7  k’usi van ta ual
  About what month?
8 (0.5)
9 D: mu’yuk to sutem o kil xtok,
  Also, my debt hasn’t yet been paid off; 
10  ep to kil (‘o)
  I still have a lot of debt (from traveling here). 
Here D, carefully avoiding my question about dates and the amount of time 
he had already been in the United States working, brought up the matter 
of his outstanding debt. Nonetheless, following the ICE agent’s agenda, I 
pressed D about his birthdate.
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11 jbh: aa
12  a bweno, pero entonse, k’usi- k’usi lek
  Oh, OK. But so, what- uh – really what
13  ali:
  Uh-
14  k’usi lek ali fechail lavok’ un che’e
  What date were you really born then?
15  (1.1)
16 D: ta mil novesyento noventaynweve . noventa
  In 1999- uh, 90,
17 jbh: k’usi- k’usi k’ak’alil un?
  On what- what day?
18 (1.9)
19 ice:  ((laughs softly)) 
Once again, the ICE agent, able only to pick Spanish numbers out of the 
Tzotzil stream, inferred that D was continuing to give me an improbable 
birthdate.
20 D: ja’, jna’tik une
  Who knows?
21 jbh: mu xana’ k’usi ta ual
  Don’t you know in what month?
22 (0.5)
23 D: mu jna’
  I don’t know.
24 jbh: a bweno pwes
  Ah, OK then.
25 (0.6)
Of course, it is rarely the case that Tzotzil speakers know their exact 
birthdates—a highly irrelevant datum of information for Indian life, except 
in certain bureaucratic contexts. Asking someone for an exact age may often 
elicit an approximate decade instead. Because I had heard the ICE agent 
chuckle, I returned to the previous conspiratorial dialogue with him.
26 jbh: so he continues to say-- he was born in a - in a -
27  community called X***
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28  of Chamula which is right -
29  very, basically right next to San Cristobal
30  and he’s uh-
31  he says that he doesn’t know his-
32  date or month of birth
33  and continues to give the year of 1990
34 (0.5)
35 ice: OK, um
36  that’s consistent with the uh
37  the uh coaching,
38  however he provided his date and month of
39  birth twice correctly
40  uh, according to our records which
41  was 11/13 of ninety-five
42  when he was arrested by the border patrol
 Notice how this particular “engagement” between the immigration 
agent and D, mediated by my own somewhat different engagement with 
D, is also informed by multiple previous encounters which in Bakhtinian 
fashion shadow the present one.9 So, there are the ICE agent’s previous con-
versations with D (in Spanish) and those of Border Patrol agents in previ-
ous encounters documented in ICE and other computer records, when this 
same boy was allegedly detained on earlier occasions while attempting to 
cross the border. In similar fashion, D’s mention to me of his debt conjures 
a series of well-known scenarios in which Tzotzil speakers borrow money 
from one another, with a frighteningly familiar set of expectations about 
repayment, interest, and the likely consequences of default.
 Here we encounter what (borrowing a metaphor from Silverstein 
2003) could be called different orders of engagement: a first-order engage-
ment between principals and interpreter builds upon second-order past 
engagements—some directly experienced, others narrated, others only al-
luded to in the shadows—which in turn build upon still higher orders of 
remove. As an ethnographically faithful translator trying to manage the in-
teractive exchange of meaningful information between interlocutors, I may 
need to reimagine and (at least provisionally) render prior engagements 
between narrators and narrated protagonists, and so on, for indeterminate 
further orders of engagement.
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A PROPER “ASYLUM” CASE
 Let me temporarily leave D as I left him that afternoon, in the clutches 
of the migra in Mississippi and move back in time about four years, to when 
I was originally induced to become a “certified” Tzotzil interpreter for the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the agencies that provide 
all official interpreters for US immigration courts.10
 My first official immigration case involved a then fifteen-year-old girl 
who had been detained by immigration authorities in Florida, where she had 
been reported to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for working il-
legally as a domestic servant in a private home. From Florida she had been sent 
to a women’s detention center in Arizona to await deportation, and there she 
had come to the attention of a legal nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
that specializes in immigration law and minor children. One of the lawyers 
had befriended the girl, “R,” and determined that she had limited Spanish and 
was probably a native speaker of Tzotzil. An Internet search turned up my 
name, and the lawyer called to ask me whether I would consider pro bono 
work on the girl’s case, explaining that because R had apparently been the vic-
tim of sexual trafficking, and given what she could learn of the child’s family 
circumstances, the NGO hoped to apply for protection and legal status for 
R by having her declared an “unaccompanied alien child” under US law, thus 
coming under the purview of the Convention on Rights of the Child, which 
puts issues of a child’s safety before any considerations of his or her legal 
status. It was imperative, if I were to be able to interpret for R in immigration 
court, that I become certified for DHS work. After meeting the girl (and en-
gaging her in probably the first more or less normal conversation she had been 
able to have in several months), I started the convoluted certification process, 
at the same time helping the lawyers flesh out more of her story.
 The NGO had already begun to assemble a narrative to help R ob-
tain legal status. It involved a rather horrific history of childhood abuse, 
sexual exploitation by older men (including her father and uncles), flight 
from home to the United States, and continued exploitation in Florida by a 
further chain of men—including the man twice her age, also originally from 
her remote village in Chiapas, who had secretly had her reported to the im-
migration authorities when she refused to become his child bride.
 R herself, little by little, told me a rather different story—a not uncom-
mon tale of teenaged couples whose liaison is disapproved by strict parents 
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and who elope from home, only to end up impoverished in a strange and 
hostile environment in exile north of the border. It was fairly clear that her 
initial preference would have been to find and be reunited with her child-
hood boyfriend, with whom she had originally escaped her village, or, failing 
that, with her own older brother (who she thought was also in Florida). 
Nonetheless, having been provisionally placed in supervised foster care in 
Arizona and enrolled in a local high school with a largely Spanish-speaking 
student body, she started to feel strongly attracted to the scenario the law-
yers had painted for her: obtaining legal status first as a ward of the state 
in Arizona and then as a legal resident (able to study nursing, as she once 
mused, or to become a lawyer in her own right). Several legal procedures 
were required to implement such a plan. First and most important was to 
demonstrate that R was, indeed, an abused and abandoned child in need of 
“protection,” who could thus legally be declared a ward of the state. As her 
eighteenth birthday approached, achieving such status in turn became ever 
more urgent for her lawyer.
 As has happened in other cases in which I have been involved, the law-
yer quickly realized that as a long-time ethnographer with continued close 
ties to friends and fictive kinsmen in Chiapas, I could do much more to 
advance the plans for R than simply give her an authoritative “professorial 
voice” as her interpreter in immigration court or serve as a pro bono inves-
tigator. She thus recruited me to attempt, on one of my periodic trips to 
Mexico, to track down R’s parents, to explain to them the plan, and to bring 
back their witnessed signatures on crucial documents to be presented to the 
juvenile division of the local family law court. This was a task the NGO 
had none of the necessary resources—linguistic, ethnographic, financial, or 
practical—to undertake. The relevant declaration, for each of the parents to 
sign, included the following language:
I am unable to care for my Child at this time and I do not object to the 
court granting custody of her to the Arizona Department of Economic 
Security. . . I understand that . . . a future hearing may result in further 
proceedings for permanent guardianship or in termination of my 
parental rights. . . . I understand . . . [this declaration] . . . may result in 
the Child being adjudicated dependent and in further proceedings for 
permanent guardianship or termination of our parental rights. If my 
parental rights are terminated, all my rights to the Child, including the 
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rights to custody, care, control and visitation, will be completely ended. 
I understand that my obligation to pay support and the Child’s right to 
inheritance will continue until the entry of a final order of adoption, if 
any, of the Child.
 R said that she spoke by telephone with her mother regularly a few 
times a month, and she had alerted them to expect me. Following her in-
structions, I ultimately undertook the journey to the lowland jungles of 
Chiapas where R’s parents lived in a community of evangelical Protestant 
converts (cf. Nash 1995; Eber 1999; Kovic 2005; Rus 2005; Rus and Vigil 
2007) exiled from their original home villages in the highlands. Despite 
considerable suspicion in the village, I finally tracked the parents down and 
explained the situation to them as best I could. (As the reader can imagine, 
rendering the English legalese of the document cited into idiomatic Tzotzil 
was no straightforward matter.) After what became a cordial visit (during 
which my Zinacantec companion bought some of their chickens), the par-
ents gave me yet another Rashomon-like version of the history of R’s “escape” 
from the village almost a year earlier. They remembered her dissatisfaction 
with opportunities in her tiny, impoverished village and blamed her being 
lured into trying to travel north across the border on the urging of an un-
scrupulous neighbor lady.
 Ultimately I brought back the legal documents with the parents’ signa-
tures (which my wife and I witnessed). I also brought R a short videotaped 
message her parents had composed for her, with her siblings sitting on their 
laps. Both urged her to be happy and to consult with kajvaltik (“our Lord”) 
for guidance and solace in whatever was to come, hoping that at the very 
least she would soon come back to visit them. The father’s language echoed 
the formal, parallel phrasing of Tzotzil ritual language and prayer (Haviland 
1994, 1996, 2000), a kind of Tzotzil analogue of the legalese of the docu-
ments he had willingly signed, evidently intended to soothe and reassure his 
wayward daughter:
(3) R’s dad sends her his advice—lek oyan, junuk avo’on 
1 ja’ . lek oyan, i junuk avo’on
 Be well, be content
2 i xamuyibaj un, mu me xavat avo’on
 And rejoice, please don’t worry
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3 ja’ lek me chamuyibaj
 It’s better to rejoice
4 atimi chavat avo’one i a veses
 If you worry, then sometimes
5 xk’uxub ajol i
 Your head will hurt
6 cha’ipaj, mi o k’usi ep chanope
 You will get sick, if you think too much
7 muk’ i xanop i junuk avo’on cha’abtej
 Don’t think about it, and be content. Work
8 chano jun
 And study
9 chapas kanal uk
 You will succeed, too
10 espesyal para jo’ot i mu k’usi yan ya’el
 It’s special just for you, not for anything else
11 chavil ma ti yo’e
 You will see that over there
12 a yan xa ech’el akuxlajel (apas xa un)
 You will made a different kind of life 
13 ja’ yu’un, ja’ mu xach’un lo’loel
 So don’t be tricked
14 mo’oj much’u k’usi chal
 Not about what someone might say
15 ma’uk k’u batenot spasel i:
 That’s not what you have gone to do
16 i oy k’usi ti avo’ontanoj ti labat ya’el
 There is something your heart has desired that you have gone for
17 te chka’i
 I will hear
18 chk’otik ta pasel va’i un, mu jna’
 if it comes to pass, I don’t know
19 parake jech chijmuyibajkutike
 so that we may rejoice
20 este yu’un mu xkat ko’onkutike
 Uh, so that we don’t worry our hearts
21 ja’ chopol ti mi k’usi anop
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 It would be bad if you thought too much
22 k’usi lik apas
 If something bad started to happen to you.
23 yec chkat ko’onkutik
 Then we would be worried
24 chka’uk ti ja’ yech chbat ti ja’ yech chapas
 If I thought that it would turn out that way, that something happened to you
25 jech xichikutik mi yech chapas
 if we thought something bad happened to you.
26 mu k’al lek jmoj jun avo’one, ke: chijmuyibajkutik ek
 But when you are fully content, then we, too, will rejoice
27 chka’ikutik ek
 We, too, will feel that way
28 i ja nox jech chakalbe un, cha’ ox p’el lik’opoj i
 And that’s what I want to tell you, just two or three words I have spoken.
29 tee, koman, junuk avo’on, chamuyibaj i chijmuyibakutik ek
 So stay there, be content. Iif you rejoice we, too, will rejoice 
 With the parents’ voluntary agreement to terminate their parental 
rights in hand, the lawyers were able to petition for R’s legal status as a ward 
of the court, which in turn began a long and somewhat tortuous path to 
regularize her immigration status in the United States. In the end, R’s case 
in immigration court was heard with just Spanish interpretation (and by 
that time she was almost ready to graduate from an English-speaking high 
school), and she was granted asylum. I last spoke to her when she was at-
tending junior college, and I have been told that she ultimately married a 
man who had also been helped to legal status by the same NGO. I do not 
know whether she has ever been back to her village in Chiapas.
 The striking contrast between how most of the Tzotziles for whom I 
interpret fare (intercepted, incarcerated, and deported with a record of felo-
nies) and R’s “successful” outcome is what originally pushed me to reflect on 
whether such cases are exceptional or whether they are, instead, consistent 
with the underlying policies governing immigration in this country. Select-
ing a particular “protected” category of individual—in this case, a minor fe-
male who may very well have been sexually victimized by other immigrants 
from her own community—itself relies upon a stereotyped view (of sexual 
relations in general, of migrant Mexican males as sexual predators, and of 
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the presumed social circumstances of minors in Mexican society) as the 
narrative background to any particular individual’s history. But in this sort 
of case, the background, more than any demonstrable facts, provides the 
narrative framework on which bureaucratic decisions are based. These deci-
sions, in turn, freeze and reify the stereotyped narrative and the background 
assumptions on which it rests.11 As usual, the narratives of the powerful are 
by definition themselves powerful narratives, able to refashion facts to suit 
their narrators.
D’S CASE: SECOND DAY
 Let me return to D. When I hung up the telephone where we met 
him in Mississippi that first day, I thought I had heard the last of the mat-
ter. However, the Chamula lad quickly resurfaced. In addition to doing pro 
bono work with hospital emergency rooms and other sorts of health-related 
interpreting, I have interpreted for a lateral part of the justice system that in-
volves the special protections afforded to minors in the United States, often 
the province of private or charitable child-oriented psychological and social 
work services. The day after I conversed with the ICE agent and D, I re-
ceived—quite independently and via a different private interpreting service 
that had contracted my services principally for such health-related work and 
that charged its clients by the minute—a call from a child-protection center 
in Texas. I thus by happenstance continued to trace D’s distressing history 
through to what was the end (at least at the time) of my own engagement 
with his case.
 As I was soon to discover, D had been transferred to a (private, 
Christian) home for juvenile offenders on an island off Galveston, Texas, 
where he was now in the hands of the US Department of Health and 
Human Services. I learned that the young man had, indeed, been provi-
sionally deemed undeportable, as a minor child whose history and pos-
sible risks of abuse and exploitation (at home and in the United States) 
had not yet been established. The new call was from a woman in Texas 
who told me she needed to interview a Tzotzil-speaking child. Having at 
first no idea that this was the same boy I had spoken to the day before, I 
as usual tried first to confirm that I could speak to the child in question 
(transcript [4], lines 7–17):
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(4) D’s second day 
1 int: OK, I’m going to do an interview and I just-
2  need a - jmmmm
3  yeah, I just need translation
4 jbh:  maybe you should just let me confirm that I can actually speak  
  to him, no?
5 (0.6)
6 int:  ok
7 jbh:  OK, mi li’ote D**?
  OK, are you here, D**?
8 (0.6)
9 D: li’une
  I am here.
10 jbh: ali:
  Uh-
11  mi lek, mi ja’ yec onox ti D abie





15   bweno li vo’one Xun jbi
  OK, my name is John
16   li vo’one Xun jbi ta jelubtas li k’ope
  My name is John, and I’ll translate the language
17 (0.8)
It seems clear that D immediately recognized that I was the same person he 
had spoken to the day before, in what was probably his first Tzotzil conver-
sation since he had been detained and separated from his Chamula relatives 
some weeks previously. However, for me the penny had not yet dropped, and 
perhaps because the interpreting context and the agency calling me were so 
different, it took me a while to accept his insistence (odd to me at the time) 
that we had already spoken and his clear exasperation that I kept asking him 
the same questions he had answered twenty-four hours before, which was to 
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become a theme in our conversations, as one “expert” after another dragged 
him through the same interrogative litany:
18 D: ali vi vo’ot une chak’opoj to ta stz’el bu makalun to’oxe?
  Are you the one who spoke there near where I was shut up before?
19 jbh: e jna’tik
  Eh, who knows?
20  ali buyot lavie, mi ali volje onox ti jk’opon jbatike?
  But where are you now, if we actually did speak to each other yesterday?
21 (0.7)
22 D: ma’uk xa
  Not any longer.
23 jbh: ma’uk xa
  Not any longer?
  [
24 D (?)-em xa (?)
  (I’ve been moved) already
25 jbh: e jna’tik, jna’tik mi o bu j-
  Eh, who knows, who knows if we-
26  jk’opon jbatike, bu lalik tal, buy a-
  have spoken together. Where have you come from, where’s your-
27  buy la- laparajele?




30 jbh:  bu lalik tal, buy aparajel
  Where do you come from, where’s your village?
31 (1.1)
 This time around, after a long pause, D skipped the hedging prelimi-
naries and told me directly from what village he hailed. It was only then that 
I realized he must be the same child I had talked to previously (lines 36–37):
32 D: te ta v***
  There in V***
33 jbh: a ta v***
  Ah, ta V**
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34  mi ma’uk ti ali-
  Isn’t it uh-
35 D: te
  There
36 jbh: mi ja’ li- pero ja’ nan ij-
  Are—But yes, perhaps
37  jk’opon jbatik volje
  we DID speak to each other yesterday
38 (0.6)
39 D: ja’ lajk’opon jbatik volje, vo’ot lajka’i xun abi mo’oj
  Yes,. We spoke yesterday, I think you’re the one called John, no?
40 jbh: ji’ vo’on a’a
  Yeah, that’s me
41  bweno, malao to, buyot xa lavie, ta tejas xa?
  OK, but wait, where are you now, already in Texas?
42 (1.0)
43 D: ta tejas
  In Texas
44 jbh: a bweno, mala to, yu’un ta jk’opon xa li antze
  Ah,, OK. Wait a bit, while I talk a bit to the woman.
45 (0.6)
46 D: bweno
  OK. 
 Once I discovered that I was speaking to the same kid as the day be-
fore, I so informed the Texas social worker, who took a few moments to 
assimilate this idea—quite unexpected for her, given that she had just dialed 
in to an on-demand telephonic interpreting service to get an interpreter in 
the first place. (I am not sure how the ICE agent had tracked me down the 
previous morning.) She emphasized that the child was now in a children’s 
center and that he should be more forthcoming and, for example, admit his 
real age (lines 61–54):
47 jbh: ah, ma’am, yes in fact I know this guy, I’ve spoken to him before,
so you should go ahead
48 (1.5)
49 int: you’ve spoken to him before?
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50 jbh: yeah I spoke to him yesterday in Jackson Mississippi I believe
51 (1.3)
52 int:  OK, with immigration?






59  I need to:
60  I need to know
61  OK, first I just want to make sure that he understands that this  
  place
62  is for minors
63  and I know that he keeps saying that he’s twenty years old, but






  I’m here
70 jbh: lek me tze’ano achikin chk li’e
  Open your ears well now
71  ali komo ali antze le’ ali s-
  Uh, like this woman
   [
72 D:  sale
   OK [in Spanish]
73 jbh: ma’uk skwenta migra ali
  She not from the migration people
74  te la ta jun centro
  She says she’s in a “Center”
75  pero li sentro taje skwenta li much’u kremotike
  But this “Center” is for people who are boys
76  tzebetike, ma’uk li muk’ta krixchano xkaltike
  or girls; not for grown up people, let’s say






80 jbh: komo sike to chaval noxtok ti chaval noxtok ti ali-
  Since you continue to say, as well- to say that um
81  ti jtob ajabilale, pero mu- xu x-
  that you’re twenty years old, but you’re not-
82  mu xach’unbat, mu xch’un onox yiloj onox lavunale
  -you’re not being beleived, they’ll never believe it, they’ve seen your papers
83 (0.9)
84  komo ilok’
  Since it came out
85  la ta komputadora lavunale, iyal onox ti k’usi ora la’ayane
  on the computer, your documents, they always tell what time you were born
86  li k’usi ora vok’emote
  what time you were hatched, as you say
87 D: ja’ jech taj une
  It’s that way (i.e., what I say is true).
88 jbh: ja’ yech une
  It’s that way?
89  entonse
  In that case-
90 D: ja’ jech
  It’s that way. 
 Reading through the transcript, I realize that my previous engagement 
with the same child now shadowed our conversation in this second different 
context: I dredged from memory (rather than from the current exchange) 
his previous claims about his age and birthdate:
91 jbh: entonse mu xa xch’un ti ayanemot ta:
  In that case, they won’t believe that you were born in-
92  ta 1990 komo ma’uk la yech ali
  in 1990 because that’s not how it
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93   ali chlok’ ta komputadora la
  comes out on the computer, according to them
94 (0.8)
95  pero mu la—
  But don’t-
96 D: ma’uk?
  It isn’t?
97 jbh: pero mu me xaxi’, mu me xaxi’, batz’i junuk me avo’onton un
  But don’t be afraid, don’t be afraid, be cheerful
98  le’ chaskolta li antz taje, ma’uk la migra, ma’uk xa li polisiya
  That woman will help you, she’s not from immigration and not from the  
  police
99  polisiya xkaltike
  She’s not police.
And in response to my interpreted reassurances—doubtless irrelevant to D 
himself—about the person interviewing him, the frustrated child immedi-
ately started again to put his own agenda on the table, in ways that could not 
be followed up as the social worker pursued her own script. He repeated his 
desire to be set free:
100 D: yu’un chilok’ xa nox
  But I feel I just want to 
101  chka’i ne
  Be released already
102 jbh: mu jna’ ta- ta jak’betik ta jlikel
  I don’t know, we’ll- we’ll ask her about it in a moment
103 (0.6)
104 D: mm, mi chiyak’ nox ech’el ta jna onox
  Mm, will she send me back to my own house 
 Following her own priorities, the social worker at the juvenile home 
had suspicions about D’s past and his likely intentions, based on her expe-
riences with other juvenile inmates. She disregarded his pleas for release—
not part of her brief, in any case—wanting instead to know about where 
he was living, with whom, and what sort of relationship he had with his 
housemates in Mississippi (transcript 5):
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(5) D’s living arrangements 
1 int: uh, who were you living with in Mississippi?
2 jbh: bweno k’al teyot ta Mississippi, buy nakalot?
  OK, when you were in Mississippi, where were you living?
3 (1.8)
4 D: ta partamento
  In an apartment
5 jbh: ta partamento, much’u achi’in un?
  In the apartment, who did you accompany
6  much’u xchi’uk un
  With whom?
7 D: ali jun kamigo
  Uh, with a friend of mine
8 jbh: amiko un, mi ma’uk achi’il, amigo no’ox?
  A friend, not a relative, just a friend?
9 (0.6)
10 D: amigo nox
  Just a friend
11 jbh: ja’ a’a
  Yes
12 D: ja’ ti xkojtikin jbakotike
  We know each other
13 jbh: buy- buy ti avojtikin abaike?
  Where- where did you become acquainted? 
14 (0.9)
15 D: te nox te, nopol-
  There, just there, nearby
16  yo’ ech’el chamula
  Down in Chamula
17   sankre de chamula stuke
  He himself is of Chamula blood
D’s use of an uncharacteristic (and noncommittal) Spanish expression, 
“sankre [sic] de chamula” [line 17], is particularly notable to me now, in retro-
spect, both because it suggests that his Spanish was perhaps better than he 
let on to his interviewers and because it continued a pattern of avoiding the 
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specifics of his relationships with his Chamula companions, some of whom 
had been arrested along with him (and in most cases were already deported), 
but others of whom remained unidentified, still at large, and probably still at 
work in Mississippi (see line 25).
18 jbh: A bweno pwes pero xavojtikin onox




As is the standard for such interpreting encounters, I rendered this little 
conversation into a first-person answer (lines 21–24) to the social worker’s 
original question (line 1). D broke in (line 25) to give me a bit more explana-
tion, which I then interpreted (line 32).
21 jbh: so I was living in apartment with a friend
22  the friend is not a relative and I met him
23  uh, in my hometown in Chamula
24 (0.6)
25 D: ja’ te komen, mu’nuk buy bat une
  He remained there, he didn’t leave
26 jbh: ali-
  Uh-
27 D: te oy to
  He’s still there
28 jbh: a buy- buy ti oye
  Ah, where- where is he?
29  mi tey to ta jlumaltike o mi te ta missisippi to?
  Is he in our country [Chiapas] or is he still in Mississippi?
30 (0.7)
31 D: Mississippi to, te oy o to
  Still in Mississippi, he’s still there
32 jbh: so and that friend is still in Mississippi, he hasn’t been
33  arrested as far as I know
34 (2.5)
35 int: did you come- when did you come to the US?
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 The social worker also wanted to probe the nature of D’s border cross-
ing, particularly why and with what resources he had paid his coyote. Both 
her institutional vocabulary (for example, her use of the word “smuggler,” 
whose connotations in English are considerably more complex, and negative, 
than Spanish loans such as coyote or pollero and especially than more ordi-
nary Tzotzil labels for the role, which are often reasonably positive, such as 
j’ik’vanej [“guide”] or jelubtasvanej [“person who crosses people over” or, indeed, 
“interpreter”]), and her special preoccupations also contributed to my own 
problems in the triangular rendering of mutual trust and comprehension:
(6) Smuggling [D2a-3]
1 int: who paid for you to come over here to the US, who paid for  
  your smuggler?
2 jbh: bweno k’alal lajelav tal ta desyerto, kusi mi tojbil mi-
  So when you crosssed the desert, was it paid for?
3  min atojoj onox avaj-
  Did you pay for your-
4  ali jelubtasvanej
  for the person who crossed you over?
5 (0.9)
6 D: k’usi van?
  What was that?
7 jbh: k’alal ajelav tal min tojbil, min a-
  When you crossed over this way, was it paid, was it--
8  min atojoj onox li much’u ali
  Did you pay whoever
9  poyero xkaltik li much’u chasjelubtas-
  aas the smuggler, as we say, the one who crossed you over?
10 D: tojbil
  It was paid for
11 jbh: tojbil
  Paid for?
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15  jtoj jtuk porke . ep me kil ne
  I paid for it myself because .. I have a lot of debt
16 jbh: ah, ji’ pero bweno ali k’alal atoj...
  Ah, yes, but, OK, when you paid-
17 D: yu’un me, yu’un me li’ipaj k’uxi xkaltik un
  Indeed, because- because I had gotten sick, as we say, 
18  epaj ti kil une ja’ telon o
  My debt grew large, I was wiped out by it
19  ja’ taj ch’om tak’in o
  By borrowing money
20 jbh: aa
21  pero ti vo’ot atoj un k’usi van yepal atojbe
  But what you paid, how much was it you paid?
22  yo’ chajelav oe







I again tried to render the gist of this first-person response from D’s mouth 
into an exchange for the interviewer.
27 jbh: ah so he- ah
28  jmm
29  so lemme just uh-
30  tell you what he was saying to me, he said he paid
31  himself
32  uh ten thousand pesos to the coyote to cross the border
33  he had borrowed money at home because he has
34  many debts
35  that are a result of a previous sickness
36 (2.3)
 In a direct echo of Miriam Ticktin’s (2011) observations about French 
asylum-seeking strategies and French rules for serious illness as a justification 
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for “care,” the social worker (after absorbing his answer during a long pause 
at line 36 and then switching to her native Spanish at line 37) pounced on 
D’s reported sickness as a possible motive for his immigration to the United 
States and a potential strategic ploy for a possible future revised immigra-
tion status:
37 int: ¿de qué estabas enfermo antes?
  [Switches to Spanish] With what were you sick before?
38 jbh: ali k’usi ip chava’i to’oxe?




41 jbh: k’usi ip chava’i to’oxe?
  What sickness did you have before?
42 (1.2)
43 D: yu’un k’ak’ jutuk kok yu’un jech xa no’ox?
  It’s that my leg got burned a bit, that’s all
 The social worker asked me to repeat that her institutional interests 
and affiliations were unlike those of the immigration authorities in whose 
hands she thought D imagined himself to be. She wanted him to under-
stand the procedures established for undocumented minor children: to allow 
them to be placed with certain relatives in the United States, regardless of 
their immigration status, while the mandated determinations were carried 
out about possible risks and dangers should a child be repatriated. As an 
interpreter I was obliged to try to render her words, despite the fact that D 
himself was trying to push his own concerns: he wanted neither protection 
nor asylum but out:
(7) Trust
1 int: I know that you have been here for less than a day
2  and that you don’t trust us
3  but we don’t work for immigration
4  we do get contracted by the government
5  but it’s
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6  through the Department of Health and Human Services,
7  not Immigration,
8  cause you are younger
9  so please don’t be scared to tell me
10  if you have other relatives here,
11  I don’t need to know where they live
12  I just want you to contact them
13  and let them know that you’re OK
14 (0.5)
15 jbh: OK, uh
16  uh, N***, let me just tell you
17  that I have already told him that you’re not
18  working for immigration,
19  because I understood that from the people who contracted me,
20  but let me just-





26  ali tzotz me chayalbe li antz taje
  So that woman wants to tell you strongly
27  komo li yabtel taje une,
  That her work
28  ma’uk skwenta migra,
  Has nothing to do with immigration
29  ma’uk skwenta polisia un
  Nothing to do with police
30  ali j-
31  jtos xa li yabtel une skwenta—
  She has a different kind of job
32 D:  te-
  There-
33 jbh: skwenta li- ja’ k’u cha’al salubridad ta jlumaltik
  Something like “public health” in our country
34  ali skwenta salud un, ma’uk ja chas-
  It’s about health, not for -
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35  chask’el un, chaschabi
  She wants to watch you, to take care of you
36  chask’elulan
  They want to keep watching out for you
 A basic misrecognition of the situation of this Tzotzil teenager made the 
social worker’s words sound, I expect, completely hollow (as well as requiring 
me to dance around her own particular bureaucratic and social understanding 
of the situation to try to reassure young D). She did not, for example, appear 
to recognize that despite his tender age, D had contracted debt and set out as 
an adult to sa’ tak’in (“look for money”), as one says in Tzotzil.
DAYS 3–10: LAWYER, SHRINK, COUNSELOR
 Over the next days (and, in fact, weeks) at the children’s home, D was 
assigned three more professional case workers, all of whom called me for 
translations periodically: an immigration lawyer, a clinician who adminis-
tered psychological evaluations, and another social worker, D’s “counselor” 
or therapist at the juvenile home, who tracked his behavior and adjustment 
to the new surroundings, asking me to probe the boy’s state of mind and to 
comment on his cultural background. Transcript 8 is drawn from an exem-
plary conversation with the latter from D’s fifth day in the home. It is clear 
that D had by now realized that his hopes for immediate release were for 
naught. In extremely lethargic Tzotzil, with long pauses (lines 5, 9, 11, etc.) 
preceding his responses, D reported that he did not feel like eating, a char-
acteristic Tzotzil symptom of illness. When I pressed him about whether it 
was just a matter of unfamiliar food—for example, whether or not he was 
being given tortillas, a food without which no Tzotzil meal is considered 
complete (lines 22–23)—he responded with another classic expression of 
Tzotzil unwellness: “I just eat one or two” (line 25):
(8) Depressed
1 int: aquí está D
  (In Spanish) Here is D (to JBH)
2 jbh: bueno
  OK
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3 (0.60)
4 jbh: bweno D k’u xa’elan un?
  Well, D, how are you doing?
5 (2.01)
6 D: li’une
  I am here.
7 jbh: bweno
  OK
8 jbh: mi ja’ to yechot
  Are you well?
9  (3.34)
10 jbh: mi ja’ to yechot, mi lek lavay, mi lek chave’?




13 jbh: k’usi, k’usi li i’i
  What? ‘No’ what?
14  1.62)
15 D: mu’yuk chive’ tajmek
  I’m really not eating
16 jbh: muk’ chave’ ta jmoj?
  Are you not eating at all?
17  (1.68)
18 D: tana, pero mu’yuk,
  Yes, but not really; 
19  mu onox jk’an ya’ele,
  I don’t feel like it,
20  mu jna’ k’u cha’al
  I dunno why
21 jbh: a pero muk’ bu nopem xava’i
  Ah, but you’re not used to it
22  mi’n chayak’be onox lavote
  Are they at least giving you your tortilas?
23  mi ch’abal vaj mi oy vaj
  Are there no tortillas, or are there tortillas?
24  (2.00)
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25 D: pero k’ajom jun chib, chib no’ox
  But only one or two, just two
26 jbh: a mu xak’an lek
  Ah, so you don’t really want them
27  pero mu me xa’ipaj un che’e
  But please don’t get sick
28  mas nan lek batz’i k’elo me aba
  It woud be better for you to take care of yourself
29  (0.68)
30  ali malao to te
  Just wait a bit
31  chka’itik k’usi xi li- ali senyor taje une
  Let’s hear what the gentleman there says
Still more telling, when I signaled that I was about to return my attention to 
the counsellor, D again immediately brought up his most central desire—to 
return home:
32 D: ta jk’an chisut ech’el un
  I want to return home from her
33 jbh: an ji’, jna’oj
  Why, yes, I know.
34  te chka’itik k’usi xi li vinik taj une
  Let’s hear what the man says
35  (1.20)
36 jbh: I***, nada mas le saludé,
  (In Spanish) I**, I just greeted him
37  así de la forma normal, este
38  le pregunté que es lo normal en estas
  And I asked him, as one normally would in these
39  este tipo de caso,
  circumstances,
40  pués, cómo ha dormido,
  How he’s been sleeping
41  si está comiendo
  If he’s eating
42  y me comenta y eso también me lo comenté ayer,
  And he remarked, and he made the same comment yesterday,
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43  que no está comiendo, que no:
  That he’s not eating, that he doesn’t
44  (0.85)
45  que no sabe porqué pero como que no tiene apetito
  That he doesn’t know why but that he has no appetite
46  no le dan ganas de comer
  That he has no desire to eat 
 Unsurprisingly, the therapist diagnoses “depression” and begins to in-
quire of me (as an anthropologist—a further sort of engagement implicit in 
my interpretation work with some American authorities) about young D’s 
“religious beliefs” as a potential therapy.
47 int:  OK
48  está deprimido
  He’s depressed
49  (1.79)
50  sí, sí está deprimido
  Yes, yes, he’s depressed
51  pregúntame si él asiste a una-
  Ask him for me if he attends a-
52  si él tiene alguna . creencia religiosa
  If he has any . religious beliefs
The therapist went on after this on to ask me whether in D’s culture they “go 
to church” and whether it is “a Christian church”—something this particular 
children’s home was especially concerned about. The ultimate goal of the 
personnel at the children’s home was to convince D that his best course of 
action was to ask for provisional asylum in the United States as an “endan-
gered minor,” to accept foster parents, and to continue his schooling. D, on 
the other hand, insisted that what he wanted (and was in fact obliged) to 
do was to get work to pay his debts before returning home to Chamula—a 
place he could not go empty-handed while title to his father’s lands was 
being held as collateral by local usurers (who also expected at least 10 per-
cent monthly interest on the 15,000 pesos of principal).
 It became clear, to me at least, that D’s situation was basically unresolv-
able until he could both prove his age and identity and cooperate sufficiently 
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with the authorities to convince them that he could “safely” return home. 
I spoke with D’s father by telephone and on one of my periodic fieldtrips 
to Chiapas met with both parents. His parents gave me photocopies of 
D’s birth and sixth-grade school certificates, and I also copied a photo that 
showed him with his godparents at his primary school graduation ceremony, 
which had taken place less than a year before.12 Putting these in the hands 
of his immigration lawyer back in Texas meant that D ultimately was able 
to force his way in front of an immigration judge to express his own urgent 
desire to be repatriated, despite repeated efforts by the brigade of lawyers, 
social workers, counsellors, and psychologists to convince him that he would 
be better off (and likely successful) if he were to accept “unaccompanied 
alien child” status and apply for asylum.
 After two more months of twists and turns, psychological pressures, 
and delays in therapy and immigration court, D was finally repatriated 
back to Mexico after seventy-one days in custody. (Ironically—and per-
haps appropriately—I was never assigned to interpret in the relevant 
hearings in immigration court, and I assume that D was represented there 
by his Spanish-speaking lawyer.) In late 2014, when I last stopped by the 
village to visit his family, D was away doing construction work in central 
Mexico, still trying to pay off his debts from that initial disastrous trip to 
the United States four years earlier. His brother confided to me that D 
speaks now with some regret about not taking American authorities up 
on their proposal that he seek legal residence in Texas, where he could 
have continued to go to school and grown up a gringo, thus at least par-
tially ducking his current state of debt-peonage. This has been the result 
in the cases of a few others for whom I have interpreted, although the 
results have been at best ambivalent when individual and family interests 
are taken into account.
A POLITICS OF “PROTECTION” AND ITS FLIP SIDE(S)
 Although I cannot develop the argument here, I am convinced that 
the notion of “coerced protection” that motivates American authorities to 
try to force asylum on certain categories of children has another chilling 
institutional expression. There is an obvious irony in the fact that while 
adult “economic refugees” are routinely excluded from the ranks of legiti-
mate asylum seekers, their children may be coerced into “protective custody.” 
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These same “protected” children are usually, in the view of their home com-
munities, old enough to leave home, although admittedly in often extremely 
precarious circumstances and not necessarily with their parents’ blessings. 
They are also able to seek gainful employment in the vast marketplaces of 
gray and black labor in their own countries, if not elsewhere. Under Ameri-
can law and given American sensibilities, the state must instead protect such 
children from exploitation, regardless of their own wishes. This is why R 
was officially “removed” from the care of her father and mother, whose “pa-
rental rights” were officially terminated more than a year after she had actu-
ally run away from home. It is why D was kept in custody for months after 
his older brothers had been summarily deported and gone back to work, 
either in Mexico or, illegally, back in the United States. In this chapter, I 
have illustrated the role(s) that a hapless and initially naive interpreter/eth-
nographer plays in such proceedings and the complex social and interactive 
engagements in which such specialized encounters occur. As I mentioned 
at the outset, the resulting perspective is by necessity partial and selectively 
limited.
 There is, however, another implementation of the same ideology: the 
fact that US courts routinely take children away from immigrant families on 
the grounds that such children, too, are “not safe” in their families and thus 
need “protection.” This is what has happened in some of the most distressing 
Tzotzil cases on which I have worked. The category “felony child neglect”—
prominent on the list of the legal difficulties in which Tzotziles for whom 
I have interpreted sometimes find themselves—refers to cases in which the 
state “removes” children from their Tzotzil-speaking families. Hard as it may 
be to imagine, in one such case a Tzotzil father was deported and his wife 
had her infant child legally removed from her care for more than one year 
because of an extreme case of diaper rash that, once brought to the atten-
tion of authorities, was never forgiven. In another, a Tzotzil woman whose 
husband had been accused (but was never charged) with inappropriate be-
havior with their eight-year-old daughter lost not only that daughter but 
also her other younger children—aged five, three, and one, and, ultimately 
a year later, her two-month-old infant as well—first to foster care and then 
to permanent adoption because she could not meet the court’s plan for “re-
unification” (which included mandatory sexual abuse survivor courses and 
having to learning the Spanish or English in which she would have been able 
to take them).
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 I continue to do Tzotzil interpretation, to help courts locate interpret-
ers for other Mesoamerican Indian languages, and to have hopes for the po-
tential usefulness of these complex and officially consequential engagements 
between languages, mediators, and bureaucracies. Nonetheless, because of 
their partiality, their ordered histories, and the engagements, reengagements, 
and disengagements that they disguise, I have no illusions about the efficacy 
of the interactions I have as a Tzotzil interpreter and especially about the 
ultimate effects of such interpreting work on the lives of the Tzotzil speak-
ers whom (in my own mind, at least) I am trying to help. The notion that it 
is worthwhile to help otherwise silenced speakers of indigenous languages 
in such proceedings should probably be replaced by a more cynical view. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Haviland 2003), far from giving a few Tzot-
ziles a voice where they are voiceless or lending them at least a whisper of 
my own “power” and prestige as a professor (who is sometimes accorded at 
least a snippet of recognition from judges and lawyers, as opposed to most 
interpreters, who are usually entirely effaced as transparent nonpersons in 
the courtroom), these interpreting engagements, complex as they are, often 
work not to enhance justice and equality, or even to serve the best interests 
of the speakers, but rather to lubricate and legitimize the wheels of bureau-
cracy itself, including its systematic and structural injustices. The appear-
ance of “full and true” translation and, thus, linguistic transparency is little 
more than a pretext for imposing ideologically driven legal resolutions on 
sociopolitical conundrums.
 In a parallel way, the rare cases of “coerced asylum” that emerge from 
the vast parade of summary deportations and incarcerations sanctioned 
by the courts and other agencies I sometimes work for are exceptions that 
prove the rule. If a “politics of suspicion” (and the concomitant blindness it 
derives from and reproduces) holds sway not only over asylum petitioners 
but essentially over all migrants, such suspicion can be suspended only for 
individuals who, for other ideological reasons, can be considered by defini-
tion to be morally pure and ethically blameless: prototypically infants and 
children. It is thus a corollary of the same “suspicion” of immigrants that ren-
ders imperative “protection” for the blameless among them. Surrounded by 
morally contaminated adults, the blameless require isolation and protection, 
and coerced asylum (if not removal from families and termination of paren-
tal rights or the institutionalized conversion into minigringos of unwilling 
adolescents) is one vehicle for achieving it.
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NOTES
1. Counting people five years or older, the percentage of that age segment of the 
Chiapas population that speaks an indigenous language is 24.3 percent. In the 2010 census, 
only Oaxaca had a larger total population of speakers of indigenous languages, which rep-
resents almost 34 percent; Yucatán has about 30 percent but less than half as many speakers. 
(Source: http://www.inegi.org.mx/.)
2. Another third are speakers of Tseltal, a close cousin, with the rest divided unevenly 
between half a dozen or so other languages, most of them also Mayan. Tzotzil and Tseltal 
each share fifth place in the list of most spoken Mexican Indian “languages.”
3. Many lawyers approach me for help interpreting for their clients knowing only that 
they come “from Mexico”—and in this they may even be wrong, as I have been asked to inter-
pret in Tzotzil for people who turn out actually to hail from rural Guatemala or farther south. 
Employers or contractors in Oregon sometimes told me they preferred to hire the hardwork-
ing “oaxaquitos”—“little people from [the state of ] Oaxaca.” They thus themselves lumped to-
gether quite a patchwork of different languages and regions. And speakers of Amuzgo, a tiny 
Oto-Manguean language with which I have worked in my own neighborhood in California, 
suffer from a kind of triple-whammy: for North Americans they are lumped together with 
other “Mexicans,” for most Mexicans they are just more inditos from Oaxaca, and for the much 
more populous speakers of dialects of the related Mixtec family of languages they are those 
strange neighbors whom you cannot understand even a little bit when they speak in their own 
tongues. (Among themselves, Amuzgos also distinguish carefully between people from their 
own communities and people—even Amuzgo speakers—from other places.)
4. After the brief but widely publicized rebellion against the Mexican state and its 
“bad government” by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in Chiapas that began on 
January 1, 1994, there followed a period of “low-intensity” warfare between largely indige-
nous Zapatista groups and progovernment paramilitaries. A particularly violent confronta-
tion involved the murder of around forty-five mostly women and children in a church in the 
Tzotzil village of Acteal (Ajte’al in Tzotzil) in December 1997, a crime for which more than 
one hundred Tzotzil-speaking people were ultimately charged and imprisoned.
5. A final equals sign (=) and a similar sign in a subsequent transcript line indicates 
a “latch”—i.e., the fact that two lines follow each other with no apparent pause between 
them. In this case, for example, the latch connects the current line #2 directly to line #5 in 
the transcript.
6. Square brackets like this one indicate overlap between the line above and the suc-
ceeding line of transcribed speech. That is, they mark the place where the preceding line in 
the transcript begins to be overlapped by the subsequent line.
7. Parenthetical numbers show audible pauses, in seconds.
8. I here write Tzotzil with a highly simplified Spanish-based practical orthography, 
in which ch = t∫, j = h, x = ∫, tz = ts, ‘ = ? (glottal stop) when following a vowel; otherwise 
it indicates an ejective or glottalized version of the preceding consonant. Where I pres-
ent morpheme-by-morpheme glosses, I use the following abbreviations: Q = interrogative 
sentential proclitic; A1–3 = ergative proclitics in first, second, and third persons; B1–3 = 
absolutive suffixes in first, second, and third persons; and CL = phrasal clitic.
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9. See Bakhtin (1986) (and, e.g., Irvine [1996] and her notion of “shadow conversa-
tions”) for the theoretical grounding of a useful perspective that finds in all talk echoes, 
allusions, and virtual responses to previous conversations, real or imagined, to show that 
people’s words are, far from being monologic, inherently linked to those of past (and future) 
interlocutors.
10. There are several ironies here, not the least of which is that only a handful of 
people in the world could possibly “certify” the linguistic qualifications of a Tzotzil-English 
interpreter, and I am one of them.
11. Another case, too complex to detail here, illustrates the kind of ideological cleans-
ing that takes place of actual biographies. A Tzotzil-speaking man who had been jailed 
by the state of Florida for alleged child abuse (itself a long and contorted story) was later 
released and provided with state-funded housing for both himself and his two teenaged 
daughters after the daughters—rescued by the FBI—denounced another Tzotzil-speaking 
man from another village, who had claimed to be their “uncle,” for trying to sell them into 
prostitution.
12. Until recently, at least many, if not most, Tzotzil-speaking children go no further 
in school than sixth grade, often “graduating” in their mid to late teens. The number of boys 
reaching this level far exceeds that of girls.
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Asylum Officers, Suspicion, and the Ambivalent 
Enactment of Technologies of Truth
BRIDGET M. HAAS
How can we tell the difference between a bogus and a genuine asylum 
seeker? It is always possible that we may not be able to tell, and that the 
bogus may pass their way into our community. . . . Indeed, the possibility 
that we may not be able to tell the difference swiftly converts into the 
possibility that any of those incoming bodies may be bogus.
(Ahmed 2004a, 122)
Our job, it’s an impossible job.
(US asylum officer, 2010)
 T h i s  c h a p t e r  t a k e s  a s  i t s  p o i n t  o f  d e p a r t u r e  t h e 
simultaneous claims that any asylum seeker may be a fraudulent one and 
that discerning who is a genuine asylum claimant versus a “bogus” one is 
marked by indeterminacy, if not impossibility. How, then, do adjudicators 
perform this “impossible job”? Using data collected from interviews with 
asylum officers who adjudicate affirmative asylum claims, I explore how asy-
lum officers engage with various “technologies of truth” (Merry and Cou-
tin 2014), revealing these adjudicators’ often ambiguous enactment of these 
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technologies and forms of authoritative knowledge. I argue that while the 
asylum seeker emerges as the central figure of suspicion, adjudicators ap-
proach bureaucratic technologies and, ultimately, their own judgments of 
claimants with mistrust as well. Finally, I consider the ways in which asylum 
officers mediate, both intersubjectively and intrapersonally, the weight of the 
challenge of confidently adjudicating cases.
THE ASYLUM PROCESS
 The data for this chapter are drawn from a larger project that focused 
on the lived experiences of asylum claimants in an urban, Midwestern area 
of the United States. While the primary data collection was with asylum 
claimants, for part of this project I also conducted interviews with fifteen 
asylum officers, as well as interviews with numerous immigration attorneys 
and advocates.1 Asylum officers are employed by the United States Office 
of Citizenship and Immigration Services within the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) and are trained to conduct interviews with individuals 
who have filed an affirmative asylum claim: an appeal to the government 
for protection owing to “a well-founded fear of persecution” in his or her 
country of origin (see the introduction to this volume). A person may file 
an affirmative claim regardless of legal status (i.e., whether they maintain 
a valid nonimmigrant visa, such as a tourist or student visa, or have either 
overstayed their visa or entered the country without being processed by an 
immigration official), provided that he or she has not been apprehended by 
DHS.
 The division between “deserving” and “undeserving” migrants typically 
maps onto the presumptive distinction between political refugees and eco-
nomic migrants, a division that is reinforced by current immigration dis-
courses and policies. In this framework, economic migrants are understood 
not only as a threat to the human rights of “genuine” asylum seekers but also 
to the moral fabric of the United States.
 It is now well recognized in the scholarly literature that the distinction 
between economic and humanitarian migrants is an untenable one and that 
categories of mobility are socially and politically constructed (Dauvergne 
2004; Holmes and Castañeda 2016; Yarris and Castañeda, 2015; Zimmer-
man, 2011). Yet the distinction between these categories of migrants remains 
the primary lens through which asylum adjudication occurs, as this chapter 
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illustrates. Moreover, the putative distinction between “right” migrants 
(humanitarian/political migrants) and “wrong” ones (economic migrants) 
relies on a conceptualization of them as inherent and self-evident categories, 
thus dangerously obscuring the fact that it is the asylum system itself that 
constructs these categories of subjecthood. Indeed, it is in the adjudication 
of asylum claims that categories of mobility and personhood are made legi-
ble and meaningful.
 At the heart of the asylum process—and of this chapter—is the stark 
fact that it is an institutional actor and not the asylum seeker himself or 
herself who decides if his or her story of suffering is truthful or sufficient 
enough to be considered deserving of asylum status. Though the claimant is 
the only person with firsthand knowledge of the events discussed in the asy-
lum interview, it is in the interactions between adjudicators and claimants 
that a persecution narrative emerges (Puumula, Ylikomi, and Ristimäki 
2107). Yet, ultimately, “epistemic authority is positioned to the asylum of-
ficer who can determine how the narrative will eventually be interpreted” 
(Puumula, Ylikomi, and Ristimäki 2017, 16). This fact of inequitable power 
distribution is made additionally problematic given the broader lens of sus-
picion that informs the everyday micropolitics of asylum adjudication. As 
Olga Jubany (2011, 2017) has argued, the asylum screening process is “in-
formed by a meta-message of disbelief and denial” (2017, 6). This, in turn, 
shapes the everyday interactions between claimants and adjudicators and 
critically circumscribes how asylum claimants are understood and assessed 
during their interviews. Thus, this chapter is concerned with the “evaluative 
gaze”: the “ways in which [asylum] employees [are] engaged in processes of 
judgment, hierarchization and moralization” and aided by particular tech-
nologies of truth and suspicion (Codó 2011, 738).
ASYLUM OFFICERS: PROTECTING WHOM?
 Sara Ahmed (2004a) posits the bogus asylum seeker as evoking the 
figure of the “bogey man”: someone who “could be anywhere and anyone” 
(123). In this way, all asylum seekers emerge, at least initially, as suspect. From 
the standpoint of both policymakers and the adjudicators I discuss here, the 
threat that the bogus asylum seeker poses, however, often has less to do 
with the potential for actual physical destruction in the form of terrorist 
or criminal acts and more to do with the moral destruction of the integrity 
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of America’s generous and compassionate “humanitarian benefit” of asylum. 
Here, as Ahmed argues, the bogus asylum seeker comes to be aligned with 
the burglar: he or she is “taking something” (123)—in this scenario, a benefit 
reserved for the truly deserving—to which he or she does not have a legiti-
mate claim.
 While concerns over terrorism and threats to national security were a 
significant impetus for increasingly restrictive immigration measures (par-
ticularly after 9/11), the asylum officers with whom I spoke seemed con-
fident that the numerous screening measures to which asylum applicants 
were subjected would prevent terrorists or other persons who posed a na-
tional security threat from getting through the system. In other words, once 
asylum officers ran the necessary background checks on asylum applicants 
(conducted by other branches of DHS, such as Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement), officers did not feel the need to probe within interviews 
for these kinds of national security concerns or potential terrorist threats. 
Rather, the threat of granting asylum to fraudulent applicants—namely 
economic migrants posing as humanitarian refugees—emerged as the key 
concern for asylum officers, as the following narratives reflect:
My biggest concern was, you know, that I was referring or denying 
somebody who was a true refugee. . . . Likewise, I was very concerned 
that I was granting somebody who was getting one over on me. You 
know what I mean? Because I don’t like the system being abused. I really 
don’t. (Asylum officer ID07)
We do get the embellishers. We get the liars. We get the people with 
fraudulent intent. Um, we have a, we’re very generous, and we try to be 
very fair. . . . But the reality is we deal with a lot of economic refugees, 
and that separates them from other refugees as a group. So, we get a lot 
of people that, in my opinion, are without a doubt, economic refugees 
who are trying to convert that into a claim that will pass muster. 
(Asylum officer ID12)
Here asylum applicants who are not “true refugees” but rather “economic 
migrants” trying to “get one over” on officers are framed as a kind of cancer 
on the system: morally suspect individuals who need to be identified and 
labeled as such.
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 Asylum officers framed the task of “weeding out” undeserving asy-
lum seekers as a critical effort in ensuring the integrity of the US asylum 
system, as well as protecting the state from hosting such morally suspect 
figures. In this way, “the asylum determination process is a way of enacting 
the biopolitical practice of the border” (Puumula, Ylikomi, and Ristimäki 
2017, 1). On a broader scale, the discourse of protecting the nation from the 
bogus asylum seeker—who could be anyone and anywhere—serves at best 
to justify and routinize the increasing policing and criminalization of asy-
lum seekers (Squire 2009; De Genova and Peutz 2010); at worst, it justifies 
“the repetition of violence against bodies of others” (Ahmed 2004b, 47; see 
also Ticktin 2011). While such discourse justifies overt and brute forms of 
violence on migrants deemed undeserving of incorporation into the state, 
I focus in this chapter on what Cécile Rousseau, Marie-Claire Rufagari, 
Déogratias Bagilishya, and Toby Measham (2004) have referred to as “clean 
violence”: acts of violence associated with technocratic organizations and 
bureaucracies that are less overt but just as damaging as other modes of 
organizational violence (1095).
ASYLUM OFFICERS AS MORAL GATEKEEPERS
 Given the specter of the “bogey man” in the form of the bogus asy-
lum seeker, asylum officers very much framed their role as a balancing act 
between protecting the state and protecting applicants. Asylum officers de-
scribed themselves as what I refer to as “moral gatekeepers”: caught between 
the humanitarian imperative to grant refuge to those in need, on the one 
hand, and the duty to protect the security of the nation, on the other. A 
central question thus emerges: Who is it that asylum officers are supposed 
to be protecting? Asylum officers seemed to struggle with this dilemma, re-
flecting a broader “ambivalence about our moral obligations to the people 
who make claims” (Bohmer and Shuman 2008, 263). As asylum officers de-
scribed it:
You know, you just hope that you do right by the applicant. And you 
hope you do right by your country. Because, you know, we were hired 
by the country to protect the citizens of the United States. And so, 
at the same time we want to be humanitarian and extend the helping 
hand of the country to the people that deserve it. You’re just constantly 
110 Bridget M. Haas
doing a balancing act, and you’re hoping you’re getting it right. 
(Asylum officer ID03)
Certainly [you] don’t want to make a decision where you’re sending 
someone into harm’s way, but at the same time you don’t want to disrupt 
the integrity of the program and just kind of find everybody eligible that 
may not need the same kind of protection as somebody else. So it’s just 
kind of hard balance sometimes. (Asylum officer ID09)
The “hard balance” of protecting the nation and “doing right by the appli-
cant” is predicated on asylum officers’ ability to discern between genuine and 
undeserving claimants, a task they view as central to their job. The stakes 
here are high. To be sure, many officers used the metaphor of “open-
ing the floodgates,” evoking images of the nation being overwhelmed by the 
“wrong” kind of migrants.
 Key to the positioning of oneself as a moral gatekeeper is the under-
standing of asylum seekers as already constituted subjects with regard to 
their deservingness of legal protection. In this way, asylum officers view the 
forms of knowledge and “technologies of truth” (Merry and Coutin 2014) 
that they bring to bear on the adjudication of asylum cases as a kind of 
archaeological method, with the claimant’s identity (“genuine” or “bogus”) 
being the object of investigation—hidden but discoverable by a trained eye. 
Again, such a view obfuscates the ways that the asylum officers, through the 
application of these techniques and technologies, actually produce asylum 
seekers as particular kinds of subjects.
 And yet, asylum officers underscored the indeterminacy, if not im-
possibility, of confidently making such judgments, of discerning between 
genuine and fraudulent claimants. As one senior asylum officer summed 
up, “You just never know if you’ve ever made the right decision.” Moral gate-
keeping appears to be on tenuous ground. How, then, do asylum officers 
engage in moral gatekeeping when it is both a necessary and impossible 
job? More specifically, how is “deservingness” and “undeservingness” (of legal 
recognition) “locally reckoned” in the context of asylum adjudication (Wil-
len 2012)?
 In exploring how asylum officers make judgments about what is genu-
ine and what is fraudulent within asylum seekers’ narratives, I am interested 
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in the moral conceptions and the technologies of truth and suspicion that 
are deployed in the adjudication process.  These technologies “produce and 
reinforce hierarchies between what is ‘knowable’ and what is not” (Merry 
and Coutin 2014, 1). While asylum officers attempted to construe these 
technologies of knowledge as neutral and “objective,” a more fine-grained 
analysis reveals their acknowledgment of the interpretive and ambivalent 
nature of asylum adjudication. In contrast to the ideal of asylum adjudi-
cation, the process is slippery and highly fraught, and asylum officers find 
themselves caught up in an endless cycle of suspicion.
CREDIBILITY AS KEY: DID THIS REALLY HAPPEN?
 To a large extent, “deservingness” within the asylum process is predicated 
on perceived credibility, the idea that an asylum claimant’s story of suffering 
is authentic—that it really happened to him or her. As legal scholar Mi-
chael Kagan (2003) argues, though credibility is not an explicit criterion 
for refugee protection, “in practice, being deemed credible may be the single 
biggest substantive hurdle before applicants” (368). Indeed, credibility has 
been shown to be “the core of the asylum process” (Thomas 2006, 79; see 
also Coffey 2003; Rempell 2009).
 In my interviews with asylum officers, the issue of credibility was the 
single most salient issue. Without exception, all asylum officers spontaneously 
highlighted credibility—more specifically, credibility assessments—as a cen-
tral concern in their work. While the asylum office does not collect data 
regarding the reasons for denials or referrals of asylum claims and was there-
fore unable to report how many cases were referred or denied due to adverse 
credibility findings, officers stressed that the most challenging cases were 
the ones in which a claimant’s credibility was suspect. As I have noted, all 
asylum seekers were viewed as suspect since anyone could be a fraudulent 
claimant, and asylum officers viewed their biggest threat to be an applicant 
trying to “pull one over” on them. Thus, the integrity of the asylum system 
and, by proxy, the nation as a whole is pitted against the asylum seeker who 
lies in order to gain access. Credibility, then, was often the key factor in dis-
cerning genuine asylum seekers from so-called bogus ones.
 However, asylum officers expressed a high degree of ambivalence about 
credibility assessments:
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Credibility determinations are horrible. They’re just impossible to tell if 
someone’s telling the truth. . . . Or know for sure they’re lying. You know, 
and you can’t ever really know. In rare times, you can know for sure that 
someone’s lying, and it’s like “Yeah!” [laughs]. “Cause I have proof. I got 
them!” But most of the time you might just have a feeling they’re lying, 
but you can’t catch them on anything. . . . So we don’t want to grant them 
until we believe them. And then we don’t believe them, so we don’t want 
to grant them. (Asylum officer ID010)
People can make up their stories just to gain the benefit. So that is 
probably the most difficult just because none of us are necessarily 
psychologists or . . . have that background where you can just look at 
someone and know they’re lying. (Asylum officer ID05)
The above excerpts make clear the crucial link that adjudicators made 
between credibility and deservingness. Lying, from the perspectives of 
asylum officials, is a manipulative strategy employed by asylum applicants 
to gain access to a benefit to which they, as “liars,” should not have the right 
to claim. And while research has shown that what may be identified as lying 
or withholding of information, particularly among refugees, is culturally and 
socially variable, such factors are not routinely taken into account by adju-
dicators (Bohmer and Shuman 2008). Furthermore, the conflation of lying 
with undeservingness fails to recognize the “moral economy of lying” that 
asylum regimes evoke, whereby successful testimonies often necessitate a 
recrafting or rearranging of biographical details and other elements of asy-
lum seekers’ stories (Beneduce 2015).
 These excerpts also reveal a critical paradox: credibility assessments 
are simultaneously necessary and impossible. Asylum officers understand 
their own capacity to discern between truthful and fraudulent claimants to 
be tenuous at best. While he or she may “just have a feeling” one way or the 
other, officers lack the expertise of a psychologist, for example, who would 
presumably be able to more confidently apprehend truthfulness or other 
“subjective” phenomena. There is, then, a danger inherent in this paradox 
of necessity and impossibility. To be sure, the highly subjective nature of 
credibility assessments has been criticized in the literature, pointing to ad-
judicators’ abuse of credibility assessments, wide discrepancies in adverse 
Asylum Officers, Suspicion, and Technologies of Truth  113
credibility decisions, and the interference of cultural bias with credibility 
determinations (Coffey 2003; Vedsted-Hansen 2005; Floss 2006; Thomas 
2006; Rempell 2008; Schroeder, 2017). The asylum officers with whom I 
spoke seemed quite aware of the dangerous murkiness of credibility assess-
ments because of their subjective elements. Emotional display, in particular, 
emerged as a particular focus of suspicion.
CREDIBILITY, EMOTION, AND NARRATIVE PERFORMANCE
 Asylum officers cited identifiable aspects of narrative performance that 
contributed to a sense of credibility: adequate use of detail, telling a lin-
ear story but able to “jump around,” and, importantly, the consistent use of 
proper names and dates. For the most part, however, asylum officers did not 
explicitly cite demeanor as a factor in credibility assessments, although they 
often alluded to an intangible quality that accompanied compelling accounts 
of a story. Thus, part of an applicant’s ability to “convince [the officer] that 
this happened to them” rested on his or her ability to evoke from the officer 
an empathic understanding, to make an affective connection. In this sense, 
it was the job of the asylum claimant to “elicit compassion” and engage in 
the act of “selling one’s suffering” (Ticktin 2011, 139, 127). Emotional dis-
play, though, could be tricky for asylum officers to read. If, as Fred Myers 
(1979) has argued, emotional talk can be a genuine reflection of inner 
states and/or strategic assertions of what is emotionally expected in a par-
ticular context, asylum officers were charged with discerning whether or 
not a claimant’s expressions of fear or sadness were “real” or strategic forms 
of self-objectification—and, of course, they could be both. Asylum officers 
reported that they often mistrusted claimants’ acts of crying, for example, 
knowing that it could be “real” emotion or it could be strictly performative.
 Yet even if asylum officers were confident that the emotional display of 
a claimant was “real”—that is, that the emotion the claimant expressed was 
a genuine reflection of his or her inner state—this was not enough to estab-
lish credibility in the eyes of these adjudicators. Another layer of suspicion 
was added: it could be the case, asylum officers told me, that the emotion is 
real, but the source of that emotion is suspect. For example:
It’s kind of hard [to assess emotions] because you don’t know when 
somebody’s crying why are they crying. They could be crying ’cause 
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their mom just passed away and they didn’t get to go to the funeral. Or 
they could be crying because they’re recounting something bad or they 
left their kid, so it’s kind of hard because you can see the emotion, but you 
don’t know the source. And it could be anything. (Asylum officer ID06; 
emphasis added)
Here, although this asylum officer may not discount the veracity of the claim-
ant’s emotion, her crying was not necessarily effective in establishing credibil-
ity because the source of the sadness could not be identified. And yet because 
of the subjective nature of phenomenon such as emotion, its source, of course, 
can never be definitively identified or proven. The asylum claimant remains 
a suspect figure, and evidence of her authenticity must be found elsewhere.
 If asylum officers then look to aspects of a claimant’s testimony and 
narrative performance that can be more readily identified and measured, 
such as level of detail or the use of names and dates, these elements, too, can 
become gray areas. In practice, the demarcation of what constitutes “subjec-
tive” and “objective” becomes ambiguous. In the course of discussing what 
kinds of “evidence” or signs asylum officers are trained to look for to deter-
mine credibility and authenticity, one officer recounted the following case:
And one time I had a man, this poor guy, he was getting his dates all 
confused, and he was, like, just all over the place, and it was very . . . and I 
was like, Gosh, this guy is sooo making up this story on the fly, whatever. 
And then he described going to jail, and I asked what they do to you, 
and he said, “They hooked me up to some wires.” And I said, “Then what 
happened?” And then he said, “Then I got really hot.” And I was, like, Oh 
my God, you were electrocuted. Your brain’s scrambled eggs. You can’t, 
you can’t give me dates, whatever. But unfortunately, because the guy was 
not represented and had no medical evidence at all, I couldn’t say he was 
credible because his dates were a mess. (Asylum officer ID05)
This narrative brings into relief many problematic aspects of the asylum in-
terview and highlights the ambiguity that imbues so much of the adjudication 
process. If we trace the narrative arc in this short passage, we see the asylum 
officer moving from suspicion (“I was like, Gosh, this guy is sooo making 
up this story”) to belief (“Oh my God, you were electrocuted”) and back to 
suspicion (“I couldn’t say he was credible”). This officer’s final judgment of 
denying credibility comes not from her subjective disbelief of the claimant’s 
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story but rather from the institutional disciplining of adjudicators that 
requires “subjective” evidence (e.g., personal testimony) to be corroborated 
by “objective” data (e.g., medical evidence, legal argument, consistent use of 
dates). Importantly, we see in this narrative passage an (inter)subjective mo-
ment of understanding in which the asylum officer realizes that something 
really did happen to her interviewee, despite his inability to offer a narrative 
that aligns with the cultural expectations of the politico-legal logic of asylum. 
It is from the inconsistencies and the untellability of the narrative that the 
asylum officer apprehends what she recognizes as the truth: the claimant was 
tortured. Furthermore, the officer understands this to be the reason for his 
inconsistencies: “Your brain’s scrambled eggs. You can’t . . . give me dates.” And 
yet this intersubjective moment of understanding through absences, through 
what was not said, was quickly rendered invisible given the lack of “objective” 
evidence that could support his perceived credibility. The asylum seeker’s in-
consistencies of dates quickly shift meaning from being a credible indicator 
of past persecution (an effect of torture) to the very justification in rendering 
that episode of persecution invisible as a legitimate claim for recognition.
 While this ultimately results in an act of bureaucratic violence—a de-
nial of asylum to a survivor of torture—it is important to note the moment, 
though fleeting, in which the techniques of knowledge and decision-making 
typically deployed in the adjudication process fail. Here it is in this mo-
ment of the failure of these technologies of truth that the asylum officer 
understands the claimant’s story. However, the authoritative weight given 
to “consistency” in asylum narratives delegitimizes alternative technologies 
of knowledge and decision-making that asylum officers may employ. Ulti-
mately, in rendering silent her own (inter)subjective understanding of the 
claimant’s authenticity and credibility, this asylum officer reproduces, albeit 
ambivalently, the forms of authoritative knowledge that have been previ-
ously established (i.e., inconsistencies in dates = lack of credibility). This 
move exposes the adjudication system, and the credibility determination 
process in particular, as a method not of getting at the truth but as “a means 
for constructing what the Truth is” (Beard and Noll 2009, 457).
CORROBORATING CREDIBILITY
 Merry and Coutin (2014), in their discussion of technologies of measure-
ment (e.g., census, audit), suggest that “interior, relatively subjective phenomenon” 
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often confound classification and are therefore “gauged by something more 
objective” (12). Likewise, asylum officers reported that they sought out “ob-
jective” measures to corroborate—or refute—“subjective” phenomena such 
as emotional displays. Throughout my conversations with asylum officers, 
they attempted to frame credibility assessments as an objective and analytic 
process, even as they simultaneously acknowledged their highly interpre-
tive and subjective nature. To this end, they stressed the need to “verify” a 
claimant’s testimony with “factual evidence” provided by external documents 
such as State Department reports on country conditions. Given adjudica-
tors’ perception of oral and written testimony as too subjective, they often 
searched for external ways to discern credibility. While the use of resources 
such as the State Department reports could be seen as a way to triangulate 
data, officers instead framed this as the need to affirm or negate a claimant’s 
subjective testimony of suffering and persecution with a putatively objective 
source (see Lawrance, this volume). This echoes arguments made by Mir-
iam Ticktin (2011) and Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman (2009), who 
have traced the historical and cultural trajectory by which asylum seekers’ 
own testimonies carry increasingly less legitimacy in the legal and political 
arenas and are often subordinated to other forms of expertise or evidence 
(see also Lawrance and Ruffer 2015).
 In my interviews with asylum officers, all of them stressed the impor-
tance of country conditions research, particularly State Department reports, 
for testing and establishing an applicant’s credibility. Recent legal scholar-
ship, however, has pointed to the “wildly varying degrees of deference” given 
to State Department country reports by immigration judges (Walker 2007, 
4). Critics argue that the reports are often “used as a crutch” in the legal arena 
(Floss 2006, 250) and that they have been problematically used “as dispos-
itive rejections of the asylum applicant’s admittedly credible personal testi-
mony” (Walker 2007, 4). Another source of (putatively) “objective” data used 
to corroborate credibility by adjudicators was external documentation that 
could constitute “evidence,” such as political membership cards, affidavits 
from witnesses or family members attesting to the applicant’s persecution, 
police records, and so forth. This was the case despite the fact that, in theory, 
asylum may be granted based solely on a claimant’s testimony. In practice, 
however, both asylum officials and lawyers and legal advocates told me that 
this is rarely the case. Indeed, as one asylum officer told me, “anything that 
corroborates a story will help.”
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 Despite officers’ attempts at framing external documentation as “ob-
jective,” in practice the assessment of documentation, like the assessment of 
written and oral testimony, was fraught with paradoxes and ambiguities that 
made this a much more slippery domain for adjudicators:
It’s more challenging to be from a country where fake documents are 
readily accessible, because you just can’t believe them. And they might 
have perfectly nice documents, and we’re going to be like, “Yeah, but 
you’re from Cameroon.” You know. It’s more suspect. So I think they 
have a harder time proving their case. (Asylum officer ID13)
I mean, sometimes the more documents you have the less likely it might 
be to believe a story. I mean, if someone says that the militia came and 
set fire to her house but then you have all these documents. “Well, how’d 
you get these documents if your house was on fire, and it was this really 
quick thing that was happening?” (Asylum officer ID08)
If material evidence such as identification documents was met with suspi-
cion, evidence attesting to trauma was an even more significant source of 
mistrust and ambivalence.
“YOU DON’T KNOW WHAT’S REAL AND WHAT’S NOT”:  
TRAUMA, CREDIBILITY, AND SUSPICION
 Fassin and colleagues (2005, 2007, 2009) have examined the devalua-
tion of asylum seekers’ personal testimonies within the political asylum pro-
cess in France. In the French asylum context, Fassin and Rechtman (2009) 
argue, the diagnostic category of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
marks “an end to suspicion,” and a medical certificate attesting to an asy-
lum seeker’s past trauma may constitute “proof ” of persecution (77). The 
concept of trauma and its related diagnosis of PTSD were certainly salient 
themes in my interviews with asylum officers. However, in contrast to Fas-
sin and Rechtman’s (2009) argument, trauma and PTSD emerged as much 
more contentious issues in my research site. Asylum officers were ambiv-
alent about the use of psychiatric and psychological evaluations and their 
ability—or not—to corroborate claims of credibility and assist in discern-
ing genuine asylum seekers from fraudulent ones. Some officers articulated 
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giving more weight to these evaluations. For example, one officer told me, 
“It’s almost sickening that the more trauma the better in a weird sense—the 
more obvious their eligibility.” Other asylum officers articulated their per-
spectives on psychiatric evaluations:
I find it [a psychiatric/psychological evaluation] very helpful because 
it gives me something to kind of hang my hat on. I mean it gives me 
one more legal tool that I can say look here, you know, they may be 
telling me the truth even though they can’t tell me the story. (Asylum 
officer ID04)
[Psychological/psychiatric evaluations] are helpful for showing how 
much injury they’ve suffered, how bad the harm has been to them. 
Also, kind of, it bolsters credibility in that, you know—they’re telling a 
psychologist the same thing they’re telling me. (Asylum officer ID09)
 While these narratives suggest that some officers made a connection 
between psychological evaluations, psychiatric diagnoses, and both credibil-
ity and eligibility, they do so for various reasons. The idea that “more trauma” 
allows eligibility to become more evident echoes Fassin (2005, 2007) and 
Ticktin (2006, 2011) in positing the subjectification of a suffering and trau-
matized body as an authentic, legitimate, and hence deserving body. The 
officer who suggested that psychological evaluations give her “something to 
kind of hang [her] hat on” does not necessarily link trauma with credibility. 
Rather, this officer frames the evaluation as “one more tool” in which to in-
terpret demeanor within the asylum interview. Other officers reiterated this 
aspect of the evaluations, arguing that while the evaluations may not bolster 
credibility, being aware of trauma or PTSD allows them, as adjudicators, to 
adjust their style of interviewing, including taking more time, being sure to 
have extra tissues available, speaking in a softer voice, or, as one officer put it, 
“trying to have a little bit more sensitivity.” 
 Finally, the asylum officer who claimed that a psychological evaluation 
helps to bolster credibility (ID09) points to the ways in which an evalua-
tion may be approached as evidence in which to compare and test for in-
consistencies or omissions of information. In other words, this officer did 
not claim that the trauma diagnosis bolsters a claimant’s credibility per se 
but rather that the possibility of finding consistent testimony between the 
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psychiatric evaluation and what he hears in his interview with the claimant 
is helpful in credibility determinations. However, there can be detrimental 
unintended consequences from the submission of these evaluations: a psy-
chiatric evaluation can also be source of inconsistencies and thus used as a 
way to weaken or even disprove credibility.
 Overall, asylum officers expressed suspicion regarding claims of trauma 
during their interviews and had mixed feelings about how much weight to 
accord to trauma and psychiatric diagnoses in assessing applicants’ eligibility 
and credibility:
I don’t know, it seems like everybody says they have PTSD and 
depression. . . . So, it’s kind of like “meh.” You don’t know what’s real, 
what’s not. (Asylum officer ID08)
I think it’s [submission of psychological evaluations] helpful to some 
extent. Like, we’ll get things [psychological evaluations] from [a local 
human rights organization]. I think it’s helpful to know, too, that a lot of 
times, at least with those types of organizations, there’s a level of vetting 
that goes on too. So that could be helpful or not helpful, because either 
the person has been vetted and is clearly credible to these people the 
whole time, or they’ve gotten more time to practice their story. So it’s 
kind of a mix. (Asylum officer ID02)
Well, if I have read their statement . . . I can compare what they’re telling 
me now to what they’ve written before, and most of the time people 
stay consistent, but sometimes it’s like “You say here you were arrested 
three times, and you’re telling me it was only twice.” And they’ll go (in 
exaggerated voice), “Oh, yeah, I forgot” or something like that. And you’re 
like, “Hmmmm. Why did you forget?” And they say (in a sarcastic voice) 
“The trauma,” and I’m like, “Oh, okay” (speaking in sarcastic, skeptical 
tone and rolling eyes). (Asylum officer ID03)
The first exchange related above (with ID08), in which the asylum officer 
wonders whether or not an applicant’s claim to PTSD or depression was 
“real” perhaps reflects the “PTSD fatigue” that a local attorney claimed to 
affect adjudicators. A PTSD diagnosis here is approached dubiously. And 
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though the frequency with which asylum seekers report PTSD and depres-
sion is reported in the psychological and psychiatric literature, in practice 
the perceived ubiquity of such diagnoses actually seems to lessen the impor-
tance of these categories within the asylum interview.
WHAT AND WHERE IS THE “REAL”?
 While some officers consider psychological evaluations as a way to 
“bolster credibility,” the second narrative presented above (ID02) demon-
strates that this is a contested stance. As this officer asserts, “vetting” by 
psychological organizations can either support credibility claims or can be 
indicative of a rehearsed (i.e., fraudulent) testimony. The final narrative pre-
sented above (ID03), while not speaking directly to the issue of submitted 
psychological evaluations, nonetheless reflects an overall skepticism or am-
bivalence on the part of asylum officers regarding the veracity of the concept 
of trauma as it is employed—here by an asylum claimant herself—within 
the asylum interview. What this officer hints at, with her sarcastic and skep-
tical tone, is that assertions of trauma may be a tool to be manipulated by 
asylum claimants in justifying inconsistencies. Thus, implicit in this officer’s 
narrative is the same ambiguity regarding the realness of claims to trauma 
and trauma-related diagnoses.
 Even for those adjudicators who did not deny the veracity of trauma- 
related psychiatric disorders, evaluations and psychiatric records attesting to 
this did not represent an unquestioned form of “proof ” of an applicant’s eli-
gibility or credibility. The case of Ruth, a Cameroonian asylum seeker and 
former political activist with whom I worked closely, painfully highlights this. 
During Ruth’s court hearing, her lawyers presented psychological and medical 
evaluations attesting to the long-term trauma she had suffered in her home 
country. The evaluations attributed her PTSD, depression, and anxiety, as 
well as her traumatic brain injury (TBI), to Ruth’s reports of detention and 
torture in Cameroon, claiming that such injuries and disorders were consis-
tent with her testimony. However, immigration officials denied Ruth asylum 
based on negative credibility findings, primarily based on inconsistencies re-
garding dates of her injuries as well as an allegedly altered membership card 
for a political party (the Southern Cameroons National Council [SCNC]). 
Upon appeal, Ruth’s volunteer legal representatives drew attention to the 
fact that, according to medical records, Ruth suffered from “cognitive deficits, 
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including memory loss, secondary to TBI,” as well as PTSD, both factors that 
could significantly contribute to inconsistencies in testimony.
 Ruth’s lawyers also stressed that her application included alternative 
evidence regarding her political party membership (the central aspect of her 
claim), including an affidavit from the SCNC chairperson in her hometown 
in Cameroon and receipts from membership dues. The Bureau of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) was not persuaded and upheld the original adjudicator’s 
claim that “the fact that [Ruth’s] SCNC card is not believable casts major 
doubt on the whole of her claim.” With regard to the psychiatric diagnoses 
and TBI, the BIA stated, “The fact that the respondent has suffered a trau-
matic brain injury does not establish that she was credible about the source 
of that injury, or her alleged political affiliations.”
 Ruth’s case suggests two important factors regarding how concepts 
of trauma and credibility are interpreted and assessed within the legal pro-
cess. First, Ruth’s case demonstrates that PTSD—or even a TBI—does 
not represent an end to suspicion in asylum cases (Fassin and Rechtman 
2009, 77). Even if the veracity of “trauma” or psychiatric diagnoses were 
not questioned, many adjudicators nonetheless viewed these categories as 
too subjective, precisely because the source of trauma or disorder was, to 
some extent, open to interpretation. Stuart L. Lustig (2008) has argued 
this point, positing that the difficulty in discerning the source of trauma for 
adjudicators (e.g., does PTSD result from political persecution or the act 
of flight and/or culture shock?) leads to less of a reliance on psychological 
or psychiatric evidence.
 Second, because of the perceived subjective nature of psychological 
evaluations and psychiatric diagnoses offered as evidence, inconsistencies 
in asylum seekers’ interviews or hearings (either inconsistencies within oral 
and written testimony or inconsistencies between testimony and country 
conditions documents) seemed to trump psychiatric evidence. That is, in-
consistencies in testimony appeared to serve as greater evidence of a lack of 
deservingness than did trauma and trauma-related disorders in indicating 
deservingness.
MEDIATING THE WEIGHT OF AN IMPOSSIBLE JOB
 Asylum officers ultimately conceded, either explicitly or implicitly, that 
assessing credibility and adjudicating claims were fluid, subjective, and 
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fallible procedures, despite attempts to make it as “objective” a process as pos-
sible. The technologies of knowledge deployed in the adjudication process 
were often engaged ambivalently by asylum officers, setting in motion a cycle 
of paradox and mistrust. Documents represented concrete, “objective” evi-
dence, yet these could be fraudulent. Emotions could reveal to adjudicators 
the authentic interior states of claimants, but such affective displays could be 
merely strategic performances, and their sources could be unknown. Psychi-
atric diagnoses and invocations of “trauma” could add legitimacy to a claim 
or be dismissed as “too subjective.” Indeterminacy characterized myriad 
elements of the adjudication process, and yet the credibility assessment as 
a technology of truth works to “produce certainties out of ambiguous and 
contested situations” (Merry and Coutin 2014, 2).
ADJUDICATORS’ AMBIVALENT POSITIONS OF POWER
 Attention to moments of ambivalence in the adjudication process il-
lustrates that the object of suspicion is not limited to the asylum claimant. 
Though often reluctant to admit it, asylum officers also viewed their own 
judgments with mistrust as well:
You know, I’ve come to realize that I don’t really know, bottom line. 
Bottom line, I don’t really know. I believe I’m a perceptive person and I’m 
intuitive, but, you know, I can’t read a person’s mind. . . . I’m not infallible. 
So I live with it. And, um, well, I live with it. (Asylum officer ID14)
So how do asylum officers “live with it?” How do asylum officers mediate, 
both inter- and intrapersonally, the demands of their position: discerning 
between genuine and bogus asylum seekers? In closing, I highlight some 
ways in which I observed asylum officers responding to the impossibility of 
certainty in evaluating stories of profound suffering and pain.
 In my interviews with these asylum officers, I noted that they read-
ily owned their decisions to grant asylum, especially to those whom they 
felt were “genuinely deserving.” Declarations such as “saving somebody’s life” 
or “helping somebody in a very real sense” were common when officers de-
scribed their jobs. However, they would often distance themselves from 
cases that they denied, thus demonstrating an ambivalent relationship to 
their own authority and power. For example, asylum officers emphasized 
repeatedly that claimants get “two bites of the apple.” Here, they are referring 
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to the fact that most asylum seekers can have their case heard by an im-
migration judge if an asylum officer denies them. While highlighting the 
power of immigration judges may have served to undermine asylum officers’ 
authority as decision-makers, it simultaneously abdicated them from the ul-
timate responsibility of denying someone legal status.
 The language that asylum officers used performed the social and 
moral work of both emotional detachment and the abdication of ultimate 
responsibility. More specifically, asylum officers would often frame asylum 
as a “benefit” or “service” to which an asylum claimant must prove his or her 
“entitlement,” with one asylum officer explaining succinctly, “It’s our job not 
to bestow a benefit on somebody that’s not deserving.” In echoing this sen-
timent, another officer insisted that asylum “is not a charity . . . this is not a 
hand-out” and that applicants must “demonstrate that they qualify for the 
benefit that they seek.” An additional, senior asylum officer summed it up in 
this way:
You know, in the final analysis, my take is, um, there’s a community 
that we work for. Yeah, we work for the applicants, okay, but they’re 
just applicants. Until they’ve demonstrated they’re true refugees, then 
we will accord them the benefits they seek. Until then, they’re coming 
to us, and they want something from us. When they demonstrate they 
deserve it, then they become, from my point of view, a customer. . . . 
They’re an applicant until they become a customer. . . . I will extend 
every courtesy and cordiality and all the rights that they’re entitled to. 
But I don’t believe that I’m dealing with customers. I mean . . . we are 
a service, but we provide the service to those who have demonstrated 
they are entitled to that service. So my biggest challenge has always 
been granting somebody who ought not to be granted and referring 
or denying somebody who should be granted. (Asylum officer ID04; 
emphasis added)
 While the language of “benefits,” “services,” and “customers” is perhaps 
not surprising given the neoliberal American context, I am interested in the 
moral value of such a framework. This rhetoric allows for an affective dis-
tancing of the asylum officer from the claimant. For example, the following 
quote from a senior asylum officer demonstrates how the asylum-as-benefit 
framework was invoked in light of the emotionally charged exchanges with 
asylum claimants:
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They [applicants] beg—they’re begging you, “Please, please.” I want 
to be like, “I’m not the queen, you know. I have to follow the rules 
and whatever. It’s not me giving it to you. It’s you qualifying.” (Asylum 
officer ID08)
Here, using the implicit framework of asylum as service or benefit supports 
the asylum officer’s emphasis that the burden is on asylum claimants to 
prove their case. This effectively shifts responsibility of a denial from the 
adjudicator to the claimant, who was purportedly unable to convince the 
officer of his or her deservingness or qualification of status. The following, 
final quote from a senior asylum officer illustrates the struggle officers en-
gage in to distance themselves from claimants while acknowledging that the 
reality of their decisions are, truly, matters of life and death:
A lot of times I’ll tell the new officers when they get here it’s like you have 
to be able to divorce yourself if you want to be able to sleep at night. You 
make a decision—the best decision you can based on the information 
you have at hand. And you let it lie. You know, our job is to try to help 
the people. But we’re not the ones who are harming them. So, you know 
. . . they still have the burden to make their case. And if we decide against 
them . . . all right, you can’t sit there and second-guess yourself that they’re 
going to be deported and go back and be killed. Because certainly that 
may happen. But you’re still not the one killing them. You’re not the one 
doing this to them. Somebody else is. (Asylum officer ID15)
 Cécile Rousseau and her colleagues (2002) have examined the refu-
gee determination process in Canada and suggested that adjudicators may 
suffer from “vicarious traumatization,” a process parallel to countertransfer-
ence in the therapeutic setting, where denial of refugees’ testimonies is one 
response. Adjudicators’ vicarious traumatization contributes to a collective 
“culture of disbelief ” in which refugee claimants are denied at high rates 
because of a perceived lack of credibility. While I am not arguing here that 
asylum officers in my research site suffer from such vicarious traumatization 
(though they may), Rousseau et alia’s work (2002, 2004) is instructive here 
in underscoring the thoroughly intersubjective nature of asylum interviews 
and the impact that such encounters have at an institutional level.
 The asylum interview is an intersubjective activity in which both asy-
lum officers and asylum claimants attempt to make meaning of narratives 
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of suffering and pain. Asylum claimants must struggle to be understood 
as worthy and legitimate subjects. Meaning here is cocreated, though in a 
highly inequitable exchange. To be sure, asylum officers wield a tremendous 
amount of power, and my research data show that a denial of asylum status 
(re)shaped not only the material circumstances of asylum seekers’ lives but 
also profoundly mediates their experiences of self and social world.
 The language of “benefits,” “customers,” and “entitlements” may serve to 
divorce asylum officers from the visceral pain of asylum claimants and the 
powerful impact that their decisions have on claimants’ lives. Yet what are 
the consequences of such distancing? When asylum seekers become “cus-
tomers” and the asylum interview a transaction, there are various aspects 
of asylum seekers’ experiences that become muted or effaced. Within the 
performance and evaluation of asylum claims at stake is the power to define 
the very contours of claimants’ identities and social realities.
 Because “any incoming body could be bogus” (Ahmed 2004a, 123), 
asylum officers adopt a “lens of suspicion” (Bohmer and Shuman 2008) for 
the adjudication of claims, with the goal of identifying the “bogus.” Yet fol-
lowing Ahmed (2004a), because the bogus asylum seeker has no reference 
(it could be anyone), the adjudication system and the technologies deployed 
by asylum officers must “stick” to bodies certain social identities and catego-
ries. While asylum officers attempted to frame this as an objective process 
where the true identities of claimants—genuine or fraudulent—are to be 
uncovered through the “rigor” and “order” of the adjudication process, a closer 
look at the narratives of asylum officers reveal cracks in this framework. This 
is most evident in asylum officers’ claims that ultimately adjudication relies 
on one’s “gut” or is ultimately “always a judgment call.” And yet this subjective 
core is elided by the insistence that “objective” evidence be brought to bear on 
elements deemed “too subjective” (affective displays, psychological affidavits, 
etc.). The cruel irony here is that while emotions of asylum seekers are often 
deemed too subjective—and hence suspect—to be counted as evidence, it is 
ultimately often the emotions of asylum officers that serve as a technology 
of constructing the “truth” about an asylum applicant. Asylum adjudicators 
use emotion both to dispel and create suspicion (Kobelinsky 2015). Asylum 
officers’ use of their gut or their intuition is problematic in that such modes 
of apprehending claims represent “hidden practices of decision-making that 
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remain beyond scrunity” (Puumula, Ylikomi, and Ristimäki 2017, 16). More-
over, the routinization of such hidden practices (e.g., the use of one’s 
intuition or the reading of nonverbal cues) ensures that over time these 
practices gain legitimacy and are uncritically viewed as part of professional 
knowledge ( Jubany 2011, 2017; Puumula, Ylikomi, and Ristimäki 2017).
 Close attention to the ambivalence that asylum officers express about 
their work and the embedded technologies of knowledge and suspicion 
provides a glimpse into aspects of the performance and interpretation of 
testimonies that get hidden or rendered silent. (The story of the claimant 
whose “brain is scrambled eggs” provides an important case in point.) For it 
is in the breakdowns of knowledge and decision-making that we can bet-
ter understand the (often invisible) power of technologies of truth—even 
if enacted and reproduced ambivalently—and the symbolic violence that 
these technologies may effect. Throughout this process, what goes unac-
knowledged is the way in which these technologies for getting at the truth 
actually construct the truth and create social categories and social realities. 
Confronting this necessitates a consideration of the social and personal in-
justices that are consequences of the “impossibility” of asylum adjudication.
NOTE
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Chapter 5
Country of Origin Information, Technologies  
of Suspicion, and the Erasure of the  
Supernatural in African Refugee Claims
BENJAMIN N. LAWRANCE
 I n  2 0 0 9 ,  t h e  a d h e r e n t s  o f  a  v o d o u  p r i e s t  ( b o k o n o ) 
kidnapped Dopé in Cotonou, Benin, and brought her to the atikevodou 
(healing vodou) shrine of Sakpata near Cové, where she was imprisoned and 
raped.1 After several weeks, Dopé, an educated, married mother, escaped to 
her husband and then fled to the United States to seek asylum. She believed 
her experiences were the result of her childhood betrothal as trokosi, a form 
of inheritable religious debt slavery, exacted as punishment for her mother’s 
infidelity. Dopé’s supernatural narrative troubled her lawyers, who feared no 
judge would consider it credible. They reframed her claim by document-
ing misogynistic forced-marriage practices, sexual assault, child abuse, child 
slavery, and the widespread belief in levirate (widow remarriage to husband’s 
kin) in Benin. Her lawyers chose gender-violence arguments coupled with 
established precedent pertaining to slavery and trafficking as a strategy to 
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avoid foregrounding the discussion of vodou, often considered a form of 
witchcraft by adjudicators.
 Dopé’s experience, like those of other women whose testimonies I 
have been asked to evaluate, is emblematic of legal strategies unfolding in 
response to the increasing securitization of migration (Squire 2009) and 
new technologies of adjudication (Lawrance and Ruffer 2015a). Until the 
1980s, refugee and asylum legal procedures operated within an informal 
climate of trust, and applicants were generally presumed to be telling the 
truth. Customized research—such as expert testimony from scholars or 
professionals (Lawrance et al. 2015) or medical reports (Lawrance 2013, 
2015; Wylie and Wallace 2014)—was almost unheard of. Since the 1980s, 
however, significant global geopolitical changes—including, but not lim-
ited to, the end of the Cold War and the expansion of globalized transna-
tional technologies—have conspired to turn the refugee experience upside 
down. The refugee status determination (RSD) process is now overshad-
owed by a “climate of suspicion, in which the refugee or asylum seeker 
is seen as someone trying to take advantage of the country’s hospitality” 
(Fassin and D’Halluin 2005, 600).
 A “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Ricœur 1970; Gadamer 1984; Stewart 
1989; Kessler 2005) characterizes asylum and refugee proceedings and gives 
rise to new technologies (Lawrance and Ruffer 2015a). One such technol-
ogy, data referred to as “country of origin information,” or COI, has become 
central to “testing” asylum narratives (Good 2015), and increasingly it fea-
tures in so-called “credibility assessments” (Cohen 2002; Thomas 2006). 
Adjudicators increasingly emphasize the importance of empirical research 
in establishing claimant credibility (UNHCR 2013; CREDO 2013). Claims 
and counterclaims must be anchored by objective data (such as verification 
of party membership) or publicly sourced information (such as verification 
of a riot or bombing), and arguments substantiated by scholarly evidence 
(such as plausibility of forms of persecution). This dramatic transforma-
tion in asylum procedure partly explains why lawyers reshape their clients’ 
narratives, as they are seeking to interface with the increasing reliance on 
expertise (see Lawrance and Walker-Said 2016).
 COI has emerged as a specialized knowledge category that attempts 
to answer, with empirical data, the central matter of refugee law—namely, 
who is a refugee? As Jean-François Lyotard (1983) explained, the burden 
resting on individual asylum seekers to prove claims that often cannot be 
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documented is a “wrong” but one that is “accompanied by the loss of means 
to prove the damage” (5). The temptation to stretch, embellish, or invent 
narratives that conform to asylum law is thus enormous. Cross-cultural and 
cross-linguistics communication barriers coupled with physical and psycho-
logical traumas add considerable complexity (Einhorn and Bertoldt 2015; 
Smith, Lustig, and Gangsei 2015), making inconsistency part and parcel 
of the process of narration (Cohen 2002). Indeed, the borderline between 
“political” and “economic” refugees is very difficult to determine (Derrida 
2001,12).
 This chapter explores how one particular technology of suspicion, 
when applied to supernatural narratives embedded in the asylum claims, 
disrupts prevailing refugee practices with unsettling consequences for claim-
ants and their capacity to narrate their own truth. The disjuncture between 
the initial narration of the experience by the refugee on the one hand and 
the process of translation via lawyers and expert witnesses appearing before 
adjudicators on the other has opened a space for the growth of “credibility 
assessments” and a proliferation of COI research methods and practices. 
Here I explore the relationship between credibility and COI and con-
sider why COI has come to occupy such a prominent role in the context 
of supernatural narratives. Constraints of refugee-convention definitions of 
protection compel lawyers to marginalize witchcraft, vodou, and related su-
pernatural practices and to foreground other elements of the claims, which, 
they opine, may be more effectively supported by expert evidence and COI. 
But, in so doing, the strategies of lawyers, the prejudices of adjudicators, and 
the refugee conventions broadly understood subject terrified individuals to 
further bureaucratic violence.
CONTEXTUALIZING SUPERNATURAL ASYLUM CLAIMS
 Recent scholarship on the supernatural in Africa—including but not 
limited to practices described as magic, sorcery, and witchcraft—has 
returned to the distinction, first articulated by E. E. Evans-Pritchard 
(1976), between external and somatic supernatural power. Witchcraft, 
the preeminent folk terminology for the supernatural, is much more pub-
lic in Africa today (Geschiere 2008) and features in political and social 
debate (West 2007). Witchcraft-driven violence challenges sociopolitical 
order with a variety of political and legislative outcomes (see Comaroff and 
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Comaroff 1993; Geschiere 1997; Ashforth 2005; Luongo 2011). Witchcraft 
and sorcery “denote a continuum ranging from supernatural malevolence 
to supernatural healing” (Luongo 2015, 186). Harry West (2005) describes 
Mozambique’s Muedan Plateau as a “world of sorcery filled with shades of 
gray” (77). By contrast, however, in the “global arena of asylum,” according to 
Katherine Luongo (2015), “no ambiguity about witchcraft or witches exists” 
(186, 187). Witchcraft operates as an “embodied capacity” to “harm” (Luongo 
2011, 9). And in asylum claims, witchcraft has “an uncomfortable ahistoricity 
and an awkward detachment from institutions” (Luongo 2015, 187).
 Supernatural allegations are as complex a site for refugee adjudicators 
as they are for scholars but for different reasons. As Luongo (2015) explains, 
claims for protection from “the threat of violence driven by witchcraft” 
often appear “extraordinary” at “first glance” (183). Immigration authorities 
“struggle with” witchcraft as a “unit of analysis,” viewing both allegations 
of and expert testimony about sorcery “with institutionalized incredulity” 
(185). Claims from Nigeria and Tanzania, for example, assessed by the 
Immigration Review Board in Canada were rejected throughout the early 
2000s because the violence described by the refugees was not considered a 
convention-anchored basis for protection. Notwithstanding these early re-
jections of claims, increasing numbers of refugee claims in Canada, Austra-
lia, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere describing “witchcraft as an engine 
of violence” (183) strongly suggest that African asylum seekers “have engaged 
the official rhetoric of refugee protection” and are developing a sui generis 
“particular social group” jurisprudence to enable protection (184).
 Asylum seekers are often uncomfortable divulging the full details of 
the supernatural realm, but generally speaking it is my experience that many 
are confident that their experiences mark them as constitutive of a protected 
“particular social group” (Millbank 2009). Luongo’s analysis examined cases 
in which witchcraft is front and center. I have received solicitations to write 
about cases that mirror some of those she has analyzed. In one recent ex-
ample from Nigeria, addressed directly to me by email, an individual from 
Nigeria described himself as “a witch” and described his fear that he was to 
be “killed with black magic.” But in contrast with the published cases ana-
lyzed by Luongo, here I examine asylum claims in which the supernatural 
is only one facet in a multidimensional case. By selecting such cases, I seek 
to sidestep the ongoing debate concerning the evolution of the definition of 
the “particular social group” basis for asylum (see Helton 1983; Graves 1989; 
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Musalo 2003) and the position of the supernatural (Schnoebelen 2009; 
Bruynell 2012) and instead to focus on how and under what conditions Af-
rican spiritual practices are viewed as lacking credibility and rendered insuf-
ficient for refugee protection. Examples from Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso, 
and Benin, from at least ten represented to me by attorneys, illustrate several 
dimensions of this bureaucratic violence.
CREDIBILITY AND COI
 Before considering credibility in the context of supernatural asylum 
claims, how credibility became the shibboleth it currently is merits some 
consideration. Assessing credibility has emerged as site of administrative 
and governmental attention because it reveals the unbounded, unanchored 
dimensions of the legal predicament of the refugee. Refugee law draws on 
criminal (Byrne 2005, 180), administrative, and civil law, and unevenly so; it 
is not simply human rights practice or international humanitarian law. The 
measurement of consistency and plausibility of refugee narratives can never 
be an exact science, and “how much” (Sweeney 2009) of one or the other 
depends on a variety of factors. RSD operates within an unbounded legal 
domain and in a constant state of flux, the unanchored nature of which is 
revealed by policies, procedures, standards, and practices, many of which are 
themselves the subject of legal challenges, judicial review, and international 
mandates and criticism.
 The central elements of credibility, as discerned by Michael Kagan 
(2003), may be separated into “positive” and “negative” factors that are ac-
corded probative weight in adjudication. The positive factors consist of de-
tail, specificity, consistency, furnishing all facts early in the proceeding, and 
the general plausibility of the account. The negative factors are vagueness, 
contradiction, delayed revelation of details and facts, and general implau-
sibility. These powerfully probative criteria, however, may not be divorced 
from the multiplicity of contexts of production, beginning with the first in-
terview upon arrival or detention, via multiple rounds of statements and 
court and appellate testimony. As Rosemary Byrne (2005) observes, asylum 
seekers “must deliver their testimony credibly, and must be found credible in 
differing contexts” (179).
 Credibility assessment speaks to a central tension embodied in asy-
lum seekers, insofar as they are thrust between the imagined and idealized 
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protections of refugee law and national realities and arbitrariness of do-
mestic immigration control. Credibility draws attention to the “intensely 
narrative mode” (Millbank 2009, 1) of the adjudicatory power of RSD 
and central importance of communication (Doornbos 2005). Robert 
Thomas (2006) explains the central tension thus: On the one hand, rec-
ognizing “genuine claimants is to fulfil the humanitarian objectives of the 
convention and protect fundamental human rights” (80). On the other 
hand, “the decision-maker” is also “concerned to ensure that non-genuine 
applicants are refused in order to maintain ordinary immigration control” 
(80). But as Kagan (2003) has observed, assessments of credibility, “often 
the single most important step” in adjudication, are “frequently based on 
personal judgment that is inconsistent from one adjudicator to the next” 
(367, 378).
 Decisions about a “well-founded fear of being persecuted,” as required 
by the United Nations’ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
increasingly depend on COI about an applicant’s origin country’s history 
and prevailing situation (UNHCR 2013). For the purpose of RSD, exter-
nal consistency necessitates that adjudicators evaluate new claims against 
COI (Good 2015). Adjudicators must decide not only whether an uncor-
roborated story appears internally credible but also that it is externally consistent 
with available COI (Weston 1998; UKBA n.d., para. 4.3). Novel or unusual 
claims are subject to additional scrutiny, and they provoke COI requests 
from refugee officers or judges to COI directorates. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees requires that COI be publicly accessible 
to all parties.
 Despite the increasing prominence of COI data in RSD globally, 
limited attention has been paid to the definition of and practices sur-
rounding its emergence, collection, and use. The European Country of 
Origin Information Network, for example, defined COI merely as “infor-
mation on conditions in countries of origin of asylum seekers” (ecoi.net 
2013). The UK Border Agency (UKBA, replaced in 2013 by UK Visa and 
Immigration), while giving an equally broad definition, explains that its 
focus is on COI concerning “human rights issues and matters frequently 
raised in asylum and human rights claims” (UKBA n.d.). It is now widely 
recognized that COI figures importantly in RSD globally (ARC 2013), yet 
how the specific research practices, mechanisms, and standards contribute 
to a definition remain unexplained. Isolated national processes have been 
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described (Rousseau et al.  2002; ACCORD 2013), but the national differ-
entiation in terms of production and employment (Gyulai 2011, 7) remain 
undocumented. 
 COI appears to have emerged domestically and unevenly from inter-
national law. Contemporary refugee and asylum law, defined in the wake of 
World War II, rests on the 1951 refugee convention and its 1967 protocol. 
Only with the protocol was “refugee” status expanded to include populations 
outside Europe and to events occurring after January 1, 1951. These instru-
ments have been domesticated with varying degrees of success throughout 
the globe (Goodwin-Gill 1999; Barutciski 2002; Kagan 2006). While these 
guidelines may appear straightforward, apart from the challenges of verify-
ing the stories of events that occurred thousands of miles away, other aspects 
of the law also leave room for ambiguity: how to define a “well-founded fear 
of persecution” or “membership in a particular social group” and what con-
stitutes “political opinion.”
 A commitment to empiricism resides at the heart of COI, but its com-
pilation, indexing, databasing, storage, and ultimately its implementation in 
adjudication is complicated by national anxieties about the volume of mi-
gration (see Gibney 2008; De Genova and Peutz 2010; Kanstroom 2012). 
Whereas each asylum seeker’s claim is considered on its merits, decisions 
based on COI may become “precedent-setting” and influence other decisions 
(Good 2015). Attempts to investigate and prove aspects of one particular 
case may subsequently become the benchmark and determine the parame-
ters of ensuing claims (Kassindja and Bashir 1998; Musalo 1998; Piot 2007), 
seemingly regardless of the domestic legal system in operation. Embedded 
within asylum and refugee narratives and their successive iterations in rul-
ings, judgments, COI information, appeals, and precedents are analytical 
categories, constructed identities, and personal narratives of fear, trauma, 
and jeopardy.
 COI operates within the constraints imposed by national legal pro-
cesses, but these limitations are opaque at best. COI operates as an “institu-
tional setting” for complex “transnational connections” (Radcliffe 2001, 20) 
that “reproduce” state power (Stevens 1999) and functionality. Research on 
expert testimony offers some insight into how to locate COI’s limitations. 
Expert testimony seeks to render refugees recognizable according to social 
and political norms configuring the present-day rule of law and thus to lead 
to the courts’ recognition of claimants as worthy of asylum (Good 2004a, 
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2004b). In the United Kingdom, courts routinely seek to “constrain the 
expert’s influence, through such means as the ‘hearsay rule’ . . . and the 
‘ultimate issue’ rule, which prevents witnesses from giving opinions on the 
main issues at stake” (Good 2008, sec. 48). The parallel is especially cogent 
because COI, like expert testimony, contributes to the reframing of asylum 
seekers’ narratives as legal evidence in order to fit them into the host coun-
try’s applicable rules of law. In so doing COI decontextualizes the claimant 
from his or her social and political subjectivity, erases personal experience, 
and subjects the refugee to bureaucratic violence.
SUPERNATURAL REFUGEE NARRATIVES
 Asylum claims in which the supernatural is only one facet in a multi-
dimensional case enable us to avoid entering into the rich but frustrating 
debate about what constitutes a particular social group basis for asylum. 
Four examples illustrate four particular dimensions of how African spiri-
tual practices are rarely viewed as religion per se for the purpose of refugee 
protection. Akosua from Ghana draws attention to whether or not magic 
is an external extrafamilial force. Konda’s narrative from Togo further un-
settles the line between family and community in supernatural narratives. 
Dopé’s experience in Benin, with which I began this chapter, highlights 
how supernatural belief is not confined to lower socioeconomic echelons. 
And Aliyah’s story from Burkina Faso draws attention to how documenting 
the materiality of the supernatural realm subversively destabilizes the legiti-
macy of supernatural religious practice.
Akosua
 The first supernatural story troubles common perceptions that magic 
is an external extrafamilial force. Akosua, from Ghana, fled in the mid-2000s 
to the United Kingdom and claimed asylum. She was a young woman in her 
late teens and the youngest of several siblings. In her first statement, she de-
scribed the immediate cause of her flight from a village in the Volta Region 
via Accra to London as an attempt to force her into a marriage to an elderly 
man (afeto) several years earlier, while she was still a child. In her fuller sub-
sequent narrative, however, she described how she was first conveyed to the 
man who lived either by or in a vodou shrine. Upon closer scrutiny, it be-
came apparent that her forced marriage began as an act of trafficking, insofar 
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as her parents sold her for a previously negotiated bride-price, and they then 
paid a third party to have her physically conveyed to the afeto. Her experi-
ence then became one of enslavement to a shrine in a manner akin to trokosi 
in southeastern Ghana.
 Whereas her description of her experience in the shrine was consis-
tent with scholarly and media accounts of victims of trokosi enslavement 
and trafficking for labor and sexual exploitation, subsequent events explain 
how her narrative became more problematic. Before the attempted marriage 
ceremony, the afeto fell ill. Akosua assumes that the afeto’s family took him 
to a shrine outside their village and that the shrine’s bokono deduced that 
his illness was the result of black magic performed by Akosua because the 
young woman was disinclined to marry. Akosua was physically conveyed 
to the same shrine, where she was accused being a witch and of causing his 
illness and also of killing her own father and aunt by magic (she used the 
word “juju”). Her head was shaved (common both for trokosi initiates and 
those accused of juju) in the presence of male and female elders; the female 
elders also performed a cleansing ceremony (dodédé). Akosua’s asylum claim 
was rejected at the first-tier tribunal as unfounded because the UKBA con-
tended that such “witch camps” only existed in the north of Ghana, and she 
was in the southeast where there was no evidence of witch camps.
Konda
 A second case concerns a young girl, Konda, who fled Togo while still 
a minor, blurs the line between magic and the family but in a different way. 
Konda initially grounded her claim in political activity. In her first adjudica-
tion, her opposition political involvement was not believed by the UKBA. 
Her description of protests, beatings, arrests, imprisonments, rape during 
detention, and her parents’ attempt to coerce her into a union against her 
will, was rejected in whole as “fallacious.” But a second dimension of her 
case was considered particularly troubling by the UKBA. Konda explained 
that after some time in Togo, she fled to Benin to reside with her uncle. She 
then returned to Togo because her uncle’s wife (her aunt) performed “black 
magic.” Konda was initially hesitant to divulge this information. She did not 
provide any information about her aunt in her initial interview. But in a sub-
sequent interview with a Home Office adjudicator, Konda’s fear of her aunt 
was explained as one reason she returned to Togo. Konda was never asked 
to provide a detailed account of what happened or details about her aunt’s 
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threats. Because she had failed to inform the UKBA at the outset about the 
supernatural dimension, they concluded that the “entire claim” was unbeliev-
able. And because Konda would not divulge the details of the supernatural 
threats, her fear of her aunt was also not believed.
 In response to the UKBA as part of a new appeal, Konda conveyed a 
much more detailed allegation against her aunt. She explained:
My Aunt was capable of killing me. She is a witch and people have died 
mysteriously and there was no reason identified for their deaths so it 
was decided that she must have been responsible for their deaths. She 
has killed people and that is why she is a witch. I think that she was a 
practitioner of voodoo, which is illegal in Togo. She was well known in 
our area. The police do nothing but people of the villages sometimes 
chase out people like my Aunt. If I was returned to Togo my family 
would know where I was and I would be found by my Aunt. She can 
know what is going on in my head, what I am thinking and feeling and 
she can know what is going to happen in my future. I believe that my 
Aunt has in the past been the reason why I may have become ill. She 
does not practise any good magic only bad magic.2
 Whereas the UKBA continued to disbelieve Konda’s entire narrative, 
she was granted temporary protection, as a minor, and her case was reheard 
several years later.
Dopé
 The third case, Dopé, with which I opened this chapter, demonstrates 
how in contrast with many adjudicators perceptions that “primitive beliefs” 
are the realm of poor and illiterate, the supernatural is not confined to lower 
socioeconomic echelons. Dopé, an educated, married mother living in the 
economic capital of Benin, Cotonou, but originally from the village of Cové, 
fled to the United States after her traumatic experience. Dopé claimed she 
was kidnapped as an adult in her late twenties by adherents of a bokono and 
brought to his atikevodou  shrine of Sakpata, where she was imprisoned and 
repeatedly raped. Dopé believed her experiences as an adult were the result of 
her childhood bonding as a trokosi, part of a punishment for her mother’s 
infidelity. Dopé interpreted her predicament to be the result of her public 
disavowal of the trokosi obligations when she reached maturity. She had 
been raped and abused by her kidnapper’s brother multiple times as a child. 
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But when she reached maturity, she simply walked from the compound and 
moved to Cotonou to begin a new life. Whereas the individual to whom 
she was betrothed had made no attempt to entice her to the shrine, after his 
death his brother dispatched men to kidnap her, consistent with his under-
standing of levirate.
 In her initial interview, the US asylum officer rejected the idea that 
educated, literate women practiced vodou. The Bureau of Immigration and 
Citizenship Services (BCIS) held that only the poor, rural, and illiterate 
would be involved in sorcery and magic. Drawing on various scholarly and 
media materials, the BCIS noted that the primarily Yoruba settlement of 
Cové, in the Zou Department, is the location of a powerful religious com-
munity called Egungun. The many religious communities in the area are all 
tied to variants of the Yoruba religion. These communities share many prac-
tices, preeminent among them being the honoring, cultivating, and worship 
of spirits (vodou). Cové is the site of multiple sects and most famously the 
Gélédé secret society. Ritual enslavement for punishment (trokosi enslave-
ment) is a form of female religious bondage necessitated by debt obligations 
that is of decreasing prevalence in parts of Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Ni-
geria, particularly among the Ewe-speaking communities. Trokosi, literally 
“wives of the spirit Kosi,” (see Akyeampong 2001, 221) is one form of vodounsi 
(Brand 2001). While the origins of the institution are somewhat unclear, 
purportedly egregious cases of exploitation in the 1990s highlighted by local 
and international human rights organizations brought renewed attention to 
this form of slavery and sexual abuse.3
Aliyah
 A final anecdote, from Burkina Faso, highlights the materiality of the 
supernatural realm, providing substance to claims but also adding additional 
layers of complexity. Aliyah, a woman in her mid-twenties from a small vil-
lage near Bobo-Dioulasso, is a survivor of attempted forced genital cutting 
at the hands of her father and his family and of forced prostitution, traffick-
ing, and attempted forced marriage at the hands of her erstwhile protector, a 
“madam” in Ouagadougou, the nation’s capital. Aliyah’s father had informed 
her at the age of sixteen that she was to be subjected to genital cutting. She 
subsequently fled her village and became destitute in Ouagadougou. Mir-
iam, an individual who knew Aliyah’s late mother, befriended her and took 
her in. But Aliyah was unaware at the time that she was being groomed 
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for a prostitution network that Miriam ran with the consent of and for 
the benefit of many highly influential Burkinabe politicians. Miriam sent 
Aliyah to the United States to marry one of her former clients. But once in 
the United States, Aliyah claimed asylum. Ever since Aliyah’s rejection of 
the proposed union, Miriam has sent small boxes of strange objects from 
Burkina Faso in the mail. Aliyah believes she is being subjected to a form of 
black magic.
 Aliyah’s boxes of supernatural oddments had the potential to de-
rail an otherwise compelling and multivalent narrative of persecution for 
several reasons. After spending some time in the southern United States 
awaiting her adjudication, Aliyah had taken to referring to the boxes of 
items as “voodoo.” Precisely why she adopted this term was never explained 
to me. But in an exchange with her attorney, I explained that it might make 
sense to avoid using the word voodoo (or the variants vodou and vaudou) 
because these terms are not traditionally associated with Burkina Faso. I 
explained that if I were trying to translate the experience, I would call it 
animist practice and animist objects, “black magic” (in quotes), witchcraft, 
or occult supernatural practice. These suggestions were informed by sev-
eral considerations. Claims about black magic can often unsettle adjudi-
cators, as Luongo argues. Indeed, the US immigration judge viewed the 
objects with noticeable discomfort and waved them aside with his hand 
when they were presented only several feet away. Vernacularization of in-
digenous terminology can also raise potential red flags. On the one hand, 
the asylum seeker and his or her counsel are attempting to convey in com-
prehensible, and perhaps palatable, language meanings that would oth-
erwise be lost on adjudicators with little to no familiarity with a specific 
region or country, such as Burkina Faso. But on the other hand, adopting 
a term such as voodoo (perhaps as a result of conversations with African 
Americans in the South or with other francophone African immigrants) 
could be interpreted as evidence that Aliyah was lying about her national 
origin in Burkina Faso.
 Assembled together, these four examples reveal several critical dimen-
sions in asylum claims invoking the supernatural as they pertain to credibil-
ity. First, from a narrative standpoint, the supernatural is all-encompassing; 
it can enter conversation at any point, seamlessly, and without warning. The 
question thus arises: How does the credibility assessment attempt to contain 
supernatural narratives? Second, the supernatural realm unites and divides 
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families; asylum seekers identify supernatural causes within the family and 
outside, and equally they can be part of, or thrust from, families as a result. 
Another question thus arises: How should adjudicators interpret the perse-
cutory context of family supernatural dynamics against the refugee conven-
tion’s mandate? Third, the supernatural realm knows no social or economic 
boundaries; it is not confined to asylum seekers of lesser education or with 
limited exposure to Western, secular, Christian, or other beliefs. A question 
emerging from this is how to account for the credibility of belief systems 
vis-à-vis the refugee convention? And finally, the supernatural can present 
itself as oral testimony but also in a physical and material context. From an 
evidentiary standpoint, adjudicators are used to examining political party 
affiliation cards and arrest warrants, but they may now be presented with 
boxes of seemingly random objects delivered as curses, weapons, or threats. 
And from this issue, the question emerges of how to weigh evidentiary mat-
ters within the wider context of credibility determination. In summary, su-
pernatural asylum claims raise a host of credibility matters that do not easily 
find solutions.
 But what precise elements of supernatural claims are evaluated in 
credibility assessments? What details are tested? And against what are they 
tested? When, in the case of Konda, the UKBA held her narrative of her 
aunt to be fallacious, how was the evaluation or test conducted? What evi-
dence was brought to bear? When Akosua’s narrative of being in a camp or 
enclosure was rejected as not supported by objective evidence, what data was 
used, and what was its probative value? When Aliyah’s box of oddments was 
pushed aside by the immigration judge, how did his discomfort alter her 
narrative and her capacity to seek protection? And when Dopé was told to 
her face that it was implausible that she, as an educated mother and business 
owner, would be involved in vodou, what assumptions were embedded in 
the adjudicator’s statement? Each of these cases speaks to the various ways 
in which COI research enters into the adjudicatory process.
COI AND THE ERASURE OF THE SUPERNATURAL
 COI is a uniquely national, applied iteration of  “global knowledge” 
(e.g., Mahajan 2008; Rothstein 2009; Keim, Çelik, Ersche, and Wöhner 
2014). In response to the expanding evidentiary burdens of RSD, national 
directorates, independent research centers, nongovernmental organizations 
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(NGOs), and for-profit companies operating under a spectrum of man-
dates, self-regulation, national policies, and ideologies have proliferated 
in the industrialized Global North. COI operations consist of research 
networks (Riles 2000) employed by government ministries, professional 
contractors, court clerks, on-the-ground technicians, embassy staff, and 
contracted freelance academic professionals. COI is a dynamic “science-lay 
hybrid assemblage” (Delgado 2010, 564) of global knowledge, wherein 
refugee subjectivities and expert knowledge intermingle on the path toward 
a determination.
 Lawyers ultimately reshaped each of the four cases described here as 
part of an intentional strategy as the vicissitudes of the adjudicatory process 
unfolded. Various lawyers, independently of one another, deemed it nec-
essary to downplay the supernatural and elevate established grounds and 
matters supported by COI. Akosua was a victim of a form of internal (i.e., 
domestic) human trafficking and domestic violence whereby she was first 
forced into a marital arrangement against her will with the afeto and sub-
sequently bonded to a fetish shrine for punishment for alleged criminality, 
an experience that is not uncommon in the region of southeastern Ghana 
populated by the Ewe ethnic group. While Akosua’s story is not representa-
tive of the majoritarian trokosi experience, it is nonetheless consistent with 
practices. Whereas the vast majority of individuals bonded to shrines are 
bonded for a fixed period or in perpetuity, are prepubescent, and undergo 
a ceremony in the presence of a bokono and become trokosi, Akosua en-
tered the shrine as a young woman for an unspecified amount of time and 
as a punishment for her alleged actions—actions that had caused spiritual 
pollution and shame to her family.
 In the case of Dopé, whereas ritual enslavement and vodou may have 
puzzled an adjudicator, defensively resisting slavery, kidnapping, rape, and 
imprisonment—in a country where vodou is publicly sanctioned and where 
the state has designated a “National Voodoo Day”—enters established 
grounds for particular social group persecution.4 The constitution and the 
statutes of Benin prohibit many practices attendant to slavery but impor-
tantly make no mention of trokosi and vodounsi, sexual slavery, forced mar-
riage (mariage forcé), and sexual assault in the context of marriage. Revisions 
to the Family Code (Code des Personnes et de la Famille) in 2004 repealed 
many discriminatory aspects of Le Coutumier du Dahomey, the 1931 collec-
tion of customs and rules codified during French colonial rule. But while 
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“customary law,” as it appears in the Coutumier, no longer has the status of law 
and is no longer recognized by the courts, it remained the case that many 
“women continue[d] to be subject to the ‘Coutumier du Dahomey’ which 
treat[ed] them as legal minors and accord[ed] them limited rights in 
marriage and inheritance.”5
 At the time of Dopé’s hearing, the practice of levirate was documented 
in Benin.6 Aspects of Dopé’s forced-marriage narrative may have been ille-
gal under the 2004 revision of the Family Code, but the practice of levirate 
remained quasi-legal insofar as it was not specifically prohibited.7 The 2004 
Family Code explicitly prohibited forced marriage, but there was no evi-
dence of enforcement.8 And whereas from the mid-1990s the governments 
of Ghana and Togo made concerted efforts to stamp out the remaining 
vodounsi, including trokosi, and mediate the relocation and retraining of 
individuals, Benin passed no similar law.9 Dopé’s legal team thus successfully 
reassembled her narrative as that of a woman fleeing multiple backward tra-
ditional misogynistic practices, at the center of which was a very violent 
form of forced marriage for which there was no plausible expectation of 
state protection.
 In Konda’s case, after attaining maturity, she again petitioned for 
asylum but included previously omitted components predating and post-
dating her flight, notably her parents’ attempt to lure her back to Togo in 
order to coerce her into marriage, and her aunt’s witchcraft. Whereas the 
political grounds for the first ruling still held true, Konda’s second attempt 
to remain permanently in the United Kingdom was reframed by the new 
information about the attempted forced marriage, and her fear of her aunt, 
the alleged witch, was downplayed. The jeopardy of forced marriage was 
more or less set aside in Konda’s original claim because she was a minor. 
Moreover, the man’s three existing unions were viewed by immigration of-
ficials as an indication that he was a morally and legally upstanding citizen, 
thus diminishing Konda’s credibility. After she reached legal maturity and 
her case was again reviewed, her lawyers considered her political activities to 
be important but likely insufficient for asylum.
 Konda’s lawyer made a calculated decision to abandon the super-
natural because of the abundant nature of the COI pertaining to forced 
marriage and a sense that the authorities would treat the black magic di-
mension with skepticism. Konda wanted to describe her aunt’s super-
natural powers, and in interviews she explained in depth her aunt’s capacity 
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of black magic. Unexplained deaths, unexplained illnesses, and a variety 
of other tales underscored why Konda was willing to leave her temporary 
refuge in Benin and return to the threat of coerced marriage in Togo. But 
her lawyers saw things differently. Instead, her parents’ attempt to coerce 
her into a union was presented as a mechanism with which to ameliorate 
the damage her political actions had allegedly caused her family. In their 
attempt to coerce Konda into marriage, her parents arranged for a story to 
be published in a Togolese biweekly newspaper that gave the impression 
that she was “lost” (perdu) and needed “help” (assistance). Konda’s parents’ 
narrative portrayed her as a misguided girl who had fallen into bad com-
pany and needed rescuing. It was carefully and intentionally designed as a 
mechanism of entrapment whereby an unwitting bystander or resident see-
ing Konda might possibly take pity on her and bring her to the authorities. 
Together the newspaper article and photograph conveyed an unmistakable 
message to an urban Muslim readership—namely, that she was a runaway 
bride. Because of the detailed and abundant information about coercive 
marriage practices in Togo, her lawyer effectively excised the supernatural 
in its entirety from her narrative.
 In Aliyah’s case, the absence of concrete rules of evidence in US immi-
gration courts was a cause for concern. When documents such as passports 
and party membership cards are produced as evidence, BCIS will often 
subject them to what they refer to as “forensic tests,” although the nature 
of the test, method, and comparative evidence is never provided. Docu-
ment fraud is an area of acute concern for immigration ministries globally, 
and document “verification” can be a long and drawn-out process. I am also 
frequently asked to comment on the type of documentation produced as 
evidence of identity. Precisely what sort of tests birth certificates or pass-
ports can be subjected to, however, is a matter of debate beyond the scope 
of this chapter. But against what data or comparative materials boxes of 
purported supernatural objects can be compared and evaluated is unclear. 
Aliyah’s mailed threats were never scrutinized for content, nature, or ori-
gin. No expertise on charms, magic, or witchcraft reported on their form 
and nature. The legal team that successfully represented Aliyah’s asylum 
claim embraced the judge’s discomfort and permitted the materials to be 
set aside. She prevailed in her claim because of the merits of her experience 
of attempted genital cutting, forced prostitution, trafficking, and attempted 
forced marriage.
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BUREAUCRATIC ERASURE
 Supernatural narratives are routinely viewed as neither credible nor 
verifiable. This is problematic on many fronts, not the least of which is the 
ethnocentricism of the adjudication process that is inherently hostile to Af-
rican religious and spiritual practice. Scholars, practitioners, and activists 
ought to be concerned, not simply because entire realms of knowledge and 
practice are dismissed but also because of the deeply biased quality of infor-
mation and research conducted when claims and narratives are framed as 
lacking in credibility from the outset.
 But more importantly, asylum claims invoking the supernatural draw 
attention to the bureaucratic violence of the RSD process by highlighting 
how a climate of suspicion creates and entrenches new technologies such 
as COI that erase the lived experiences of refugees. Whereas refugee law is 
structured by international conventions and protocols, it is implemented 
domestically by national governments. The practices surrounding COI are 
complex and multivalent, but the productive contexts appear uniformly na-
tional. A far cry from the “cosmopolitan” (Cheah 1998, 2006; Appiah 2007), 
“postnational” ( John 2014), or “glocalized” (Livingston 2001; Köhler and Wis-
sen 2003) iterations of global knowledge diffusion, the empirical context of 
COI has a robust national imprimatur. As a consequence, asylum seekers 
with supernatural dimensions to their claims experience intense pressure to 
reframe and resituate their claims according to ideologies that routinely posi-
tion African supernatural realm as outside conventional religious paradigms.
 The bureaucratic erasure of the supernatural by COI is hardly sur-
prising. COI reflects the ideological and moral compasses of its producers. 
COI agents may be researchers employed directly by ministries, licensed 
professionals, tribunal clerks, technical or embassy staff, or freelance aca-
demics. Many are new migrants or former asylum seekers. They may oper-
ate as gatherers and collators or synthesizers and interpreters of knowledge. 
The information comprising COI data ranges from the narrow and personal 
to broad national or regional questions: it encompasses questions tailored 
to a specific refugee narrative and general research and “fact-finding” (Swift 
2008). The majority of COI researchers are, at best, likely leery of black 
magic or any references to supernatural forces.
 And as COI is produced and applied within hierarchical legal systems, 
the paradigmatic bias is amplified at higher levels. Individuals with morals, 
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ethics, and ideological outlooks run COI agencies. More established COI 
agencies appear to cloy to the science of témoignage (witnessing) (Binet 1905), 
at least in the manner in which Médicins Sans Frontières revitalized the 
concept in the 1970s (Fassin 2008; Brauman 2010), as a vital conduit of oth-
erwise inaccessible knowledge. But more often than not, COI agents oper-
ate with what might best be described as a form of “foreknowledge” and an 
instinct of what claims are “expected to look like,” in the sense that they un-
derstand the novelty of claims must be situated within an “already existing, 
generic template” (Mahajan 2008, 585).
 COI is a slippery amalgam because of the diversity of COI practices 
and practitioners. It may contain accounts of interviews with activists, poli-
ticians, scholars, or others conducted firsthand by COI agents. It can include 
secondhand research, gleaned from scholarly articles or “parascholarly” (Clay-
baugh 2010) summaries, introductions, or thought pieces. Newspaper arti-
cles, press releases from NGOs, and empirical, qualitative, quantitative, and 
anecdotal data collated from governmental or NGO reports are its bedrock. 
But COI agents may even solicit opinions from scholars, former diplomats, 
military officials, and even itinerant tourists who have been in a particular 
region or witnessed an event. And importantly, as the social media revolution 
has transformed the circulation of knowledge and proved pivotal in political 
crises, more nimble COI agencies have developed mechanisms and protocols 
for the collection of information about claimants from publicly accessible In-
ternet sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn. The collection of what is 
often regarded by RSD adjudicators as “objective data” (Good 2007, 2015) is 
anchored by a dynamic transnational tension fundamental to the contempo-
rary refugee experience, a tension between domestic constraints on migration 
and the national obligations of the international system.
NOTES
1. Sakpata (Xapata) is an extremely powerful vodou and feared generally. His in-
fluence waned among vodou communities in the 1970s and 1980s with the eradication of 
smallpox, but more recently, with the emergence of HIV/AIDS, new strains of tuberculo-
sis, and Ebola, he has regained prominence. See Verger (1995); Le Meur (2006).
2. Original testimony in possession of the author.
3. Ameh (1998); Dovlo and Adzoyi (1995); Erturk (2008); Rosenthal (1998).
4. National Voodoo Day (la fête nationale du vaudou) has been celebrated on Janu-
ary 10 since 1994. See BBC News, January 10, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa 
/4599392.stm.
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5. Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), https://www.genderindex 
.org/?s=Benin, citing a 2002 CEDAW report.
6. See US Agency for International Development, Annual Report on Good 
Practices, Lessons Learned, and Success Stories October 1, 2004 – September 30, 2005 
[Women’s Legal Rights Initiative under the Women in Development Iqc Contract No. 
Gew-i-00-02-00016-00, Task Order 01] June 2006, and interviews by Rotman (2004). 
Sources in French also indicate aspects of its prevalence [e.g., Christian Dieudonné 
Houegbe, “Le calvaire psychologique du lévirat,” Amazone, journal mensuel béninois, no. 006 
DE 08/99 (1999): 14.]
7. Loi N°2002-07 du 24 Août 2004 portant Code des Personnes et de la Famille 
(2004 Family Code), http://www.inpf.bj/IMG/pdf/code_des_personnes_et_de_la 
_famille.pdf.
8. An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada report noted that forced marriage 
is still “practiced in certain rural areas.” See, Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada, Benin: Forced marriages, in particular, marriages forced on men and protection 
offered by the state, 22 January 2007, BEN102408.FE: http://www.refworld.org/docid 
/469cd6cbc.html.
9. See Botchway (2008); Madison (2011).
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Chapter 6
The Digitalization of the Asylum Process  
(and the Digitizing of Evidence)
MARCO JACQUEMET
 T h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y  s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c  l a n d s c a p e  i s  b e i n g 
transformed by digitalization—that is, the restructuring of social life around 
digital communication and media infrastructure. Focused, face-to-face in-
teractions are now routinely layered with multifocal, multichanneled ex-
changes flowing through both local and distant nodes (Blommaert 2010; 
Jacquemet 2005). Digital communication technologies are much more than 
enablers of people’s interactivity and mobility: they alter the very nature of 
this interactivity, transforming people’s sense of place, belonging, and social 
relations. We are now witnessing the emergence of a telemediated cultural 
field, occupying a space in the everyday flow of experience that is distinct 
from yet integrated with physically close, face-to-face interactions. The 
integration of digital technologies in late modern communication trans-
forms human experience in all its dimensions: from its social field (now 
globalized and deterritorialized) to the semiocapitalist marketplace (with 
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its shifting methods of production, delivery, and consumption) to the pro-
duction not only of new conveniences and excitements but also of new 
anxieties and pathologies (Duchêne and Heller 2012; Heller 2003; Tom-
linson 2007). In this context, linguistic (and multilinguistic) skills have 
become valuable commodities in the global marketplace, and digital tech-
nologies have become the indispensable tools for its functioning. More-
over, because messages must become numbers before they can reach their 
recipient, digitalization has also placed translatability and reproducibility 
at the very core of these communicative exchanges and their sociolinguistic 
problems.
 In judicial contexts, digitalization has produced an epochal transfor-
mation in the way interactions are managed and knowledge is accessed. In 
asylum proceedings, digital communication technologies are becoming the 
latest tool in the battle between, on one hand, immigration officers skeptical 
of asylum claims and, on the other, refugees and their advocates fighting for 
the right to asylum.
 Until the late 1970s, agencies in charge of asylum determination 
placed high value on the asylum applicant’s account. In the absence of writ-
ten evidence, applicants were prompted to demonstrate their credibility 
through a detailed narration of their stories. Evidence provided directly by 
the asylum seeker was generally accepted at face value (Fassin and Recht-
man 2009). Starting in the 1980s, however, we entered the current “age of 
suspicion” (Shuman and Haas, 2015): more restrictive policies were intro-
duced in almost all Western nations (the final destination of most asylum 
seekers), and asylum agencies reduced their reliance on the credibility of 
the applicant’s testimony. As a result, asylum depositions increasingly ac-
quired the flavor of cross-examinations, with asylum officers systematically 
questioning applicants’ narratives, seeking to disprove their accuracy, and 
at times curtailing their storytelling altogether (Haas and Shuman, this 
volume; Jacquemet 2010).
 Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the digitalization of the asy-
lum process has provided state agents and asylum seekers (and their advo-
cates) with new power technologies. In this chapter, I will look in detail at 
three of these power technologies and their related communicative features: 
the storing of information on digital devices, the emergence of and reliance 
on digital translators, and the role of databases and search engines in the 
management of asylum cases.
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MOBILE DIGITAL DEVICES: SEDENTARY VERSUS MOBILE POWER
 The various agents involved in the asylum process—including gov-
ernment officials, refugee advocates, interpreters, and the asylum seekers 
themselves—can be understood as occupying a spectrum of positions gen-
erated by the structural tension between two opposing figures: the sedentary 
sovereign, represented by immigration officials, and the nomadic, deterri-
torialized subject, represented by asylum seekers (of which refugees are a 
subset). Intermediate players, such as court clerks, interpreters, lawyers, and 
other refugee advocates are scattered along this continuum.
 The dichotomy between sedentary power and nomadic movement, 
first explored by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their Nomadology 
(1987), provides a useful framework for examining the strategies used by 
asylum officers and asylum seekers. Government asylum agencies mostly 
operate in the striated space of the nation-state: gathering intelligence on 
refugees through the collection, coordination, and analysis of multiple data-
bases; probing intra-Webs to gather additional evidence for assessing asylum 
claims; and relying on fixed digital infrastructures (such as networked office 
computers) during their interactions with claimants. On the other hand, 
asylum seekers occupy a smooth space, which they defend in the face of 
sedentary forces through their use of mobile digital devices. They use smart-
phones to organize and coordinate activities on the fly, orient themselves 
and navigate in smooth, unmarked territories, and maintain links with their 
social networks by storing valuable information (phone numbers, contact 
names, addresses, maps, and meeting points) in minimal space.
 At the same time, we acknowledge that the structural opposition 
between sedentary and mobile power is a simplification of the complex phe-
nomena of asylum, in which there is a continuum between sedentary and 
mobile uses of technology on the part of asylum seekers and authorities, 
who both employ hybrid strategies. Smartphones’ advantages for asylum 
seekers (and for migrants overall) are clear, but they are not the only ones 
who use them. State and international agencies use a combination of fixed 
infrastructures (radars, observation posts, communication control-and- 
command centers) and mobile technologies (ships, high-speed inflatable 
boats, and surveillance camcopters, as well as smartphones and other com-
munication technologies) to search, intercept, and at times rescue undocu-
mented migrants and refugees crossing into state-controlled territory. On 
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the other hand, asylum seekers sometimes adopt strategies of striated space, 
such as securing identity papers (real or fake), identifying secure departure 
and destination points, or tapping into the resources of land-based organi-
zations (such as relief agencies).
 The emergence of hybrid strategies of sedentary-mobile power does 
not, however, diminish the paramount importance of mobile technologies 
for deterritorialized subjects. To access and manage the asylum process, 
asylum seekers routinely rely on their cell phones to maintain contact with 
the lawyers and humanitarian organizations helping them, to communicate 
with asylum authorities, and to access valuable information about the asy-
lum process. In addition, asylum seekers can use images and maps stored on 
smartphones during the asylum hearing itself.
 Let me illustrate this point with a specific case I witnessed in May 
2009 in Rome during the asylum deposition of a Kurdish Yazidi refugee 
from Syria who claimed that he fled his country because of religious per-
secution. The asylum court employed a young female Kurdish Muslim in-
terpreter familiar with the Kurdish variety spoken by the claimant. When 
the asylum officer asked the claimant for information on his religion, the 
interpreter refused to translate the asylum seeker’s full reply, at one point 
claiming, “Lui sta parlando del diavolo. . . . E io non posso più tradurre!” 
(“He speaks of the devil. . . . I cannot translate this!”). After a moment of 
stunned silence, the judge—who knew that the interpreter was Sunni and 
was familiar with previous asylum cases that exposed Sunni intolerance to-
ward Yazidis’ religion—asked the interpreter whether the claimant had any 
images on his cell phone linked to his faith. The interpreter was able to relay 
this question, and the asylum seeker, with a puzzled shrug, turned on his cell 
phone, searched through its images, and finally produced an image of Melek 
Taus, the “Peacock Angel.”
 Luckily for this asylum seeker, the judge knew that the Yazidis believe 
God placed the world under the care of seven holy beings or angels, most 
notably Melek Taus, who, as world ruler, causes both good and bad to befall 
individuals. The judge was also aware of the persecution Yazidis suffered at 
the hands of their Syrian Muslim neighbors. Because the asylum seeker was 
able to corroborate his claim to be Yazidi by producing the right religious 
image, he was deemed a credible refugee, and his claim was accepted.
 In this case, the judge was able to tap into classic tools of sedentary 
power, such as sedimented knowledge encoded into court records, prior 
The Digitalization of the Asylum Process  157
cases, and archived materials. Meanwhile, the mobile technology of digitiz-
ing images on cell phones (making them easily storable, transmissible, and 
portable) became an asset for the asylum seeker in his quest for credibility. 
These two power technologies, both geared toward storing information 
yet achieving their goal in opposite ways (sedentary/mobile), had a direct 
impact on the transidiomatic environment of the asylum hearing, allowing 
people to reach a mutual understanding without relying on a common lan-
guage or forcing a recalcitrant interpreter into cooperating.
DIGITAL TRANSLATORS
 The crucial role of interpreters in asylum-related interactions is well 
documented (Inghilleri 2005; Jacquemet 2011, 2013; Pollabauner 2009; Spotti 
2015). For the past decade, asylum courts have coped with limitations on 
the availability and capabilities of human interpreters by relying on digital 
programs to solve some of the translation puzzles they routinely encounter. 
While the use of digital translators is still quite limited and their transla-
tions imprecise, these programs can still have value to a reader who can piece 
together meaning from less-than-well-formed texts.
 Machine translation (MT), however, is nowhere near the dream of an 
automatic, smooth, and precise transfer of information from one language 
to another. MT was born in the late 1940s out of the cryptography and 
techniques for decoding German messages developed during World War 
II. Having demonstrated the ability of machines to use digital codes to de-
cipher secret codes—such as the various cryptanalytical Bombes machines 
used to break the Enigma machine (see Churchhouse 2002), the intention of 
the first generation of computer programmers was to treat foreign languages 
(especially Russian) as codes to be unencrypted, forging a purely machinic 
link between source and target languages (Raley 2003; Weaver 1955).
 However, by 1959, the dream of a perfect rule-governed MT was al-
ready over. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, the first academic researcher in the United 
States to work full time on automatic translation (he was hired by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1951), reached the conclusion that 
fully automatic, high-quality translation “was an unreachable goal, not only 
in the near future but altogether” (1959, 21). The inability to take context 
into consideration and to translate ambiguity, irregular syntax, and multiple 
meanings made MT the butt of the joke in many linguistics departments.1
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 Over the past two decades, however, MT has improved dramatically, 
propelled by cheap computing power, a spike in federal funding in the wake 
of 9/11, and, most important, a better idea for the design of MT programs. 
This idea dates from the late 1980s, when researchers at IBM stopped rely-
ing on grammar rules as the foundation for translation programs and began 
experimenting with comparisons of sets of original texts and their transla-
tions, known as parallel text. The most promising method to emerge from 
this work is called statistical MT. In statistical MT, algorithms analyze large 
collections of parallel texts (called parallel corpora), such as the proceed-
ings of the European Parliament or newswire copy, to divine the statistical 
probability of words and phrases in one language ending up as particular 
words or phrases in another. A model is then built on those probabilities 
and used to evaluate and translate new text. A slew of researchers took up 
IBM’s insights, and by the turn of the twenty-first century, the quality of 
statistical MT had drawn even with five decades of grammar-based MT.
 The success of statistical systems, however, comes with a catch: such 
algorithms do well only when applied to the same type of text on which they 
have been “trained.” Statistical MT software trained on English and Spanish 
parallel texts from the BBC World Service, for example, excels with other 
news articles but flops with software manuals. As a result, such systems re-
quire vast parallel corpora not only for every language pair they intend to 
translate—which may not be available for, say, Pashto—but also for differ-
ent genres within those language pairs.
 By 2016, MT had become reasonably accurate when input is basic and 
when both input and output are restricted in style, vocabulary, expression, 
and content. However, as was the case for C. K. Odgen and I. A. Richards’s 
Basic English Project (also, by the way, developed to respond to military 
needs; see Koeneke 2003), MT language must be basic, common, and po-
tentially neutral. In this way, MT has developed alongside economic global-
ization, highlighting the linguistic utilitarianism and functional pragmatics 
specific to intercultural exchanges in business trade.
 The social consequences of these limitations are also becoming clear: 
MT in late-modern communication is shaped by the language of commerce 
and gives further priority to the principle of functionality and utilitarian-
ism, since, as Jean-François Lyotard (1984) pointed out, “the technocratic 
values of efficiency, productivity, and performativity go hand in hand with 
the transmission of easily decodable messages” (5).
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 What is missing from the search for an accurate, precise MT is an 
awareness of the fuzzy, nonfunctional nature of most linguistic exchanges 
and of the way meanings are negotiated by social groups in the structura-
tion, diffusion, and interpretation of language in context. As in face-to-face 
talk, where people manage to understand each other’s fragmented sentences 
through continuous feedback and guesswork, human-computer interactions 
can also be facilitated by feedback mechanisms. In this logic, computer pro-
grammers have been developing digital translations that human users may 
check for intelligibility and, if needed, correct. Computer-assisted transla-
tion (CAT) incorporates a manual editing stage into the software, making 
translation an interactive process between human and computer. Some 
advanced CAT software provides a more complex set of tools available to 
the translator, which may include terminology management features and 
various other linguistic tools and utilities (Barrachina et al. 2009). Carefully 
customized user dictionaries based on correct terminology significantly 
improve the accuracy of MT and, as a result, aim at increasing the efficiency 
of the entire translation process.
 MT in the legal sector may take advantage of the functional and 
utilitarian language used in most legal documents, but the situation be-
comes more complex when foreign nationals are asked to testify in a court 
of law. Human-computer synergies can be seen in the work of asylum agents 
(mainly interpreters but also judges and lawyers) who may utilize digital 
translation to produce comprehensible texts in the target language. Entire 
segments of the initial asylum application (especially the story accompany-
ing the asylum request, which can be written in any number of languages) 
are routinely inserted into online translation services (such as Google Trans-
late or GoFish) to get a glimpse of the main elements of a case. These in-
evitably imprecise and partial translations are then checked by professional 
translators with the support of digital databases from multiple languages to 
account for regional or nonstandard codes.
 These interventions, however, tend to produce documents that high-
light the denotational-heavy passages of the original text at the expenses 
of more metaphorical, but potentially ambiguous, narration, with the in-
evitable consequence of lessening the emotional impact of the original text 
( Jacquemet 2015).
 The process of recontextualization proper of translation is here dou-
bled. First a software program and then an asylum agent detach the speaking 
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subject from the production of the judicial evidence. The “asylum speaker” 
(in the clever wordplay by UK-based hip-hop group Foreign Beggars), a 
term that itself had been recontextualized in academic writing by Katrijn 
Maryns (2005), is doubly distanced from their story, with potentially nega-
tive consequences for their credibility.
 Moreover, in most judicial systems, MT and other digital tools (such 
as computer-generated transcriptions of voice mail) are not admissible 
evidence, being considered in the same class as hearsay—that is, out-of-
court statements (Cornell 2011). These digital tools can however be used 
by trained professionals (such as court-certified translators) in their work 
(thus, including digital software), but these officers would have to certify 
personally that their digital tools are reliable and best practices.
 This human-centered approach to the use of digital translation in 
contructing legal evidence can be further illustrate by turning to another 
techno-linguistic mechanism used in asylum proceedings: the online multi-
lingual dictionary. Today many online dictionaries offer both word-to-word 
translation and text-to-speech capabilities (providing the standard pronun-
ciation of any word). They contain millions of combined entries accessed via 
an array of user interfaces, from the very simple to the highly sophisticated.
 Online dictionaries are quickly becoming the necessary tool for lexico-
graphical translation, especially in institutional settings. The single most im-
portant impact that online dictionaries have on the translation process is in 
offering quick access to multiple solutions for the needed-to-be-translated 
term. In so doing, digital technology imposes, according to Anthony Pym 
(2011), a collapse of the paradigmatic axis over the syntagmatic one, disrupt-
ing linearity and flow. Just like in the case of the poetic function explored 
by Roman Jakobson (1960), MT, and more specifically online dictionaries, 
projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection (paradig-
matic) into the axis of combination (syntagmatic) paradigmatic choices. 
The need to select, during the sequential development of a linguistic ex-
change among people not sharing the same language, the proper translated 
term from a paradigmatic list of equivalent ones causes inevitable breaks 
in the conversational flow, producing an interaction with distinct qualities, 
such as a syncopated rhythm, a start-and-stop cadence, and cutoff sentences.
 When such digital intervention occurs during a judicial proceeding, we 
may wonder about its impact on the construction of evidence and on wit-
ness credibility. Let me illustrate this point with a case I uncovered during my 
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fieldwork with an Italian humanitarian organization, Senza Confine, which 
provides logistical and legal support to asylum seekers in Rome. Senza Con-
fine routinely relies on interpreters, but at times these interpreters are con-
fronted with multilingual documents that test their linguistic competence.
 Such was the case in summer 2009 during an interview between an 
Italian lawyer from Senza Confine and a Kurdish asylum seeker, assisted 
by a Kurdish interpreter. The asylum seeker had earlier managed to write 
in Turkish the story of his departure from Turkey and included it with his 
asylum application materials. While reviewing the materials during the in-
terview, the lawyer asked the interpreter—who spoke some Turkish as well 
as Kurdish and Italian—for an oral translation of the story:
Figure 6.1. Copy of the handwritten asylum claim, redacted by a Turkish speaker on behalf 
of the Kurdish asylum seeker (Asylum Processing Center, Crotone, Italy, November 2007).
When the Kurdish interpreter got to the Turkish word şebeke, he was un-
sure on how to render it for the lawyer. In the text above, şebeke is found in 
the next to the last line, which reads:
Antalyada    bir ay  sonra      dayım bir    şebeke   bulup   Antalyadan   bizi İzmire   getirdi
[Antalya-at one month after uncle-mine a şebeke finding Antalya-from us  İzmir-to brought]
At Antalya my uncle found a şebeke after a month, and he brought us from Antalya to İzmir.
He decided to consult his smartphone. First he looked şebeke up in an on-
line Turkish-Italian dictionary but was unsatisfied with the result: the words 
the dictionary offered—such as alimentazione (food) and sulla griglia (on the 
grill)—were completely unrelated to the topic. He then checked an online 
Turkish-English dictionary, which yielded “network, system, graticule, grid.” 
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So he decided to render şebeke as “networker.” This English word, however, 
did not satisfy the asylum lawyer, who asked the intepreter for a more pre-
cise explanation of “networker”:
Transcript 1. Senza Confine, Roma, May 6, 2009
Law Lawyer, young woman, Italian
Int Intepreter, young man, Kurdish
AS Asylum seeker, young man, Kurdish
Law e chi e` questo networker? Law and who’s this networker?
Int volevo dire trafficanti Int I meant human traffickers
Law ah, ok Law oh, ok
 e quanto li ha pagati?  how much did he pay them?
Int te çiqas da şebekê?  Int how much did you pay the  
   trafficker?
AS heft hezar euro  AS 7,000 euros
Int settemila euro Int 7,000 euros 
Law e vabbene Law oh, very well
As the transcript above shows, the interpreter realized that “networker” in 
this context could best be translated in Italian as trafficanti (traffickers or 
human smugglers), and the interview moved forward successfully.
 Here we see a series of feedback mechanisms operating to translate the 
asylum seeker’s story. The interpreter’s interaction with an online dictionary, 
accessed through his smartphone, bridged the gap between the Turkish 
term and the interpreter’s knowledge. Even though the interpreter’s initial 
search was not fruitful and the second one turned up a word that was still 
quite ambiguous, the continuous interaction and feedback between digital 
and human agent achieved some form of shared knowledge.
 If the lawyer had not questioned the word “networker” and instead al-
lowed it to enter the legal deposition, the impreciseness and foreignness of 
this term could have had negative consequences for the asylum seeker. In the 
permanent culture of suspicion that characterizes asylum hearings (especially 
regarding the credibility of the asylum seekers; see Fassin and Rechtman 2009; 
Jacquemet 2011), a skeptical judge could have interpreted the use of such a 
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nonstandard, “fuzzy” lexeme as sign that the asylum seeker had something to 
hide. It was only through the multiple reciprocal moves of all agents (inter-
preter, online dictionaries, lawyer) that the superdiverse, unclear nature of this 
story could be rendered in the acceptable, standard Italian of the asylum court.
 If we want to translate literature by authors such as James Joyce (Eco 
2000), we should stay clear of digital translation technologies for years to 
come and maybe forever. If, on the other hand, we are just looking for some 
pointers (a function, after all, crucial to all processes of indexicality) that can 
help us understand multilingual exchanges, then these technologies can be 
quite useful—especially when combined with human intelligence.
SEARCH ENGINES: DENOTATION IN A SUPERDIVERSE ENVIRONMENT
 Most Western nations (as well as international organizations such as 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Jesuit Refugee 
Service) attempt to address the needs of asylum seekers by providing them 
with interpreters, access to websites containing information useful to their 
cases, and the services of lawyers, social workers, and cultural mediators.
 Despite such efforts, the asylum process in Western countries re-
mains a site where refugees’ multilingual practices come into conflict with 
national language ideologies. State bureaucrats, in particular, impose norms 
and forms (shaped by national concerns and ethnocentric cultural assump-
tions) on immigrants barely able to understand the nation’s local language, 
let alone the officials’ procedures for conducting in-depth interviews, writ-
ing reports, and producing the records required in order for institutions to 
grant refugees access to local resources (Blommaert 2009; Eades and Arends 
2004; Pollabauer 2004; Maryns and Blommaert 2001).
 During the asylum process, state and international agencies operate 
within a regime of denotational-heavy registers. They focus mostly on the 
denotational axis (the link between description and the thing or event de-
scribed) to determine the credibility of an asylum seeker’s application. Ap-
plicants are asked at various steps in the procedure to provide denotational 
information (personal names, date and place of birth, names of relatives, 
place names, etc.), which is then probed by officers in order to assess the 
credibility of the applicants’ claims. In this context, asylum seekers are re-
sponsible for the accuracy of their statements, while examiners and ad-
judicators use various technopolitical practices (questioning, producing 
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a record, checking databases, and so on) to ensure that applicants’ claims 
are verifiable in accordance with dominant understandings of the referen-
tial world. In such a multilingual environment, the officers’ search for and 
the applicants’ production of proper references are rendered problematic by 
intercultural breakdowns that can result from discrepant semiotics of the 
denotational world. Applicants must make sure that the information they 
supply is properly produced and interpreted. If it is not, the applicants alone 
face the charge of being not credible—which, as in the case discussed below, 
may lead to incarceration, deportation, torture, and death.
 The ethnographic interviews I have conducted with asylum officers 
and my review of the existing literature reveal a particular linguistic regis-
ter characterized by (over)reliance on proper names. The reasons for this 
are multiple. To start with, institutional agents (judges, police officers, bu-
reaucrats, et al.) erroneously assume that proper names are stable signs that 
survive translation from one language to another in a fairly constant, recog-
nizable form. They believe proper names carry denotation but not conno-
tation (an idea that goes back to John Stuart Mill) and thus attribute to 
proper names high denotational value (“John F. Kennedy was assassinated 
on Friday, November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas” has higher denotational- 
referential value than “the president was killed in the sixties”). In other 
words, they think that proper names boost referential accuracy, making it 
possible to investigate the credibility of an asylum claim or the testimony the 
claimant subsequently gives before a judge.
 Bureaucrats have routinely used proper names to examine and create 
dossiers since the formation of nation-states. In this sense, proper names have 
always functioned as specific communicative technologies for imposing disci-
plinary power (Foucault 1980; cf. also Battaglia’s [1995] “representational econ-
omy” and Butler’s [1997] “sovereign performatives”). Moreover, commonsense 
notions about the rigidity of proper names make them sought after—and 
heavily monitored—in asymmetrical multilingual environments where speak-
ers do not have equal access to the various languages being spoken and must 
rely on interpreters or digital translation. Because proper names are believed 
to survive the linguistic mutations of the translation process, they are seen as 
the only linguistic resource equally available to all participants. In these situa-
tions, proper names are used by interactants in locating the interactional flow 
during turns in languages they do not comprehend. Proper names can thus be 
considered anaphoric cairns allowing listeners to follow, albeit approximately, 
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the turns they do not understand in the staggered process of producing speech 
in language 1 (L1), translating it to L2 (and/or L3, L4, etc.), replying in L2 
(and/or L3, L4), translating the reply back to L1, and so on.
 This is particularly true within superdiverse settings where nonnative 
speakers (such as new immigrants, refugees, or asylum seekers) need to rely 
on interpreters (sometimes family members) to make sense of the interac-
tion at hand (Davidson 2000; Orellana 2009; Reynolds and Orellana 2009). 
Consider for instance the following case from my fieldwork among asylum 
seekers in Rome. Here we see how an applicant—a young man from Af-
ghanistan who could not comprehend a whole Italian sentence—was able 
to enter the conversation without the help of the interpreter:
Transcript 2. Senza Confine, Roma, May 20, 2009
AS Asylum seeker, young man, Pashtun
O Officer, young woman, Italian
I Interpreter, middle age woman, Farsi/Pashtun/Italian
O  [to I] l’udienza si terrà  O [to I] the hearing will be held
 a Roma o a Ca=serta?=  in Rome or Caserta?
AS                          = Roma = AS Rome
The asylum seeker did not have to wait for the interpreter to relay the question 
and promptly overlapped the officer to provide an answer, eager to show his 
awareness of the exchange and his ability to answer based just on his knowl-
edge of the context and recognition of proper names (in this case place names).
 Personal names enter the asylum process at multiple points, from prov-
ing one’s identity to the more involved step of providing external denotational 
references to corroborate an asylum claim. The difficulty of proving an asylum 
applicant’s identity lies at the heart of the asylum process. In most cases, asy-
lum seekers have had to compromise their identity: they may have destroyed 
their documents to conceal their identity from pursuers; their documents may 
have become irremediably damaged and unreadable along the way; they may 
have left them behind in their rush to escape; they may have had to forge iden-
tities; or they may never have had any identity papers to start with. This latter 
case is more complex than a case of missing documents. As Carol Bohmer and 
Amy Shuman (2007) state, “The applicants themselves find the whole idea of 
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needing documents to prove identity incomprehensible. For them, identity is 
about much more than one’s name on an unforged document” (88).
 In the Italian situation, most asylum seekers arrive on small boats over-
loaded with people. They carry a minimal amount of baggage or none at all, 
and the majority lack identity papers. As a result, one of the first acts they 
are asked to perform in front of Italian immigration officers is to provide 
their names. This act, however, is far from unproblematic. Italian officers 
unfamiliar with foreign names, lacking proper interpreting support, and 
under pressure to process a boatful of people as expeditiously as possible 
routinely make mistakes in transcribing the names of asylum seekers. These 
failed “mini-entextualizations” can have serious consequences for the asylum 
seekers later on ( Jacquemet 2009).
 For instance, an Italian nongovernmental organization working on be-
half of refugees reported the case of a Mr. Boukhari, a refugee from southern 
Morocco who made his way on a boat to the Italian island of Lampedusa. Mr. 
Boukhari did not understand Italian, but he could speak some French. The 
officer processing his case in the identification center in Lampedusa wrote 
down his name incorrectly in the transcription of the hearing. To compound 
the mistake, Mr. Boukhari, unfamiliar with the Roman alphabet, did not re-
alize the spelling was wrong when he signed the report. He was admitted 
to the country on humanitarian grounds and was granted a one-year stay 
permit. Once settled, he applied for a permanent work visa. When the 
Immigration Office of the Italian Questura reviewed his application, they 
discovered the difference between the name recorded in his first interview 
in the identification center and the name he was using in his application for 
a work permit. He was accused of having entered the country under a false 
name, and his one-year stay permit was revoked (Rovelli 2006, 151).
 In a similar case, a Mr. Adesida, a Nigerian refugee, was admitted to 
Italy in 2003 and given a one-year work permit. When the permit was about 
to expire, he went to the local Questura to renew it, where he was arrested 
on the grounds that he had filed his renewal form under a false name. It 
turned out that the immigration report of his initial interview had omitted 
one of his four personal names. Not only was his renewal denied, but he 
was arrested and confined in Milan’s detention center for undocumented 
migrants, from which he was sent back to Nigeria (ICS 2005, 56).
 With the digitalization of bureaucratic processes, proper names 
have become increasingly important. In fact, denotation is built into the 
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technological affordances of digitalization: databases are structured so that 
personal names and numeric codes can be tracked and mined, Web search 
engines make it easy to find references to names, and social networks tag 
names (and link them to personal photographs) to establish their referenti-
ality in the offline world.
 Digitalization has allowed asylum courts to become “smart court-
rooms,” fully wired with access to the digital information infrastructure 
24/7. In particular, digitalization has enabled the staff of asylum courts to 
conduct immediate online searches to verify proper names cited by appli-
cants, even while the applicants are in process of giving their testimony. At 
the asylum hearings I observed in Italy, typically one member of the asylum 
commission would be assigned to conduct searches through both the public 
Internet and ministerial databases on foreign intelligence to try to verify (or 
discredit) the applicant’s story.
 The following example illustrates the obsession with proper names 
and the use of digital searches particular to asylum courts, including court 
interpreters, who often take it upon themselves to seek and produce clear 
denotational references. The asylum seeker in this case was a man from 
Turkish Kurdistan; the interpreter was a young woman fluent in the appli-
cant’s first language, Kurmanji, but unfamiliar with the political situation in 
his homeland. She mistakenly lexicalized and transformed a fragment from 
the applicant’s story into a proper name, triggering a frantic search to verify 
the said proper name:
Transcript 3. Commissione Territoriale, Roma, May 26, 2009
AS Asylum seeker, young man, Kurdish
I Interpreter, young woman, Kurdish
O Officer, young woman, Italian
Law Lawyer, Italian woman
O allora perche` i militari turchi O so, why the Turkish army
 ce l’avevano con lei?  was after you?
I cima leshkerè tirka tera neyarti?  I why was the army after  
 dikirin   you?
AS min arikari dida kurda  AS because I helped the Kurds
 u leshkerè kurda   and the Kurd army
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I aiutava i kurdi e l’armata kurda I he helped the Kurds and its army
O come l’aiutavate? O how did you help it?
I çawa te wanra arikari dikir? I how did you help them? 
AS min arikari dida wan kesè AS I helped the people waging a
 ciyada gerila bun  guerrilla war in the mountains
I aiutava i Guerrigli (...) I he helped the Guerrigli
 sono dei soldati kurdi  they are Kurdish soldiers
O I Guerrigli (..) O The Guerrigli?
 questi non li ho mai sentiti (...)  these ones I never heard of...
 e chi sono?  And who are they
-----[Fourteen minutes omitted]
O e che rapporti ci sono O and what kind of relationship is there 
 tra il PKK e questi Guerrigli  between the PKK and these  
   Guerrigli
 che ho sentito qui per la prima volta that I heard about here for the  
   first time
 e che il collega non trova  and that my colleague cannot find
 su internet?  on the internet
Law guardi che c’è Law I believe 
 un errore di traduzione,  there’s a translation mistake
 lui ha detto che aiutava la guerriglia,  he said he helped the guerrilla
 cioè il PKK  that is, the PKK
O ah! O so,
 voi aiutavate dei guerriglieri del PKK? you helped the PKK guerrilla?
 [a I] chiedi un pò?  [to I] can you ask him?
I we arikari PKK è ra dikir? I did you help the PKK
AS erè AS yes
I si, aiutava il PKK I yes, he helped the PKK
O oh, meno male! O well, finally!
(...)  (...)
O e come si chiamava una volta O how was the PKK previously  
 il PKK?   called?
I PKK bi naveki dinè ra ji tè I the PKK, is it know with another  
 naskirinè?   name?
AS KADEK AS KADEK
O vabbene O very good.
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 This transcript begins with the asylum officer asking the applicant 
how he came to be persecuted by the Turkish army. The applicant replied 
in Kurmanji that he helped the “people waging a guerrilla war in the moun-
tains.” This description was mistranslated by the interpreter as “i Guerrigli” 
(which in English could be rendered as “the Warriors”). Faced with a proper 
noun she had not encountered in her five years of deposing Kurdish asylum 
seekers, the Italian officer expressed her skeptical curiosity and probed the 
applicant for more information. After listening for more than fifteen min-
utes to an interaction (not included in the transcript) between the asylum 
seeker and interpreter that turned increasingly nonsensical, the officer once 
again expressed her skepticism about the existence of such a guerrilla or-
ganization (“that I heard about here for the first time”) and referred to her 
colleague, who was feverishly searching that supposed organization’s name 
both on the Internet and the intranet of the Italian foreign office (“and that 
my colleague cannot find on internet”). At this point, the applicant’s lawyer 
felt compelled to intervene and clarify that the “Guerrigli” were really the 
PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan). Once 
the officer ascertained that the applicant was indeed referring to the PKK 
when the interpreter translated his words as “Guerrigli,” she quickly moved 
to establish an internal reference by asking the applicant whether the PKK 
had been known by a different name. When he provided the correct an-
swer, “KADEK,” the acronym for the Freedom and Democracy Congress 
of Kurdistan (Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê), she was finally 
satisfied with his accuracy and expressed her satisfaction. Note that in the 
last turn, once the applicant produced the proper name KADEK, the offi-
cer did not wait for the interpreter because she immediately recognized the 
name. It took fifteen minutes, but they arrived at a successful decoding of 
the proper reference. The asylum seeker was subsequently granted the status 
of refugee and allowed to remain in Italy.
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIGITALIZATION
 “Going digital” during asylum hearings has two somewhat contradic-
tory consequences: it may speed up the entire process by facilitating trans-
lation and access to evidence (documents, recordings, etc.), but it can also 
result in proceedings that fail to disambiguate the complex heteroglossic 
nature of asylum seekers’ depositions.
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 Asylum officials, including judges, identify the lack of time to properly 
process their cases as a major source of stress. A recent study published in 
the New York Times reveals that immigration judges in the United States 
alone handle more than seven hundred cases a year—twice as many as 
federal district court judges (Dickerson 2016). As a result, immigration 
judges must often decide the fate of asylum seekers in the time it takes to 
consume a fast-food lunch, leading to higher burnout rates among judges 
than among hospital workers and prison wardens (see Lusting et al. 2008).
 In asylum courts, most testimony is filtered through interpreters, since 
judges are not usually fluent in the languages spoken by asylum seekers. Even 
simple questions that judges might ask of asylum applicants can increase the 
time required to process a case. As a result, judges seek to minimize their 
questioning—including questioning that could help establish an applicant’s 
credibility. In the context of the ideology of suspicion described above (and 
in other chapters of this volume), this creates a situation in which judges 
make life-or-death decisions that are strongly influenced by their cultural 
biases and assumptions that asylum claims are often bogus.
 As Gumperz suggested in his work on crosstalk (1979), the simplest 
and most effective way to combat intercultural bias is to avoid rushed deci-
sions, slow down the entire process, and take the time to make sure ques-
tions are understood and answers are properly processed. But with more 
than five hundred thousand cases currently pending just in the United 
States, immigration judges do not have those options (TRAC 2017). This is 
where digital technologies may come in handy.
 Digital technologies have ushered in an “age of immediacy” (Tomlinson 
2007). Digitalization has not only allowed novel, faster methods of produc-
tion, delivery, and consumption (the “just-in-time” economy), but they have 
also intensified and facilitated our connections with other people and/or in-
stitutions, making us increasingly available to others in our daily lives. In the 
asylum context, these technologies make it easier and faster to manage all as-
pects of the proceedings, from scheduling to translation. But even as they speed 
things up, some of these technologies interject new problems of their own.
 MT and search engines seem to me the two technologies that carry 
the greatest risk of communicative breakdowns and bias against asylum 
seekers. As Rita Raley (2003) pointed out, MT transforms languages into 
basic, purely functional, and putatively neutral media for communicating 
information on a global scale—but it produces mixed results. On one hand, 
The Digitalization of the Asylum Process  171
MT can speed up the asylum process and facilitate understanding, but on 
the other hand, by introducing an extra layer of mediation that privileges 
basic and functional linguistic solutions and causes a syncopated, rushed, 
and disrupted conversational flow, MT may hurt witnesses’ impression 
management and ultimately their credibility.
 The ability to look up names through search engines can provide a 
speedy way to corroborate claimants’ stories, dovetailing nicely with an in-
stitutional system already wired to privilege nominal identity and denota-
tional accuracy. At the same time, search engines can further exacerbate the 
tendency of judges to focus on proper names, thus transforming the hearing 
into a quiz show where claimants need to come up with the correct words.
 With both these technologies, we should remember that credibility is 
gained incrementally but is lost catastrophically. It can be lost not only when 
an asylum applicant uses a single erroneous—or seemingly erroneous— 
translated term but also when a nervous witness’s halting narration is inter-
preted as evidence that there is something to hide ( Jacquemet 2013).
 In a recent paper, I argued that the process of determining asylum seek-
ers’ credibility calls for questioning methods that focus on the overall nar-
rative rather than on the accuracy of single answers ( Jacquemet 2015). This 
means allowing the applicants more leeway in using multiple turns to frame 
a particular statement, having more patience with looped or circular stories 
with scarce denotational load, and paying more attention to the stories them-
selves, their performative effect, and their overall rhetorical structure.
 In this scenario, more than one turn of speaking may be needed be-
fore interactants have a sufficiently symmetric grasp of the referent. The 
recourse to digital mediations (including translation) seems to complicate 
the turn-taking organization of the asylum hearing, with as yet unknown 
consequences. What we can say with certainty is that the multiple de- and 
recontextualizations during these multiturn exchanges (both human and 
digital) will require more time, putting additional stress on a system already 
stretched to its breaking point.
NOTE
1. See for, instance, Eco 2000 for the hilarious consequences of subjecting a James 
Joyce piece to multiple MT passages (from language A to language B to language C and 
back to language A). This jocular animosity is shared and reciprocated by MT researchers 
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who have even their own jokes about linguists, dating from the period when their methods 
were heavily influenced by theoretical linguistics: “Every time we get rid of a linguist, our 
MT gets better” (quoted in Silberman 2004, 228).
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Mixed Migration and the Humanitarian Encounter
Sub-Saharan Asylum Seekers in Israel
ILIL BENJAMIN
 In  the  asy lum po l icy  wor ld ,  two types  of  migrants— fo rced 
migrants and economic migrants—are frequently presented as distinctly 
different in their motives and, consequentially, their eligibility for protec-
tion. While forced migrants are typically presumed to have fled persecu-
tion in order to save their lives, economic migrants are often presented by 
host countries as “merely” seeking to improve their life conditions, and their 
reasons are frequently presented as less pressing than those of individuals 
fleeing targeted violence (Van Hear 2011a, 2011b). As recent United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) policy briefs make clear, the 
1951 United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees was meant to serve so-called genuine refugees, not economic migrants 
(Feller 2011).
 A 2003 UNHCR report to the UN General Assembly suggests that 
“asylum systems cannot function effectively without well-managed migration; 
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and migration management will not work without coherent systems and 
procedures for the international protection of refugees” (cited in Van Hear 
2011b, 3). The presumption underlying this statement is that refugees should 
be treated as a privileged category, and that economic migrants will attempt 
to exploit the asylum system in their desperation to regularize their sta-
tus in host countries, thereby diluting the refugee concept. Utilizing vari-
ous techniques of deterrence, ranging from indefinite detention and family 
separation to visa restrictions and slow asylum adjudication processes, host 
countries have created a bureaucratic environment for migration that is 
punishing for forced and economic migrants alike. Such environments are 
presumed to discourage false asylum claims (Gibney 2004).
 In practice, however, the 1951 refugee convention’s signatory countries 
have found it increasingly difficult to distinguish forced migrants from eco-
nomic ones (Castles 2003; Feller 2011; Van Hear 2011a, 2011b). Because eco-
nomic turmoil tends to accompany ethnic violence, refugees and economic 
migrants often travel together, using the same migration paths and smug-
glers. Their motives for fleeing, moreover, are more difficult to differentiate 
than UNHCR policy briefs would suggest. Both groups may experience 
violence along the way, and both necessarily seek and pursue economic live-
lihoods in addition to physical safety. Stephen Castles (2003) characterizes 
forced migration and economic migration as “closely related (and indeed 
often indistinguishable) forms of expression of global inequalities” (17). He 
is one of numerous critical scholars who have suggested that the political 
subject imagined in refugee law is a deliberately narrow one. In the eyes of 
such critics, the convention is a fig leaf in a system designed to protect the 
Global North’s borders by crafting highly restrictive criteria for asylum eli-
gibility (Cabot 2013; Nathwani 2003; Ramji-Nogales 2014; Van Hear 2011a).
 Employing terms such as “mixed migration” and the “migration-asylum 
nexus,” UN actors have gradually acknowledged the overlap between eco-
nomic and forced migration (Feller 2011; Van Hear 2011b). The presump-
tion that one category clearly merits asylum whereas the other does not has 
increasingly been recognized as problematic (Gibney 2004). Judging from 
their policies, however, host countries often arguably appear more con-
cerned by the threat to their borders that has been posed by the presumed 
contamination of the asylum category than they are by the possibility of 
deserving migrants being denied protection (Feller 2011; Terretta 2015; Van 
Hear 2011a, 2011b).
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 In this chapter, I draw upon ongoing debates regarding the distinction 
between economic and forced migrants in order to examine the humanitar-
ian encounter between legal aid workers and sub-Saharan asylum seekers 
in Tel Aviv, Israel. These aid workers are part of a nongovernmental organi-
zation (NGO) that I call Assistance for African Refugees (AAR).1 Based 
on semistructured interviews and ethnographic observations conducted in 
2011 and 2012, I describe how AAR volunteers and paid workers worked 
to help sub-Saharan asylum seekers, primarily from Sudan and Eritrea, to 
demonstrate to Israeli asylum officers either that they merited temporary 
protection or that they qualified as 1951 convention refugees, and hence they 
deserved temporary or permanent asylum in Israel.
 Founded in 2004, AAR is a small human rights NGO that has drawn 
international and local attention to the plight of asylum seekers in Israel 
while providing them with a variety of limited welfare services. In 2011–12, 
the activity that most set AAR apart from similar NGOs was its legal aid 
and refugee status determination (RSD) assistance. AAR staff helped pre-
pare asylum seekers for asylum interviews at the Israeli Ministry of Interior 
(MOI), the institutional body that has adjudicated asylum requests in Is-
rael since 2009. They served as first readers for both RSD and country of 
origin applications, advised asylum seekers on how to collect documentary 
evidence, and helped them to rewrite their narratives in linear terms empha-
sizing individual persecution, a transformation that involves the creation of 
what Susan S. Silbey (2005) has called a “legal consciousness.”
 As I show in this chapter, AAR aid workers habitually encountered 
asylum narratives that appeared embellished or fabricated, raising their 
doubts regarding whether these were “genuine” refugees. But a more difficult 
problem was that even if people did appear to have fled violence, their stories 
were often “messy” (Cabot 2013) and did not fit the criteria of the 1951 con-
vention, or they lacked the evidence to prove it. The struggle for aid workers, 
then, was that sometimes it was not enough to find out who was lying and 
who was telling the truth, because even “honest” asylum seekers frequently 
lacked the documentary evidence necessary for a compelling asylum case.
 I examine how AAR volunteers and workers understood their ben-
eficiaries’ stories and how they sometimes came to incorporate apparent 
fabrications or embellishments into a moral economy of deserving. I argue 
that with time, AAR volunteers came to realize that suffering manifested in 
many forms, whose severity did not necessarily correlate with the likelihood 
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of being granted asylum. In doing so, I aim to explore how tensions between 
economic and forced migration were understood by legal aid workers.
 My focus on aid workers, as opposed to merely on asylum seekers 
themselves, is deliberate. Even as aid workers and lawyers worldwide help 
asylum seekers reframe their narratives to fit the expectations of asylum offi-
cers (Haas 2012), their own insights and editorial remarks often remain pri-
vate and uncodified (Cabot 2013; Farrell 2012). By describing how aid workers 
tried to help asylum seekers fit the 1951 convention, I also seek to stage a 
broader argument about the role of honesty and deception in the humani-
tarian sphere. I argue that applicants who were perceived to be lying about 
their pasts pose an ethical challenge for legal aid workers, whose commitment 
to helping them often presumed an honest beneficiary. Some aid volunteers, 
specifically, appeared to develop a cynical attitude about their beneficiaries’ 
periodically embellished narratives, as well as about their own efforts to help 
them. At the same time, I suggest, volunteers were sometimes able to salvage 
their notion of a deserving aid beneficiary by shifting the target of their cyn-
icism from the embellished asylum narratives to the asylum system itself.
SUB-SAHARAN ASYLUM SEEKERS IN ISRAEL
 Since 2006, over fifty thousand sub-Saharan asylum seekers have 
arrived in Israel, a country of just over eight million, through the Sinai 
Desert, following a harrowing journey frequently involving smugglers 
exacting extortionist prices at best and, at worst, kidnapping, ransom-
ing, and detainment along the way (Fezehai 2014; Harris 2013). Many of 
these asylum seekers are known to have fled ongoing ethnic violence in 
Sudan and indefinite conscription and extrajudicial executions in Eritrea 
(Human Rights Watch 2014). Although Israel is a signatory to the 1951 
refugee convention, the Israeli MOI, in keeping with Israel’s founding as 
a haven for Jews, has long been publicly opposed to granting asylum to 
non-Jews (Kritzman-Amir and Berman 2011). In August of 2011, the then 
minister of interior, Eli Yishai, characterized asylum seekers at large as 
“infiltrators” and as an “existential threat to the Jewish state,” declaring that 
if he could not deport them, then he would “lock them up to make their 
lives miserable” (Human Rights Watch 2014, 21, 5).
 Israeli MOI policies since then have largely reflected Yishai’s view. The 
Israeli government, whose migration policies have long been limited almost 
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exclusively to Jews, have scrambled since 2006 to administer, detain, and 
govern their new arrivals. In the late 2000s, the Israeli military often met 
asylum seekers at the Israel-Egypt border and briefly detained and registered 
them, providing them with temporary nondeportation documents known as 
conditional release visas. These documents permitted them to stay in Israel 
for a limited period of time but granted them no social or welfare rights. At 
this point, many were given one-way bus tickets to Beer-Sheva or Tel Aviv, 
where they joined up with their countrymen, often sleeping at first in public 
parks or, for those more fortunate, living in cramped conditions in tenement 
apartments in south Tel Aviv. Gradually, able-bodied asylum seekers began 
to fill Israel’s high demand for under-the-table employment in construction, 
sanitary work, and agriculture. Several thousand more moved to the south-
ern coastal city of Eilat in order to work in the hospitality industry, while 
governmental policies pertaining to their status and legality were still being 
established. In the early 2010s, the Israeli government’s detention policies 
intensified, and the mobility of asylum seekers throughout Israel became 
accordingly much more intensely scrutinized and circumscribed.
 In 2009, the MOI commenced RSD proceedings for sub-Saharan asy-
lum seekers. Until late 2012, Sudanese and Eritrean asylum seekers, by far 
the largest groups, were not permitted to submit RSD applications (Human 
Rights Watch 2014, 8). Instead, Israel granted them a status widely known 
as “temporary protection,” citing reports of lingering violence and oppression 
in those countries. Temporary protection, however, has typically meant little 
more than a right to temporarily remain in the country, and its grantees have 
still been subject to indefinite detention and lack healthcare and work rights.
 As Israel’s asylum seeker population grew, government policies per-
taining to them have accordingly become more restrictive. To date, the 
MOI’s RSD rejection rates for sub-Saharan asylum seekers at large have 
been higher than 99 percent. Israeli government statistics indicate that as of 
February 2015, of 3,165 Sudanese asylum applicants, none had been recog-
nized as a refugee, and 2,200 cases were still undecided. Of 2,408 Eritrean 
asylum claims, only 4 were granted, over 1,000 have been denied, and 1,335 
were still undecided (Lior 2015).
 Israel, then, has been a reluctant 1951 convention signatory at best, waging 
a steady war of attrition against asylum seekers that has been meant to dou-
ble as a deterrence against future asylum seekers (Kritzman-Amir 2012). The 
MOI has kept RSD applications in limbo for years, while also unpredictably 
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revoking temporary protections and imprisoning thousands of asylum seekers 
sporadically and indefinitely in detention centers in the Negev Desert (Kersh-
ner 2013; Kestler-D’Amours 2013). Opaque and inconsistent policies have also 
been the norm regarding where asylum seekers were permitted to live in Israel, 
how and where they could renew their visas, and whether their employers 
would be fined for hiring them without a work permit (Guarnieri 2012).
 In addition, in violation of the principle of nonrefoulement, which pro-
hibits the deportation of asylum seekers from a signatory country to a place 
where they might face danger, the Israeli government has forcibly returned 
dozens of asylum seekers to the Egypt-controlled Sinai Peninsula within 
hours or days of their arrival (Kritzman-Amir and Spijkerboer 2013). 
Thousands of others, meanwhile, have been pressured to leave Israel “vol-
untarily” on threat of indefinite detention in the Negev Desert (Kestler- 
D’Amours 2014). Some, moreover, have been actively deported to third 
countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, where they faced the prospect of 
abduction, imprisonment, and deportation to their home countries (Human 
Rights Watch 2014; Omer-Man 2014).
 These policies have elicited a public outcry on the Israeli political left 
as well as in the global human rights community. A number of NGOs in 
the Tel Aviv area, meanwhile, quickly sprang up or repurposed themselves 
to provide limited welfare and health-care services to asylum seekers, com-
bined with heated advocacy campaigns for asylum policy reform. Outside 
the Israeli left, however, sympathy for asylum seekers has been decidedly 
limited, with dominant political voices in Israel characterizing asylum seek-
ers at large as economic migrants masquerading as refugees who should be 
expelled from the country or, at most, permitted to stay with minimal ser-
vices. “Anti-infiltrator” sentiments have run increasingly high throughout 
Israel over the past decade, mirroring a corresponding rightward shift in 
European politics (Couldrey and Herson 2015). In low-income urban areas 
populated by large numbers of asylum seekers, such sentiments have occa-
sionally ignited into bursts of mob violence against asylum seekers. Mean-
while, Israeli right-of-center politicians have fanned the flames with alarmist 
rhetoric about Israel being imminently overrun by hundreds of millions of 
“infiltrators” from Africa.
 A fence hastily built along the Israeli-Egyptian border in late 2012 ef-
fectively put an end to the flow of new asylum seekers from the Sinai, re-
ducing the number of entries into Israel from over ten thousand in 2012 to 
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just forty-three in 2013 (Omer-Man 2014). This abrupt change took NGO 
workers by surprise, many of whom had doubted that a mere fence could 
stop the flow of asylum seekers. Their main concerns then shifted from pro-
viding for a never-ending stream of new asylum seekers to providing for the 
tens of thousands already present and advocating for the release of several 
thousand of them from indefinite detention.
 AAR was an exception in the Israeli NGO landscape. Unlike other 
NGOs, most of its paid staff and volunteers were not Israelis but rather 
young foreigners who came to Israel to spend several months at AAR as 
part of a volunteer program or to satisfy a study requirement back home. 
Most volunteers who helped with RSD and country of origin coaching, 
moreover, were not trained lawyers. A few were lawyers or law students, but 
others were trained and counseled by Israeli lawyers specializing in asylum. 
These lawyers also took on some of the more difficult, and occasionally the 
most promising, cases themselves.
THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED HONESTY IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION
 When asylum seekers first arrived at the AAR offices in south Tel Aviv, 
volunteers invited them to tell their stories. What had happened to them 
back home? Why did they leave? As volunteers put it, they generally sought 
to determine two things. First, was the asylum seeker’s story of suffering 
credible? In other words, did it seem detailed and internally consistent? Did 
it cohere with what was known about the person’s home country? Was it 
supported by documentary evidence, such as hospital reports or death cer-
tificates? And second, if it seemed credible, did it also fit the convention’s 
criteria? In other words, was it a tale of individual persecution, as opposed 
to merely an escape from conflict or poverty?
 As volunteers knew from experience, asylum judges expected docu-
mentary evidence of persecution and narratives that possess a clear chronol-
ogy and causality, with the victims and perpetrators clearly identified 
(Shuman and Bohmer 2004). Narrative inconsistencies and absent docu-
mentary proof have routinely been invoked by asylum officers and judges to 
cast doubt on asylum applicants’ credibility (Einhorn 2009; Millbank 2009; 
Shuman and Bohmer 2004).
 In UN and academic circles, however, the equation of credibility with 
narrative consistency and with documentary evidence has increasingly been 
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called into question. UNHCR handbooks and white papers increasingly ad-
vocate a more nuanced approach, reminding asylum officers and judges that 
asylum seekers fleeing persecution often have no time or ability to collect 
documentary evidence (Gorlick 2002; Lawrance and Ruffer 2014). Research 
on autobiographical memory, in addition, has shown the extent to which 
inconsistency and fragmentation are inherent characteristics of normal 
memory and do not necessarily reflect any deceptive intent (Conlan, Waters, 
and Berg 2012; Eyster 2012). Memories of trauma, in particular, are prone 
to fragmentation (Shuman and Bohmer 2004). As Benjamin Lawrance and 
Galya Ruffer (2014) point out, “What may appear to be ‘inconsistencies’ in a 
rape narrative may only be inconsistencies within a framework that expects 
linearity and fails to account for survival mechanisms like fragmented 
memory of a trauma” (13).
 Assessments of plausibility are equally contested and culturally driven: 
behaviors and events that ring as plausible in one culture may not seem so 
in another (Millbank 2009, 11). For example, as Bruce Einhorn (2009), 
a former immigration judge, points out, an American immigration judge 
might find it implausible that in Cameroon someone might know someone 
else very well but only by the latter’s first name. This is one reason why, Ein-
horn argues, credibility is so difficult to assess: asylum judges do not always 
think critically about the cultural variability of plausible evidence.
 Catherine Farrell (2012) has similarly written of Scottish asylum 
judges who fail to reflect upon their own role in constructing the “truths” 
that they hear. On a day-to-day basis, she found, some judges labored under 
illusions of a universal truth, rarely pausing to consider how their own cul-
tural backgrounds and biases might determine what rang as true in asylum 
proceedings (175). In turn, the difficulty of determining credibility results in 
“dramatic diversity in the decision-making process” among asylum judges, 
even among ones working in the same court (Einhorn 2009, 188). “Credibil-
ity,” Einhorn (2009) writes, “is the single most inconsistently assessed vari-
able in asylum adjudication” (189). The term “refugee roulette” has been used 
by refugee law scholars to capture the seeming arbitrariness of asylum ad-
judication and the disparities in asylum granting rates among adjudicators 
(Ramji-Nogales, Shoenholtz, and Schrag 2009).
 Not only is how to assess credibility a contested matter, but the roles 
that credibility and honesty then go on to play in asylum adjudication are 
also under debate. It is widely acknowledged that the perceived honesty of 
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asylum seekers can grant or refuse them asylum (Millbank 2009). Asylum 
seekers typically face a culture of disbelief in asylum adjudication, often 
pleading their case to courtrooms suffused with suspicion toward their 
testimonies (Malkki 1996; Shuman and Bohmer 2004; Souter 2011, 2016). 
As Malkki (1996) notes, refugees are regularly “regarded as unreliable infor-
mants prone to exaggeration” (384).
 Yet expectations of absolute honesty, James Souter (2011, 2016) sug-
gests, are unwarranted. Asylum seekers are often pressured, he points out, 
to exaggerate their tales of woe out of fear that their own stories would rank 
low in judges’ personal hierarchies of suffering. Exaggerations, he claims, 
should not be taken to mean that applicants’ true suffering or persecution 
histories are nonexistent. For instance, as Sam Dolnick (2011) and Suketu 
Mehta (2011) point out with respect to asylum seekers living in New York 
City, many are intimidated or misled by smugglers or self-styled asylum 
coaches into embellishing their stories of suffering, often to fit in with the 
latest news reports from their home countries. Asylum officers and judges 
regularly become aware of this, adopting a skeptical attitude toward the ar-
chetypal “Colombian rape story” or “Tibetan refugee story” (Mehta 2011).
 The main issue judges should be assessing, argues Souter (2011), is 
not whether asylum seekers are lying but, rather, the risk they would face if 
returned to their home countries. The two, he argues, are not mutually ex-
clusive. To an extent, UNHCR guidelines would appear to concur with this 
idea. “Untrue statements by themselves are not a reason for refusal of refugee 
status,” one 2011 UNHCR handbook states. Rather, the evidence that asy-
lum seekers provide “must be assessed as a whole. . . . The rejection of some, 
and in some cases even substantial, evidence on account of lack of credibility 
does not necessarily lead to rejection of the refugee claim” (Gorlick 2002, 6). 
In other words, some statements could still be true even if others were found 
to be false. Alternatively, an applicant may give an inaccurate account simply 
because she does not know exactly who her persecutors were—only that 
she was persecuted. Finally, danger to the applicant back home could still be 
demonstrated using outside sources even if the narrative itself were deemed 
partially or even primarily not credible.
 UNHCR and other sources point out that RSD proceedings are not 
a matter of certainty but of likelihood (Conlan, Waters, and Berg 2012). 
These sources hold that applicants should only be required to demonstrate 
their well-founded fear of return “to a reasonable degree” and not necessarily 
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beyond any doubt (Lawrance and Ruffer 2014, 2). Such statements would 
appear to reflect not a zero-tolerance policy toward apparent dishonesty but 
rather a more nuanced view. This view takes into account the difficulties 
of assessing credibility and acknowledges that asylum seekers may still be 
deserving of protection even if their testimonies contain dishonest or non-
credible elements.
 Yet asylum hearings seldom follow UNHCR directives and academic 
critiques. The UNHCR generally cannot impose its directives on asylum 
judges, who think not only of international refugee law but also of their 
own countries’ domestic and foreign policy interests. Thus, judgments of 
honesty continue to play a central role in asylum adjudication. Moreover, 
as Lawrance and Ruffer (2014) point out, “An absence of documentation is 
increasingly invoked as grounds for doubting the credibility of an applicant’s 
entire narrative” (8).
REFRAMING ASYLUM NARRATIVES
 In her ethnography of asylum credibility determinations in the United 
States, Bridget M. Haas (2012) found that US asylum officers often in-
structed asylum seekers to “just be honest” (394). But as Haas shows, asy-
lum seekers had to “just be honest” in very specific ways. Narratives had to 
be internally consistent but not too smooth. Officers sought documentary 
evidence of persecution, but having too many documents could also evoke 
suspicion. Additionally, vague narratives were considered suspect, and so 
narratives of one’s persecution had to be detailed but could not sound re-
hearsed; the asylum seeker needed to show some emotion but could not 
be sobbing. Stories had to be told in clear, chronological order, but asylum 
seekers also needed to be able to reformulate their statements when asked 
to do so. Demeanor and expressions of emotion, in other words, mattered 
considerably in asylum hearings by lending particular inflections to the sub-
stance and rhythm of each narrative (see also Cabot 2013). Indeed, it would 
be impossible for demeanor not to matter, Jenni Millbank (2009) argues, 
even though it has not been shown to be a reliable marker of truthfulness.
 In AAR in south Tel Aviv, volunteers were likewise aware of the need 
for asylum seekers to present consistent, detailed, logical narratives of their 
suffering. In Heath Cabot’s (2013) ethnography of the asylum regime in 
Greece, legal aid workers found asylum seekers’ stories to be “messy, vague 
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[and] scattered, demanding that lawyers actively re-narrate the accounts of 
claimants,” yet lawyers found that “disciplining these life stories was difficult” 
(117). My informants in Tel Aviv encountered similar challenges. As they 
put it, their main aim was to help asylum seekers rewrite their statements 
in focused, factual terms that emphasized actions directed at individuals 
themselves, not the general political climate back home, as the 1951 conven-
tion was never about granting asylum en masse to entire populations. But 
many asylum applicants’ narratives adumbrated broad strife lacking in clear 
targets, villains, and timelines.
 As Amy Shuman and Carol Bohmer (2004) note, asylum seekers often 
struggle to grasp the chronology and causality requirements of asylum re-
gimes, which rarely align with how events are actually experienced or remem-
bered. They tell the story of Mustapha, an asylum seeker from Sierra Leone, 
who claimed his village had been destroyed amid widespread violence when 
he was thirteen and that he had been left behind in the chaos. Asked why 
he left Sierra Leone, he said only that “they were killing everyone,” and he 
could not offer, perhaps because he did not know, a more specific account of 
who had persecuted him and why (400). Mustapha’s story is highly remi-
niscent of many at AAR in Tel Aviv. Volunteers spoke to me often of their 
challenges in getting what they considered to be a “clear story” out of their 
beneficiaries.
 In particular, some asylum seekers seemed to presume that the emo-
tional weight of their stories was persuasive in its own right. As aid workers 
knew, emotional weight alone did not equal a credible narrative; indeed, ex-
treme emotion and flowery prose were likely to trigger asylum officers’ suspi-
cion and were for that reason to be avoided (Haas 2012). In summer of 2011, 
for example, an asylum seeker from Nigeria arrived at the AAR offices with 
an autobiographical narrative he had written and addressed to the Israeli 
MOI. In the narrative, he begged for compassion from the “brethren of [his] 
savior Jesus Christ.” When AAR volunteers attempted to politely persuade 
him that appealing to religious solidarity or mentioning Jesus might only 
alienate Jewish Israeli asylum officers, he rewrote his letter. The second draft 
no longer mentioned Jesus but still contained emotional pleas for salvation 
by a divine being.
 Aghast, AAR volunteers attempted to communicate to him that any 
reference to religion could only hurt his case. He became despondent. For 
him, what was of primary importance was precisely those elements that 
188 Ilil Benjamin
would fail to move a dispassionate, evidence-seeking asylum officer: his 
sense of loss, his faith, and his hope that a people he saw as distant kin 
might demonstrate compassion and save him from harm. He had little idea 
of the dispassionate, restrictive manner in which asylum officers reviewed 
applications. Haas (2012) argues that translating narratives into a technical 
idiom alienates asylum seekers from their own understandings of suffering. 
Similarly, numerous asylum seekers in Tel Aviv expressed frustration with 
the fabricated subjectivities they had been advised to adopt.
 In addition to adopting emotional registers that did not fit the “so-
cial aesthetics” of asylum interviews (Cabot 2013, 116), some asylum seekers, 
AAR volunteers said with frustration, seemed to go against their own best 
interests by unintentionally presenting themselves as economic migrants. 
Aid workers heard periodic reports, for instance, of Sudanese asylum seek-
ers who, when asked by Israeli border officers, asylum officials, and civilians 
why they had come to Israel, responded, “I came to work.” AAR volunteers 
were mortified to hear of this, especially since many Sudanese applicants 
had come from Darfur and often carried with them, for once, ample docu-
mentary evidence of persecution. As AAR volunteers knew well, moreover, 
any mention of economic motives would spell disaster for any asylum case.2
 I asked one Darfuri asylum seeker in his twenties why some of his 
countrymen might say they had come to work. Did such a statement not 
present them as economic migrants, I asked, thereby undermining their 
asylum claims? “They do not know what refugee means!” He responded 
with a mixture of empathy and anger, adding, “They don’t know to say ‘my 
government would kill me because I am a black African, I had to flee’—no, 
they do not know to say this. And so they say they come to work. But it’s 
not true! Because we were poor before! So why didn’t we come twenty years 
ago?” As he indicated, poverty was not a new reality for his kin and fellow 
citizens. Yet Sudanese asylum seekers had largely begun arriving in Israel 
in the aftermath of the Darfur conflict in the mid-2000s, suggesting the 
economic motives, at least at that moment, were not central to their flight. 
More important, his comment illustrated that a particular narrative is often 
expected of asylum seekers who wish to make a convincing case. Namely, 
when asked, they need to clearly indicate who had persecuted them and 
why, and any reference to economic motives could only cast doubt on such a 
narrative (Shuman and Bohmer 2004). Yet as he put it, coming to work and 
fleeing death were not mutually exclusive. Seeking work to build a new life 
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for oneself did not mean that one was not also fleeing violence and persecu-
tion. His words, indeed, captured well the concept of mixed-motive migra-
tion (Van Hear 2011a, 2011b).
 For some of his Darfuri friends, he said, the word “refugee” also carried 
negative connotations of victimhood and helplessness. They wished to em-
phasize to their unwilling hosts their agency and their readiness to work and 
not to simply repeat, “I am a refugee,” as NGOs constantly advised them to 
do. This was precisely, he implied, a performance that did not cohere with 
how they themselves understood their situation. It did not mean, however, 
that they would not qualify as refugees according to the 1951 convention. Yet 
the possibility that someone who sees herself as “coming to work” could still 
be a refugee generally fell on deaf ears in Israeli mainstream discourses about 
asylum seekers. Right-of-center politicians and civilians tended to cast the 
whole lot as economic migrants or “infiltrators,” demanding their immedi-
ate expulsion from Israel. They delighted in such apparently incriminating 
statements as “I came to work.”
 Economic motives sprinkled throughout asylum seekers’ narratives 
also added an important complication to aid workers’ efforts to help them 
present a smooth front in asylum hearings. Even though life-threatening 
economic deprivation played an important role in many asylum seekers’ life 
stories, AAR aid workers rushed to erase any semblance of it from their 
beneficiaries’ narratives, lest their cases be dismissed out of hand for seeming 
to reflect voluntary rather than forced motives.
ASYLUM AID AND MUTUAL MISTRUST
 When they first arrived at AAR, many volunteers assumed that asy-
lum seekers were by and large honest about their pasts and that they had 
been doubly victimized: by their persecutors and by the MOI’s overly re-
strictive and opaque asylum-adjudication process. Aid workers were deter-
mined to stem of tide of rejections in whatever manner they could, while 
offering asylum seekers their earnest solidarity and advocacy.
 Not long after arriving, however, volunteers would typically encounter 
asylum stories that seemed implausible. “A lot of people make up outrageous 
things,” Amanda, a volunteer, once stated matter-of-factly. She had spent 
nearly a year at AAR by that point and seemed no longer fazed by apparent 
fabrications. Writing of legal aid workers in Greece, Cabot (2013) notes that 
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“NGO workers sometimes described West African applicants as engaging 
storytellers who [were] also utterly untrustworthy” (118). These applicants’ 
stories, Cabot writes, often reinforced “popular culture notions of a wild, 
strange, ‘primitive’ Africa,” rife with themes of sacrifice and beheading (118). 
AAR aid workers in Tel Aviv encountered similar themes. As Amanda put 
it, some asylum seekers would
play up the stereotypes we have of Africa. One person said he had been 
due to be king in his country, but he didn’t want to be, so he fled and 
was persecuted. We asked him, “What king? That doesn’t exist in your 
country. King of what?” Or they claim they are fleeing witchcraft, or that 
they’re from Darfur because they know we know about Darfur, when in 
reality they’re not from Darfur.
 In some instances, claiming to come from an active war zone (whether 
or not it was true) could help asylum seekers in more specific ways than 
simply by creating a broad impression of urgency. Namely, Israel habitually 
declared a (very small) rotating list of countries to be danger zones, meaning 
that their nationals would temporarily not be deported from Israel. One 
day, a man came to the AAR offices claiming to be from the Democratic Re-
public of Congo (DRC), whose countrymen were at that point eligible for 
temporary protection in Israel. But he could not speak French or the local 
Bantu language he claimed to speak, Lingala. Sophie, an AAR coordinator, 
had found someone to speak Lingala with him, but he could not respond. 
“He was lying, clearly, saying he’s from the DRC to get [protection],” she 
said. She had tried to offer him help, but he became angry and disappeared, 
she said, after she could not reassure him regarding his asylum prospects. 
“He was furious. He thought I was denying him asylum myself,” she added. 
She did not fault him for lying, however. “I don’t know what I would do 
in their situation,” she said. “Probably I’d try anything. Also, we really don’t 
know what they went through. I understand him trying to protect his life.”
 As legal scholar Itamar Mann (2012) points out, claiming to hail from 
a region officially designated by UNHCR as a zone of conflict has been 
a fairly common strategy among migrants desperate to avoid deporta-
tion, and such strategies have tended to be avidly shared and debated by 
asylum seekers together in cramped detention quarters. While visiting 
a detention center for asylum seekers in Greece, an important migration 
entry point to the European Union (Cabot 2013), Mann noted that asylum 
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seekers incarcerated there had internalized such common wisdoms as “If 
you’re black, say you’re from Somalia. If you’re from central Asia, say you’re 
from Afghanistan. And if you’re an Arab, you’d better be Palestinian.”
 When they first encountered similarly implausible stories, some AAR 
volunteers in Tel Aviv felt stunned, contemplating the absurdity of having 
come all this way to volunteer in difficult conditions not for the sake of refugees 
but for a more diverse population that might consist to a significant degree 
of economic migrants trying to game the system. Some wondered how they 
could advocate effectively for asylum seekers whom they did not trust. Did 
those who embellished their stories still deserve free legal aid? Moreover, 
could they be harming “real” refugees by muddying the pool?3
 This sense of mistrust, in turn, undermined the fragile underpinnings 
of the humanitarian encounter between aid workers and asylum seekers. 
Aid organizations often profess an outspoken and unconditional concern 
for all of humankind (Barnett 2010, 112). Humanitarian assistance is deeply 
informed by ideals of humanity, which promises aid to anyone in need re-
gardless of their country or origin, and of impartiality, which prohibits tak-
ing sides in armed conflict (Barnett and Weiss 2008). At the same time, 
aid workers are also concerned with questions of conditional worth and of 
who is most deserving of care (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Willen 2011). “Hu-
manitarian practitioners,” writes Čarna Brković (2014), even if they want to, 
“cannot treat lives as equal. Instead, they have to differentiate lives through 
intertwined influence of nationality, geopolitics, and compassion” (8).
 At AAR, then, aid was nominally meant to establish a space of apoliti-
cal and unconditional support. At the same time, for many aid workers, their 
assistance hinged on the assumption of an honest asylum seeker in a state 
of acute and immediate need. Migrants who appeared to have embellished 
their narratives, especially if their primary motives for migration seemed 
economic, disrupted these foundational assumptions. Many volunteers 
had long been wedded, whether they realized it or not, to an emergency 
imaginary of humanitarian action: they had come to intervene in a specific, 
time-bound emergency, and need was often equated in their minds with 
images of violence, death, despair, and destruction (Calhoun 2010; Red-
field 2010). Economic migrants, by comparison, presented decidedly more 
ambiguous needs, ones that were low-simmering and never-ending. They 
tested aid workers’ professed responsibilities: what sorts of assistance could, 
and should, they offer to a Ghanaian migrant whose case was virtually 
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guaranteed to be rejected and who, by her own admission, was simply trying 
to bide her time in Israel for as long as possible? In such instances, there 
was little of the comforting moral clarity that aid workers had come to rely 
on and crave as a form of guiding their actions and soothing their failures 
(Redfield 2010).
 Craving clarity, NGO workers throughout Tel Aviv sometimes held on 
to sweeping, and problematic, assumptions regarding asylum seekers’ coun-
tries of origin. Government actors and NGO actors alike associated partic-
ular countries, such as Sudan and Eritrea, with government oppression and 
violence and others, such as West African countries, with economic migra-
tion. At a medical NGO nor far from AAR, for example, Uri, a medical aid 
worker, once told me that a Ghanaian patient was not eligible to have his 
treatment covered by the NGO’s asylum seeker fund. “Ghanaians are self-
pay,” he told me distractedly while rifling through medical files. Perplexed, I 
pointed out that this man had lodged an RSD application. “West Africans 
generally aren’t [asylum seekers]—they’re migrant workers.” Uri responded 
matter-of-factly, disregarding my earlier statement. “We don’t discuss it pub-
licly, [but] 99 percent of them are here to buy time.”4 In Greece, Cabot (2013) 
similarly found that NGO workers were sometimes quick to reflexively de-
clare South Asian asylum seekers ineligible for asylum, even though some of 
their asylum applications, upon closer examination, held merit.
 This mistrust often became mutual. Just as volunteers habitually sus-
pected their beneficiaries of deceptive intent, some asylum seekers in turn 
become convinced that AAR volunteers were themselves the ones denying 
them asylum or visas. More than once, I heard asylum seekers begging AAR 
volunteers to pull strings with the MOI in order to help them extend their 
stay in Israel somehow and reacting with disbelief or anger when told that 
AAR had no connections or power with the ministry. At the height of the 
refugee crisis in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the AAR offices were indeed 
rife with tensions and raised voices. Contrasting with the gratitude-suffused 
encounters that visitors might expect, instances of mutual anger and frus-
tration were fairly common, and volunteers seemed habitually exhausted or 
embittered about their daily work.
 Yet stories that might seem implausible in certain contexts, volunteers 
knew, did not necessarily mean that asylum seekers were lying or that they 
faced no risk back home. Although the man in the Lingala example above 
might really have been lying about being from the DRC, other country of 
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origin cases were not so clear-cut. For example, since 2006, the Israeli gov-
ernment has routinely told Eritrean asylum seekers that they were really 
from Ethiopia as a pretext to deport them (Yaron 2013). Until the 1990s, 
Eritrea was a part of Ethiopia, and people in present-day Eritrea and Ethi-
opia share considerable ethnic, linguistic, and historic ties. These ties, then, 
have significantly complicated Eritrean asylum seekers’ efforts to secure 
temporary nondeportation in Israel.
 Another example is described in a report about contested ethnicity 
in the Israeli asylum regime (Yaron 2013). In 2006, a young male asylum 
seeker from southern Sudan arrived in Israel from Jakao, near the Ethiopian 
border. He spoke the Nuer tribal language. However, noting that he also 
spoke Amharic, MOI officers claimed that he was in reality an Ethiopian 
masquerading as Sudanese in order to qualify for protection. While they did 
not deport him, they refused to grant him a temporary nondeportation visa, 
keeping him in limbo for years. In 2011, when South Sudan was declared an 
independent country, with which Israel immediately established diplomatic 
ties, he was promptly deported.
 As AAR volunteers gradually realized, plausibility was a complex mat-
ter to ascertain. Narratives that sounded implausible could have important 
kernels of truth to them or could belie suffering of a different, but no less ex-
treme, kind. In her study of legal solicitors in Scotland, Farrell (2012) found 
that many of them routinely assumed that their beneficiaries were lying. 
One solicitor candidly said he believed himself to have handled only three or 
four “genuine” refugee cases in his entire career (171). But, as another solicitor 
put it, “appellants are so desperate to leave their own country for whatever 
reason that they will sometimes make up a claim and I think that is a reality” 
(172, emphasis added).
 The word “desperate” serves here an important exculpatory role. While 
this solicitor did suspect deceit, he also suspected that what had happened 
to asylum seekers back home was likely bad enough to prompt enormous 
desperation to leave. The solicitor understood, moreover, that such desper-
ation could prompt asylum seekers to amplify their narratives, even when 
their own stories might have been enough to grant them asylum. This recalls 
Souter’s indictment of the asylum system itself as responsible for encour-
aging desperation-born deception (2011, 2016). Several solicitors in Farrell’s 
(2012) study likewise noted the influence of smugglers on asylum seekers’ 
stories, recalling Mehta (2011) and Dolnick’s (2011) descriptions of asylum 
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seekers in New York City being unwittingly coached to tell stereotypical 
narratives. As Haas (2012) and Cabot (2013) have shown, even “real” refugees 
must put a great deal of performative “work . . . into becoming recognizable 
as such” (Cabot 2013, 116).
 Some AAR volunteers underwent a similar coming-of-age process. 
Even though they often questioned particular details in their beneficiaries’ 
narratives, some developed an increasingly forgiving view of those they sus-
pected of deception, guessing at the myriad pressures and past horrors that 
might prompt such deceit. This realization was gradual and did not happen 
to everyone. But when it did emerge, it often accompanied a second import-
ant realization that that myriad forms of suffering mattered, even if they 
did not always meet convention requirements. As Sophie, an AAR asylum 
assistance coordinator, recounted to me in 2012,
In many cases, I’ve seen people whose reasons for fleeing wouldn’t fit the 
[1951] convention but were horrific, and what do I do with these people? 
One man who lived in Ivory Coast till he was eight came to us. He had 
to flee because his parents were killed there during their civil war. Then 
the situation in the Ivory Coast changed, and he wasn’t being persecuted 
any longer, but he still couldn’t return: what awaited him back there? He 
had no one. And he’s not just an economic migrant either.
DESERVING AND ECONOMIC MIGRATION
 The phrase “he’s not just an economic migrant either” is telling. 
While Sophie likely did not intend it that way, she, an aid worker, was im-
plying that economic migrants’ needs, unlike the boy’s, were illegitimate. As 
her words indicated, it was easy to feel compassion for an eight-year-old boy 
whose parents had been killed in the Ivory Coast and who had no home to 
return to. It required a different degree of compassion, and a different pro-
cess of self-reckoning, to develop sympathy for, and work tirelessly to save 
from deportation, tens of thousands of “run-of-the-mill” economic migrants, 
whose pasts were also rife with hardship but perhaps of a more prosaic kind.
 Over time and especially after forming friendships with their benefi-
ciaries, some AAR volunteers began to develop such a sympathy, decoupling 
their own personal calculus of deserving from that of the 1951 convention, 
which they had previously uncritically accepted as a legitimate means of 
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differentiating deserving from undeserving migrants. Suffering and need, 
some of them came to realize, came in myriad forms, few of which would 
grant their bearers political asylum. In Israel, it was almost impossible, they 
knew, to win the “refugee roulette” no matter which form of suffering one 
had endured (Ramji-Nogales, Shoenholtz, and Schrag 2009).
 Since 2006, aid workers and activists at AAR and other NGOs had 
campaigned throughout Israel for refugee rights, invoking the plight of 
twentieth-century European Jewish refugees and Holocaust victims in order 
to argue for similar compassion for sub-Saharan asylum seekers. However, in 
private, some aid workers admitted to me that people fleeing individual per-
secution likely constituted only a portion of their beneficiaries. Many, rather, 
particularly applicants from West Africa, seemed like economic migrants 
driven by less exotic forms of need.5 Some of the volunteers I spoke with, 
however, appeared to have developed a habit of shifting their anger from their 
beneficiaries to the 1951 convention. They expressed a growing disillusion-
ment with the convention as an instrument that seemed designed to keep 
people out, not let them in. Between forced and economic migration, they 
realized, lay not a chasm but an ambiguous landscape of ill-defined misery.
 Yet there was arguably no good way for aid workers to voice such cri-
tiques in public venues or to argue for broader notions of deserving (Wil-
len 2011). Many felt their roles constrained them to publicly repeat simple 
messages about everyone being a convention refugee because it was the only 
narrative that carried any or legitimacy or weight in the Israeli public sphere. 
Begging for compassion for economic migrants, many felt, would not be a 
wise in a political environment suffused with xenophobic sentiment.
 Other aid workers questioned the wisdom of this approach. “We say 
they’re all refugees, and the government says they’re all economic migrants,” 
one aid worker from the nearby medical NGO reflected ruefully. Neither 
side believes the other, she added, and meanwhile the MOI rejects everyone. 
She, like several of her AAR counterparts, privately thought that it would 
be wiser for NGOs to reverse their long-held “everyone’s a refugee” position 
and to publicly admit that this was not the case. NGOs, she argued, should 
push for fairer RSD proceedings while acknowledging that some asylum 
seekers might not fit the 1951 convention and have to be deported or “shared” 
with other countries in the Global North. Such a move, she believed, would 
read as more palatable to the MOI and gradually help lower the 99 percent 
asylum rejection rate.
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 She had to be careful, however, with respect to how and where she 
expressed this opinion. In NGO settings, “economic migrant” was often 
a taboo term, a phrase that implied siding with the Israeli government’s 
blanket descriptors of all asylum seekers as economic migrants. Some aid 
workers were afraid that publicly acknowledging the presence of economic 
migrants within their beneficiary pool might undermine NGOs’ legitimacy 
and place all their beneficiaries in peril.
EVIDENCE OF PERSECUTION
 As I have illustrated so far, while the formal challenge for AAR aid 
workers was to determine whether their beneficiaries’ stories would persuade 
an asylum officer, a separate process of private self-reckoning also occurred, 
pertaining to the judgment of asylum seekers’ “deserving” (irrespective of 
their formal eligibility for asylum). These two processes of adjudication, 
formerly seen as one and the same, increasingly diverged as aid workers be-
came increasingly critical of the 1951 convention and as they encountered 
asylum seekers whom they felt were deserving of protection even though 
they would never meet the official requirements. Once in a while, however, 
these two separate processes of reckoning reconverged when certain asylum 
narratives simultaneously tested both aid workers’ notions of evidence and 
of deserving.
 An important example concerns an asylum seeker I will call Victor, 
whom I only knew to be an asylum seeker from a country in West Africa 
whose nationals did not qualify for group protection in Israel and thus had 
to undergo individual RSD proceedings. Amanda, an AAR volunteer, re-
called Victor vividly. He had arrived at the AAR offices brandishing a Shell 
Oil Company worker identification card, she recalled, which showed his 
own photograph and his name alongside the yellow Shell logo. A militia 
group resentful of his Shell employment and privileged social standing back 
home, he told volunteers, had decided to take revenge on him and kill his 
sons. Startled, several AAR volunteers requested documentary evidence of 
their deaths. In response, Victor only repeated parts of his story tearfully 
and held out his Shell Oil ID.
 “This Shell Oil ID only shows me you worked for Shell Oil,” Amanda 
recalled having said to Victor. “It does not tell me your sons were killed. Do 
you have hospital reports, police reports, or death certificates?” In response, 
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the man held out his Shell Oil ID again, with growing desperation. 
Amanda and her colleagues advised Victor to ask friends or family back 
home to send him the death certificates. In response, Victor vacillated be-
tween yes and no, finally claiming that he could not send back for the 
documents since his wife was illiterate. Amanda was taken aback, uncertain 
of how his wife’s illiteracy related to her ability to collect documents. In 
recalling his story to me, she said incredulously, “He expected me to believe 
that he worked for Shell Oil yet his wife was illiterate?”
 A few months later, Victor finally returned with death certificates that 
he had somehow acquired. But they seemed suspiciously new and contained 
dates that contradicted his narrative. The documents clearly seemed forged, 
Amanda recalled. She and her fellow volunteers inquired how Victor’s sons 
could have been killed after he had already arrived in Israel, if their deaths 
were what had prompted him to escape. Victor broke down. Stopping short 
of admitting he had lied, he confessed that his government did not issue 
death certificates on demand, and then he begged for Amanda’s help. Re-
gretfully repeating AAR’s most oft-heard mantra, she explained she had no 
power to decide his case. “But an asylum officer,” she coolly remembered tell-
ing him, “would not find your story credible.”
 Confounding the volunteers, Victor did not give up. His Shell Oil ID 
itself became a central piece in a war of attrition—and mutual suspicion—
between aid workers and asylum seekers. Every few weeks Victor would re-
turn to the AAR offices, waving his Shell Oil ID in tears and begging for 
help. Seeing aid workers had little new to offer him, he would storm out and 
then repeat this cycle a few weeks later, each time with mounting frustra-
tion. In recounting the story to me, Amanda was mystified that he thought 
his Shell Oil ID would be enough evidence to win him asylum.
 Victor’s story recalls that of Mustapha in Shuman and Bohmer’s 
(2014) study, who, when asked to produce affidavits attesting to his per-
secution, instead presented a photograph of the docks from which he had 
escaped Sierra Leone as a stowaway on a ship to Brazil. Mustapha did not 
seem to realize that from the perspective of asylum officers, the photo-
graph of the docks counted simply as another part of his narrative “rather 
than independent evidence to corroborate it” (408). Victor had used his 
Shell Oil ID in a similar way. Even if he did find the ID to be sufficient 
evidence of persecution, AAR aid workers did not see it as such, exem-
plifying the ways in which asylum seekers may disagree with both judges 
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and their own legal advocates on what constitutes credible evidence (see 
Coffey 2003).
 Cases like Victor’s likewise further challenged AAR volunteers’ reflex-
ive distinctions between economic and forced migration and between prob-
lem zones and quiet zones. Amanda did not know why Victor’s story was 
filled with inconsistencies. It was unclear, she said, if he was lying about his 
sons’ deaths altogether, or whether they had indeed died in the manner he 
claimed and that he had fabricated their death certificates simply because 
he had no other way of obtaining them. Either way, she considered his case 
weak. As other AAR volunteers wondered, if Victor was indeed lying about 
parts of his narrative, was it was because he had been subject to a different 
form of persecution or violence that he did not care to disclose? Or was it 
because his motives were primarily economic? As Cabot (2013) has simi-
larly found with respect to legal aid workers in Greece, significant “epistemic 
anxieties” and “guesswork” frequently accompany eligibility determinations 
(121). Whatever the answer in Victor’s case was, over time Amanda began 
to suspect he had indeed undergone some kind of hardship back home that 
deserved recognition, regardless of whether it satisfied 1951 convention re-
quirements. His emphatic, tangled narrative presented an important cri-
tique of the hierarchies of deserving that Amanda and her colleague had 
taken for granted. And even if he had been telling the truth, Amanda re-
flected ruefully, he might have genuinely been unable to acquire the docu-
ments to prove it.
WORKING THROUGH A 99 PERCENT REJECTION RATE
 In her ethnography of asylum adjudications in the United States, 
Haas (2012) was able to interview asylum officers and gain insight into how 
they make their decisions. Yet I, and AAR volunteers, possessed little inside 
knowledge regarding the MOI’s decision-making processes apart from what 
could be inferred from the rationales outlined in rejection letters. What AAR 
volunteers did know, however, was that they were almost guaranteed to fail. 
Mindful of the high RSD rejection rate, which has hovered above 99 per-
cent since 2009, aid workers regularly contended with the possibility that 
they were constructing legalistic identities in vain, failing asylum seekers both 
morally (since they were thereby tacitly legitimizing a draconian asylum sys-
tem) and practically (since doing so could not even help them win asylum).
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 In March of 2012, an Israeli lawyer and AAR volunteer whom I shall 
call Ya’el gave a lecture to a group of Tel Aviv NGOs about asylum eligibility 
determination in Israel. During the lecture, she related a particularly memo-
rable story of an asylum seeker who was kidnapped by human traffickers in 
the Sinai Desert and who was then blindfolded and tortured by his captors 
before eventually being rescued. In his subsequent narrative, he estimated 
that based on the distinct voices he had heard, there were five or six different 
men torturing him. The MOI, Ya’el said, denied his asylum request. His 
rejection letter, she paraphrased, had stated, “In your first interview, you said 
you were tortured by five or six people, but in the second interview you said 
six or seven people. How do you explain this discrepancy?”
 “As a lawyer,” Yael said in her lecture, “such [cases] are difficult for me 
to tackle. Every minute detail change means to the officer that he’s a liar. 
This is how they fail asylum seekers: they deliberately seek out every means 
to discredit them.” Indeed, cases like that of the blindfolded man nurtured 
in aid workers a particular form of cynicism toward what Cabot (2013) has 
called the “‘useless’ shadowy bureaucracy” of asylum regimes (200). If the 
MOI denied a blindfolded man asylum for not knowing exactly how many 
men were beating him, they reckoned, then what was the point of trying to 
help anyone? Cases like these, aid workers felt, showed that the MOI was 
eager to reject all applicants and was not acting in good faith.
 Another common ministry move was to decide by fiat that an asylum 
seeker, contrary to her own narrative, was in reality from a “safe” country that 
Israel could deport her to. Sophie, the asylum assistance coordinator, described 
how this was done: “A lot of north Sudanese too are now about to be deported 
because the MOI suddenly told them ‘you’re actually from South Sudan,’ just 
so they could deport them. And the most frustrating part is that these people, 
because they are from Darfur, actually for once have everything they need to 
prove their identity: UN documents, birth certificates—more than usual, so 
much more.” When asked how the MOI could deport card-carrying Dar-
furis without attracting international condemnation, Sophie speculated that 
it probably did not really care about appearances by this point, adding that 
“the MOI wants them to get fed up and leave. It’s a war of attrition.”
 I often asked AAR volunteers how they could continue to do what 
they did every day while knowing that they were almost guaranteed to fail. 
Sophie surprised me with her response. “I don’t think our job is to get them 
refugee status,” she said. “It is their right to tell their full story if they want, 
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and we should help them be heard.” I was puzzled by her answer, which 
seemed out of step with her passionate devotion to her beneficiaries. Per-
haps, I wondered, this was her way of persuading herself of the value of 
her work regardless of the outcome or of distancing herself at times from 
heart-wrenching questions of truth and deserving.
 Meanwhile, Ya’el, who took on AAR’s most complex cases pro bono, 
gave a different response. “As lawyers, it’s tough to continue day after day 
when all our clients are rejected, or when one client succeeds in ten years,” 
she said in her March 2012 lecture. “So my colleague says to me, ‘No, no—
don’t look at it this way! Ask instead how many were deported? And if none 
so far, then okay—that’s success!’ So success depends on how you define it.”
 Yael’s point highlights an important silver lining to aid work at 
AAR. Cases deemed weak were typically rejected by the MOI after a 
brief preliminary interview. But strong cases, as AAR staff put it, were left 
to linger in limbo for years before rejection. As they waited to hear back, 
these “stronger” applicants could stay in Israel, work, and send money back 
home. Some AAR volunteers took comfort in this fact, reckoning that even 
if asylum approval rates in Israel might be virtually nil, if they could still help 
their beneficiaries sound credible enough to not be dismissed out of hand, 
thereby allowing them some time to earn remittance money in Israel, then 
they had already done them an indisputable good.
 Following anthropologist Natalia Roudakova (2013), who draws on 
German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk’s (1987) work on cynical reason, I would 
like to suggest that some AAR aid workers cultivate a form of cynicism that 
Sloterdijk calls an “enlightened false consciousness.” As Roudakova puts it, 
those suffering from false consciousness might misrecognize the grounds of 
their actions, thinking they are doing one thing while actually doing another. 
In contrast, enlightened false consciousness means that they do know what 
they are doing but continue to do it. In Slavoj Žižek’s (1989) terms, “the 
cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the ideological mask 
and the social reality, but he nonetheless still insists upon the mask” (29).
 Some of the AAR volunteers I have described, I argue, behaved in 
ways that suggested an enlightened false consciousness. On the one hand, 
they worked tirelessly to help asylum seekers reframe their stories to suit 
the demands of an opaque asylum regime. On the other, they sometimes 
developed a deep, resentful skepticism—both of the asylum regime itself 
and of asylum seekers who might be embellishing parts of their narratives. 
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In other words, throughout their months or years at AAR, paid workers and 
volunteers parted with many illusions of honesty and good faith in the asy-
lum system, wherein “deserving” applicants ultimately triumphed and won 
asylum. Dishonesty, instead, seemed rampant everywhere: by and large, the 
MOI did not appear to give a fair hearing to applicants, and the latter des-
perately tried to game the system.
 For these aid workers, their cynicism itself became a tool of assigning 
blame and leveraging a political critique at the Israeli asylum system. As Rou-
dakova (2013) puts it, this particular form of cynicism, which Sloterdijk (1987) 
has called the “cynicism of the oppressed” (143), “manifests itself in a variety of 
ways—from low-lying suspicion of the ideological pronouncements of those 
in power to active hostility towards the masters” (4). I argue that after their 
initial surprise at the prospect of fabricated narratives subsided, some AAR 
aid workers were able to shift their focus of cynicism from the seemingly 
dishonest asylum seeker to the theater of asylum itself. Then, to persevere in 
this thankless job despite a 99 percent rejection rate, some volunteers were 
additionally able to redefine success as nondeportation for the moment.
 In this chapter, I have suggested that aid workers fluent in legalistic 
and nonlegalistic construals of suffering are a good place to examine the 
pitfalls of the asylum system and its categories of deserving. The immense 
difficulty of winning asylum in Israel, I have suggested, compelled AAR aid 
workers to reevaluate what they understood by “deserving” and to question 
the presumed gulf between economic and forced migration.
 When I first arrived at AAR, I was fascinated by the cynicism I wit-
nessed in the more seasoned aid workers. In contrast with the bright-eyed 
idealism of novices, many of the more experienced aid workers seemed to 
dispassionately roll with the punches of irate demands and implausible 
stories. I wondered how they were able to continue their daily work while 
maintaining such a high degree of cynicism. However, as this study shows, 
if aid workers could sometimes shift their target of cynicism from their 
beneficiaries to the asylum system itself, then they have effectively kept in-
tact a key figure in the humanitarian repertoire—the deserving beneficiary.
NOTES
1. All names in this chapter are pseudonyms.
2. Heath Cabot’s (2013) aid workers in Greece realized this as well.
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3. Meredith Terretta (2015) describes asylum lawyers and aid workers who share such 
concerns regarding those who are presumed to be faking their narratives.
4. This aid volunteer was admittedly not from AAR but from a nearby medical 
NGO; he was not well versed in asylum technicalities. While I never heard AAR volun-
teers explicitly make such sweeping “99 percent of country X are economic migrants” state-
ments, more toned-down versions of this assumption circulated at AAR as well. As Cabot 
(2013) shows with respect to asylum seekers in Greece, both NGO and government actors 
in Greece were prone to making broad generalizations about the asylum eligibility, or 
ineligibility, of applicants from particular countries of origin.
5. Such assumptions, however, Sophie was careful to explain to me, were not made 
about Sudanese and Eritreans.
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Chapter 8
Transgendered Asylum and Gendered  
Fears in US Asylum Law and Politics
SARA L. MCKINNON
 I n d i v i d u a l s  h a v e  b e e n  m a k i n g  g e n d e r -  a n d  s e x u a l i t y - 
related asylum claims for almost as long as there have been asylum provi-
sions in the United States, which started with the United States Refugee 
Act of 1980. These cases would fit into the “social group” category of the 
1951 United Nations (UN) definition of a refugee as someone outside of 
their home country with a well-founded fear of persecution relating to their 
“race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion” (UN 1951, 36). But, as many legal scholars have noted, the social 
group category is challenging because before you can make your argument 
for protection, you would first have to define your social group, which the 
immigration officials hearing your case could always state does not consti-
tute a group or connect to the persecution you fear (Berg and Millbank 2013; 
Godfrey 1994; Musalo 2003; Southham 2011; Voss 2005). In 1994, the US 
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attorney general, Janet Reno, articulated in US law that sexual orientation 
constituted a social group. No longer did gays and lesbians have to articulate 
the group they belonged to. Merely identifying as gay meant that they fit as 
refugees. This provision stated that “an individual who has been identified as 
homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for that reason alone 
may be eligible for relief under the refugee laws on the basis of persecution 
because of membership in a social group” (Reno 1994). Through this prece-
dent, some transgender applicants were also able to gain refugee status, as 
“gay men with female sexual identities” (Hernandez-Montiel v. INS 2000).
 Never has there been a similar recognition for gender to count as a 
social group in the United States. While feminist legal advocates suggested 
the amendment around the same time as the sexual orientation declaration, 
the courts and the attorney general remained silent on the question of gen-
der’s inclusion (Stevens 1993). Instead, the courts have consistently stated 
that gender is too broad to count as a social group because it applies to over 
50 percent of any country’s citizens.
 While recognition of gender’s inclusion has stalled, there has been 
much movement in the contemporary moment for understanding gender 
identity and expression as protected categories. In conjunction with ener-
getic lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) immigration activ-
ism, in 2011 the United States released a framework that offered even more 
possibility in the ways transgender applicants might gain refugee status by 
adopting the language of gender identity and expression as constituting so-
cial groups. This chapter reads the incorporation of gender and sexuality in 
asylum law together to consider the politics undergirding who can be cate-
gorically received. In other work, I have discussed what the incorporation of 
particular subjects as asylum seekers does for a country of asylum (McKin-
non 2011, 2016). Specifically, I show that the fact of being incorporable often 
means that a person or group is not seen as threatening in some way to the 
state and that the asylum grant can simultaneously be used to buttress or 
warrant state projects in the nation and around the world.
 In this chapter, I am interested in this newest wave of incorporation—
the incorporation of transgender asylum applicants—and what these incor-
porations reveal about US national and international aspirations and fears. 
In addition to trans applicants seeking asylum for reasons of their gender, 
cisgender women have also been seeking gendered protections since the be-
ginning of the current US refugee and asylum system. If we recognize all of 
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these instances as moments where individuals are using refugee protocol to 
protect their right to diverge in some way from the gendered social and cul-
tural norms in their country of birth, then the question guiding this chapter 
is which kinds of gendered transgressions are incorporable and which are 
too suspicious, threatening and thus excluded? And finally, what politics un-
dergird these incorporations and exclusions? I suggest that a fear of brown 
and black reproductivity, and the attendant threat that such reproductivity 
poses to the status of white America, is at the base of categorical inclusions 
and exceptions in US immigration and refugee law.
THEORY AND METHOD
 Trans feminism is a useful theoretical frame to employ in engaging 
these questions because it evokes attention to the transgressions and cross-
ings that come in disrupting gender norms and what those transgressions do. 
In articulating a trans feminist framework, Finn Enke (2012) points out that 
a part of the theoretical possibility of trans is that it is a prefix that means 
and functions “‘to cross’” (5). This syncs with Susan Stryker’s (2008) high-
lighting of the transgressive nature of the term as describing “the movement 
across a socially imposed boundary way from an unchosen starting place—rather than 
any particular destination or mode of transition” (1; emphasis in original). 
And as Gayle Salamon (2008) writes, “Genders beyond the binary of male 
and female are neither fictive or futural but are embodied and lived” (115). 
In taking these two points seriously, we must first of all recognize the range 
of socially imposed boundaries that may be crossed and what the “trans-ing” 
of those boundaries does. Boundary crossings have material implications for 
the trans-ing subject and society. A trans feminist framework allows us to 
consider the range of ways that people transgress this gender binary and the 
material impacts of boundary crossings and attempts to control them.
 Another trans feminist framework—a transnational feminist approach— 
is also useful as it considers the material and lived conditions of such trans-
ing and transgression. Specifically, this approach understands the trans in 
transnational to mean “the transversal, the transactional, the translational, and 
the transgressive aspects of contemporary behavior” (Ong 1999, 4; emphasis 
in original). Such an approach not only examines what happens in trans-ing 
the nation but also what happens when people, ideas, or things trans na-
tion-state borders and fall in the in-between or the “cracks and crevices, the 
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silences and sutures of the global” (Shome 2006, 3). While some see trans 
and feminist perspectives as in tension, Gayle Salamon rightly notes that 
there is transformative potential in combining trans and feminist theoriz-
ing. Specifically, drawing trans and transnational feminist analyses together 
means paying attention to movement and the boundary transgressions that 
happen in that movement, while also maintaining focus on dynamics of 
power that play out in those movements and transgressions. Additionally, 
both approaches maintain focus on attempts at controlling such movement, 
which makes theories such as biopolitics and necropolitics especially useful 
to understand the conditions of trans incorporation and exclusion (Hari-
taworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2014). These analytics also place focus on 
understanding how boundary crossings and transgressions connect with 
limits, exclusions, and prohibitions. Where people transgress social norms, 
there are, quite often, subsequent forces that work to maintain and enforce 
the social order. And these power-enforcing actions also have ripple effects 
that are intended and unforeseen. I want to suggest here that while greater 
recognition for trans asylum seekers has meant an acknowledgment of the 
precariousness that comes with trans-ing gender boundaries and that nec-
essarily also affords possibilities for certain trans and gender variant appli-
cants to gain refuge, it does so at the expense of walling off the concepts of 
gender and gender-based violence from the concepts of gender identity and 
expression. Such recognitions articulate a figuring of other asylum seekers 
as suspicious.
 A fear of brown and black reproductivity has been a constant in the 
history of white America (Collins 2004; Flavin 2009; Ordover 2003; Rob-
erts 1997). Though brown and black masculine reproductivity is also feared, 
this latest iteration of US asylum law targets the female-assigned body, re-
producing a dynamic where gendered protections seem to be expanding, all 
the while presumably heterosexual, cisgender women of color continue to 
have limited grounding in gaining gendered protections. This move to in-
corporate trans applicants enables the United States’ global moral project of 
positioning itself as the authority on human rights issues, while containing 
the threat of expanding protections for women whose reproductive bodies 
are seen as threatening. This analysis demonstrates how the protection of 
some gender transgressions can also participate in or produce limits and 
foreclosures—transgressing others’ possibilities for livability in the context 
of US transnational political aspirations and anxieties.
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 I take a rhetorical approach to the law to understand how particular 
gendered transgressions are incorporable while others are suspicious and 
fearful. A rhetorical approach to anything is particularly interested in the 
practical function of language or what language does in particular contexts. 
Within a legal context, this means that I analyze the claims, evidence, testi-
mony, and message strategies that unfold in legal arguments and decisions 
but also the “extrajudicial” discourses and contexts that frame how cases 
are heard and evaluated (Hasian 2002). Because asylum law is an interna-
tional form of law enacted in national contexts, I attend to both national 
and global public discourses that shape the success and failure of particular 
groups of asylum seekers, including transnational human rights advocacy, 
media reports, congressional records, and foreign policy debates.
HISTORICIZING TRANS ASYLUM
 The US asylum system as we know it today began with the implemen-
tation of the United States Refugee Act of 1980, which harmonized US law 
with international law and created a system for evaluating asylum seekers’ 
claims. By the mid-1990s, the courts had heard enough sexuality- and 
gender-related cases to realize that there were not only gaps in the protec-
tions offered through the application of the UN definition of “refugee” but 
also that it may be necessary to address those gaps.
 Gender and gender-based claims to asylum were introduced early 
in the US system of managing refugees as a problem. The courts began 
consistently hearing these cases in the late 1980s, and by the early 1990s 
legal advocates were offering analyses that called for the courts to address 
the gap in protections around questions of gender (Godfrey 1994; Kelly 
1993; Kim 1994; Love 1993). As these advocates pointed out, the contours 
of “social group” in the refugee definition posed significant challenges for 
women fleeing gender-based violence. Furthermore, the social imaginary 
of gender-based violence meant that many claimants were told that their 
experiences of violence were “personal,” not “political,” excluding them 
from protection under refugee provisions. In 1995, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service offered gender-attentive guidance to immigration 
judges and officials who would be hearing such cases, but this docu-
ment neither stated that gender was a recognizable social group, nor did 
it necessitate that officials follow the guidelines (INS 1995). As mere 
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suggestion, the document did little to clarify and strengthen gender-based 
protections. Rather, as I show in other work, acknowledgment of cis wom-
en’s gendered claims was incorporated through segregated case precedent. 
Through these cases, gender came to be recognized, almost exclusively, 
as something that cisgender, presumably heterosexual woman have, and 
gender-based asylum meant refuge for cis women who were fleeing vio-
lence easily intelligible as cultural, relational, or private (McKinnon 2016). 
The isolated and contingent nature of gender’s incorporation meant that 
the social and cultural transgressions that most cis women experienced 
persecution for went largely unrecognized as forms of political violence, 
making them ineligible for refugee relief.
 In contrast, Attorney General Reno moved on articulating sexual ori-
entation (and because of the conflation of gender and sexuality, certain trans 
claimants as well) as a particular social group in 1994. This decision was 
based on the claim of Fidel Armando Toboso Alfonso, who sought asylum 
in 1986 on the basis of being persecuted in Cuba for being gay. Toboso 
Alfonso was originally denied asylum by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
in 1990 (Matter of Toboso Alfonso 1990). But in 1994, Reno reversed the 
case and used it to set precedent for gays and lesbians to be recognized in 
US asylum law as particular social groups (Reno 1994). As immigration ad-
vocates and journalists account, this ruling enabled thousands of gays and 
lesbians to win refugee relief in the United States (Millman 2014).
 It would be another five years before Hernandez Montiel’s case made 
it through the courts, setting a precedent for those who transgressed social 
and cultural norms through their gender identity and expression to gain 
relief. Specifically, the courts recognized these claimants as “gay men with fe-
male sexuality identities,” a social group that made them eligible for asylum 
(Hernandez-Montiel v. INS 2000). This precedent certainly created space 
for some trans applicants to be recognized as refugees in accordance with 
international refugee and human rights protocol (Boer-Sedano v. Gon-
zales 2005; Comparan v. Gonzales 2005; Maldonado v. Attorney General 
2006; Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales 2006; Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft 2004), 
but it left many other trans applicants, such as trans men, gender-variant, 
and gender-queer applicants, without good standing to be seen as refugees 
in accordance with the law, and the precedent did nothing for cis women 
also making claims related to their gender (Neilson 2004). The Hernan-
dez Montiel precedent would continue to guide the way trans applicants 
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navigated the immigration system for ten years. Yet, late in the first decade 
of the new millennium, the approach to trans asylum began to shift.
 The shift in recognition for transgender applicants coincided with the 
mounting international and US “LGBT rights as human rights” agenda. This 
agenda first developed on the international stage. In 2007, the UN released 
the first set of guidelines for incorporating sexuality and gender-identity/
expression principles into international law, a document that is now known 
as the Yogyakarta Principles (UN 2007). Since 2007, the international body 
and its member countries have released dozens of other reports, statements, 
and resolutions on the question of the place of sexual orientation and gen-
der identity/expression in international human rights law. Additionally, the 
UN created a mass campaign to highlight the need for protecting the rights 
of LGBT persons. UN Free & Equal “raises awareness of homophobic and 
transphobic violence and discrimination, and promotes greater respect for 
the rights of LGBT people everywhere. . . . The campaign engages millions 
of people around the world in conversations to help promote the fair treat-
ment of LGBT people and generate support for measures to protect their 
rights” (UN 2016). UN Free & Equal proudly proclaims that the campaign 
has been viewed by over a billion people and that it is circulating around the 
globe its message of “acceptance and respect” (UN 2016).
 The mainstreaming of a sexual orientation and gender identity anal-
ysis at this international level has prompted similar mainstreaming at the 
nation-state level. In particular, in countries such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom, we see a rise in the use of the human rights concerns 
of special groups as warrants and justifications for foreign affairs and pol-
icy. This is especially true in the United States, where the end of the Cold 
War meant a shift in foreign affairs rhetoric from addressing communist 
states to human rights matters (Dietrich 2006). The United States has 
long positioned itself as the global pastoral power around issues of human 
rights (McKinnon 2016). Not having a significant sexual-orientation and 
gender-identity platform in national affairs, let alone in international affairs, 
the United States made significant steps to harmonize its LGBT agenda 
with the international platform. Mainstream LGBT organizations such 
as the Human Rights Campaign led the way in revising the national plat-
form. Gays and lesbians can now serve openly in the military (after repeal 
of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy), can get married (after reversal of the 
Defense of Marriage Act), and are included in hate crimes legislation as 
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protected groups (after signing of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. 
Hate Crimes Prevention Act). Queer scholars and activists ardently critique 
the focus of gay rights mobilization for its focus on inclusionary politics. 
Not only does this modality have a very narrow focus on specific institu-
tions, but these politics also normalize white, middle-class, professional sta-
tus interests as the main concerns of the LGBT movement (Brandzel 2016; 
Puar 2013; Puar 2006). In particular, Jasbir Puar (2013) links political con-
solidation around this agenda to US capital accumulation through “the gay 
and lesbian human rights industry.” This industry “continues to proliferate 
Euro-American constructs of identity (not to mention the notion of a sex-
ual identity itself ) that privilege identity politics, ‘coming out,’ public visibil-
ity, and legislative measures as the dominant barometers of social progress” 
(338). This agenda not only has impact at the national level but also increas-
ingly is employed for globally oriented projects of US foreign policy.
 Toward internationalizing the United States’ use of this LGBT human 
rights framework, in 2009 President Barack Obama signed on to the UN’s 
“Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.” In 
its press release, the Obama administration explained: “The United States 
is an outspoken defender of human rights and critic of human rights abuses 
around the world. As such, we join with the other supporters of this State-
ment and we will continue to remind countries of the importance of re-
specting the human rights of all people in all appropriate international fora” 
(US Department of State 2009). This globally oriented project is in line 
with earlier iterations of the “women’s rights as human rights” platform that 
deployed protecting-women-and-girls rhetoric to justify US international 
defense, diplomacy, and development projects (Grewal 2005; Hesford and 
Kozol 2005). In fact, the 2011 speech by the then secretary of state Hillary 
Clinton popularly titled by the press her “Gay Rights as Human Rights” 
speech, eerily parallels her 1995 “Women’s Rights as Human Rights” speech 
at the Beijing Conference. As she stated in the 2011 speech:
It is violation of human rights when people are beaten or killed because of 
their sexual orientation, or because they do not conform to cultural norms 
about how men and women should look or behave. It is a violation of 
human rights when governments declare it illegal to be gay, or allow those 
who harm gay people to go unpunished. It is a violation of human rights 
when lesbian or transgendered women are subjected to so-called corrective 
214 Sara L. McKinnon
rape, or forcibly subjected to hormone treatments, or when people are 
murdered after public calls for violence toward gays, or when they are forced 
to flee their nations and seek asylum in other lands to save their lives. . . . No 
matter what we look like, where we come from, or who we are, we are all 
equally entitled to our human rights and dignity. (Clinton 2011)
 Because Clinton was a representative of the United States’ interna-
tional policy, her speech serves as a global orientation project. She begins 
by stating the problem—“It is a violation of human rights”—naming the 
abuses that follow as contrary, unjust, and incorrect. The strength of the 
statement serves as a soft-power warning to countries, calling them to orient 
correctly on the matter of LGBT rights. Specifically, the speech calls coun-
tries to orient their mode of enacting sovereignty so that they are not seen as 
countries that violate or condone violence against LGBT individuals. That 
this speech coincided with President Obama’s executive memorandum to 
the heads of all US federal executive offices and agencies, instructing each 
office to implement an actionable plan centered on the LGBT human rights 
agenda, demonstrates the promise that supported the call to countries to 
correctly orient in matter of LGBT rights. Specifically, Obama directed de-
partments to “ensure that U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance promote 
and protect the human rights of LGBT persons.” The order also initiated 
stronger refugee and asylum provisions for those fleeing LGBT persecution:
In order to improve protection for LGBT refugees and asylum seekers 
at all stages of displacement, the Departments of State and Homeland 
Security shall enhance their ongoing efforts to ensure that LGBT 
refugees and asylum seekers have equal access to protection and 
assistance, particularly in countries of first asylum. In addition, the 
Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security shall ensure 
appropriate training is in place so that relevant Federal Government 
personnel and key partners can effectively address the protection of 
LGBT refugees and asylum seekers, including by providing to them 
adequate assistance and ensuring that the Federal Government has the 
ability to identify and expedite resettlement of highly vulnerable persons 
with urgent protection needs. (Obama 2011)
We can see in both this current LGBT rights platform and the earlier “wom-
en’s rights as human rights” iteration, the organizing of US national and 
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foreign policy agenda around what I have described in earlier work as an 
enactment of “pastoral power” in the name of particular special groups. 
This agenda then becomes actionable in geopolitical contexts to service 
the political-economic interests of the United States (McKinnon 2016).
 The current version consolidates US aspirations for political power 
and control through trans rights rhetoric. In order to be prepared for the 
internationally oriented project of what the then US ambassador to the UN 
Susan Rice called in a speech “advancing US interests and values abroad,” the 
United States must provide a symbol to the outside world that the country 
itself is recognizing trans rights (Rice 2013)
 A symbolically powerful yet contained way to do this is through the 
adoption of legal language and protections for trans asylum seekers. As a 
national manifestation of international law, asylum law holds the symbolic 
power of duly representing a state’s domestic and foreign orientation toward 
particular issues. In attempting to demonstrate the United States’ defense 
of a person’s right to transgress binarized gendered norms, the 2011 protocol 
and training began by historicizing LGBT asylum through mention of the 
precedent set with the Toboso Alfonso ruling in a document created by the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Next, the 
document gestures to the international efforts to create LGBT protections, 
by citing the UN Resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and 
Gender Identity, which states that “LGBT[I] persons are endowed with 
the same inalienable rights—and entitled to the same protections—as all 
human beings” (USCIS 2011, 11). It then moves to articulate terminology 
that asylum officers can use to distinguish the particularities of cases. This 
inclusion of terminology seemed particularly important given the previ-
ous conflation of sexual orientation and gender identity in the Hernandez 
Montiel case (Hernandez-Montiel v. INS 2000). The USCIS document 
explains:
Gender is what society values as the roles and identities of being male 
or female. Sex is the assignment of one’s maleness or femaleness on 
the basis of anatomy and reproductive organs. Gender and sex are 
assigned to every individual at birth. Gender identity is an individual’s 
internal sense of being male, female, or something else. Since gender 
identity is internal, one’s gender identity is not necessarily visible to 
others. Gender expression is how a person expresses one’s gender 
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identity to others, often through behavior, clothing, hairstyles, voice, 
or body characteristics. Transgender is a term used for people whose 
gender identity, expression, or behavior is different from those typically 
associated with their assigned sex at birth. . . . Transgender is a gender 
identity, not a sexual orientation. Thus, like any other man or woman, 
a transgender person may have a heterosexual, bisexual or homosexual 
sexual orientation. (USCIS 2011, 12–13)
The definition of gender offered here allows for cis women and men to be 
seen as having a gender, yet by linking gender identity and expression di-
rectly to trans-ness, the document forecloses the possibility that cis individ-
uals might make legitimate claims on the basis of their gender identity and 
expression. There is one discussion in the manual of  “gender-based mis-
treatment,” but by only focusing on the struggles of cis gay women in this 
section, the document continues to reify the idea that cis women are those 
who have gender-based experiences (USCIS 2011, 23–24).
 Since the implementation of this guidance for asylum officers, there 
has been further clarification of the protections for transgender asylum 
seekers. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals approved three 
trans asylum cases from Mexico with the expressed social group connected 
to their memberships as transgender persons in Mexico. The Ninth Cir-
cuit used the case Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch to articulate the precedent. 
While Edin Avendano Hernandez was prohibited from receiving asylum 
because of a prior conviction in the United States, she was granted immigra-
tion relief through the protections of the UN Convention Against Torture. 
This case does important work not only for future transgender applicants in 
providing legal precedent in which to ground their claims but also in sepa-
rating out the previous conflation of sexuality with gender identity from the 
Hernandez Montiel precedent. Avendano Hernandez’s legal counsel argued 
that a significant aspect of the two prior denials of the claimant’s plea was 
the conflation of sexuality and gender identity, which necessarily meant that 
the claimant did not fit the standards of the previous precedent:
The IJ [Immigration Judge] failed to recognize the difference between 
gender identity and sexual orientation, refusing to allow the use of 
female pronouns because she considered Avendano-Hernandez to be 
“still male,” even though Avendano-Hernandez dresses as a woman, 
takes female hormones, and has identified as woman for over a decade. 
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Although the BIA [Board of Immigration Appeals] correctly used 
female pronouns for Avendano-Hernandez, it wrongly adopted the IJ’s 
analysis, which conflated transgender identity and sexual orientation. 
(Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch 2015, 4)
 In assessing the case, the Ninth Circuit judges agreed that the courts 
erroneously conflated the two. They also set language for distinguishing the 
categories:
While the relationship between gender identity and sexual orientation 
is complex, and sometimes overlapping, the two identities are distinct. . . . 
Of course, transgender women and men may be subject to harassment 
precisely because of their association with homosexuality. . . . Yet 
significant evidence suggests that transgender persons are often 
especially visible, and vulnerable, to harassment and persecution due 
to their often public nonconformance with normative gender roles. 
(Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch 2015, 16–17)
The training protocol and this recent precedent go far in shoring up the dif-
ference between sexuality and gender identity/expression in order to allow 
for greater recognition of transgender asylum claimants. Yet with this new 
recognition also comes the possibility to foreclose protections for other gen-
dered groups.
 Unintentionally or not, the development of trans protections in US 
asylum participates in the severing of gender as a concept that might refer 
to a whole spectrum of identities, expressions, and experiences that vari-
ously fit or transgress social and cultural norms. Gender, instead, is figured 
ontologically rather than something that is done and felt in a multitude of 
manners (Butler 2004; Salamon 2010). Instead, the protocol and latest prece-
dent further entrench a division between gendered subjects as it solidifies 
distinct categories for gender and gender-based persecution (concepts asso-
ciated with cis women) and gender identity and gender-identity persecution 
(concepts given to trans and gender-variant applicants). For example, Aven-
dano Hernandez’s case is evaluated solely on the basis of her persecution as 
a transgender woman. The beginning narrative of the case is framed as such:
Avendano-Hernandez is a transgender woman who grew up in a rural 
town in Oaxaca, Mexico. Born biologically male, she knew from an 
early age that she was different. Her appearance and behavior were very 
218 Sara L. McKinnon
feminine, and she liked to wear makeup, dress in her sister’s clothes, 
and play with her sister and female cousins rather than boys her age. 
Because of her gender identity and perceived sexual orientation, as a 
child she suffered years of relentless abuse that included beatings, sexual 
assaults, and rape. The harassment and abuse continued into adulthood, 
and, eventually, she was raped and sexually assaulted by members of the 
Mexican police and military. (Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch 2015, 3–4)
Avendano Hernandez is not figured here as seeking asylum on account of 
her gender alone. It is, instead, her gender identity and expression that serve 
as the basis of her claim. This seems like a small shift. Yet rhetorically the 
difference between gender and gender identity and expression, especially in 
a legal context, matters greatly. This articulation solidifies the courts’ ear-
lier equation that gender is something reserved for cis women, while gender 
identity and expression become new segregated legal categories reserved for 
trans applicants.
 In my broader research I found that the segregation of gender-based 
persecution from sexuality-related persecution normalized a one-sex, 
one-gender system whereby male-assigned subjects are figured as the neu-
tral subjects for which all categories (except gender) are available. By segre-
gating gender from gender identity and expression, this latest incorporation 
of trans-inclusive protections also works within the logic of this one-sex 
system, naturalizing male-assigned applicants as more readily legible, and 
hence eligible, for all asylum claims. This normalization arguably allows for 
greater political protections for trans applicants (though time will tell). Yet 
in separating gender and gendered-forms of persecution into categories, it 
maintains the already uphill battle that cis women have in successfully prov-
ing that the gendered transgressions that they violated or were threatened 
for should enable their protection in accordance with international and US 
law. Instead, for cisgender women whose grounds for claiming asylum are 
connected to their gender, their options for claiming asylum remain, at best, 
contingent and segregated.
 Cisgender women continue to struggle greatly in being seen as claim-
ants with a legitimate basis for asylum. In the early years of asylum proceed-
ings, it was easy to hear an immigration judge discredit a woman’s gendered 
claim by saying that her social group didn’t count because gender is too 
broad to count as a social group. Upon sharing experiences of violent sexual 
Transgendered Asylum and Gendered Fears 219
assault at the hands of military officials, women were also told that their 
experiences attest more to “personal mistreatment” than “persecution.” Un-
fortunately, such approaches to evaluate cisgender women’s claims are still 
quite common. This was the case for Reina Izabel Garcia Martinez in 2004. 
Garcia Martinez’s experiences with political violence began at age nine when 
a guerrilla group moved into her small community in Guatemala. The group 
began forcibly recruiting villagers to participate, including her family. Her 
brother was murdered in resistance. Soon thereafter, the Guatemalan mili-
tary also came to Garcia Martinez’ community to “protect” the village from 
the guerrillas. Instead of protection, the military began to physically and 
sexually violate the community members. As reported in the court’s detail 
of this case,
“Over the course of the next several years, someone in the village was 
raped by soldiers about every 8 to 15 days.” According to Garcia, the 
military targeted the village, and retaliated against its residents based on 
the mistaken belief that the villagers had voluntarily joined, and were thus 
attempting to aid, the guerillas. (Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft 2004, 1070)
 The judge who evaluated the case believed that Garcia-Martinez “had 
‘testified sincerely and genuinely without hesitation’ about her experiences” 
but ultimately denied her claim, stating:
“The evidence in the record simply does not substantiate a finding that 
[Garcia] had been a victim of past persecution. Particularly, [Garcia] has 
failed to show . . . that her attack had anything to do with . . . her political 
opinion, her race, religion, her political affiliation or membership in a 
particular social group.” Garcia’s rape was simply “a criminal act that was 
committed against her by a soldier[,]” and there was no evidence that the 
rape was “condoned by the government.” (Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft 
2004, 1071–72)
 Sonia Maribel Lopez Juarez experienced similar challenges to gain 
asylum relief. Despite testifying to years of brutal rape by a man from her 
hometown who had a lot more power and money than she did, the judge 
consistently doubted her testimony, at one point asking,
How do I know that you’re not making up this story? That you’re 
coming here as an economic refugee and you have no legal right to be 
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here and you’re making up a story so you can claim asylum? And there’s 
reasons [sic] for you to misstate the facts, because you want to stay 
here and there’s no other way that you can stay here unless you make 
up a story. Now, how do I know, do I have anything other than your 
statement that you claim that you were raped by this young man in 
Guatemala? ( Juarez-Lopez v. Gonzales 2007, 2)
The Seventh Circuit would ultimately vacate the previous denials by the 
immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals, but it was not 
before significant doubt had been raised about Lopez Juarez’s claim for gen-
dered refuge reliefs. Across the range of gender-based asylum claims made 
by cisgender women, claimants are consistently not believed, told that their 
experiences are not political, or are discredited as having experiences that 
do not rise to the level of persecution. The severing of gender from gender 
identity and expression makes the discounting of cis women’s claims that 
much easier to contain as segregated from the broader political question 
of how particular groups are recognized and received as worthy of asylum.
 I argue that this legal segregation of gender from gender identity and 
expression, rather than being an accidental and incidental happening, serves 
to create boundaries around a particularly suspicious and fearful figure in 
US law and politics—the figure of the reproductive brown cis woman. The 
separation of gender from gender identity guards the state from the threat 
of the nonwhite reproductive woman’s body. As I have demonstrated in pre-
vious work, one of the primary logics that shapes who is incorporable as an 
immigrant subject is national anxiety around protecting white America from 
the reproductive threat that nonwhite women, by the nature of how their 
bodies are rhetorically perceived, bring with them (McKinnon 2010). While 
some migrant subjects are valued for their entrepreneurial possibilities, oth-
ers are racialized through “schemes that serve to blacken and stigmatize” the 
way they are imagined as subjects with potential for belonging to the na-
tion-state (Ong 2003, 13). Eithne Luibhéid (2013) demonstrates that a partic-
ularly fear-producing subject in contemporary Western national contexts is 
the nonwhite immigrant woman who is “pregnant on arrival.” The actual or 
possible reproductivity of an immigrant woman is, across many Western na-
tional contexts, central to the discursive boundaries created between who is a 
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desirable immigrant subject and who is not, who is “legal” and who is “illegal,” 
as well as who might be tolerable enough for incorporation and who must 
be excluded. This happens in the United States because, as Carrie Crenshaw 
demonstrates, the definitional difference in US law between men and women 
is based on cis women’s reproductivity and the differences that are presumed 
to be associated with that characteristic (Crenshaw 1996). In the immigration 
context of asylum where we are speaking mostly about nonwhite women’s 
possible reproductivity, this difference is deployed as a means of exclusion 
to protect the primacy of white America from the risk of nonwhite repro-
ductivity. In an age of the neoliberal US state, all immigrant subjects are also 
weighed as variously desirable or undesirable alongside their ability to reduce 
the image that they will be a burden to the state. This happens through hav-
ing access to capital, having a degree in a sought-after academic field, having 
family connections, or having sponsorship through an employer. Since there 
is almost no way to reduce the way the cis women’s bodies are read as repro-
ductive, cis women making gender-based claims are figured overwhelmingly 
as undesirable and threatening. In accepting such gendered subjects as widely 
as might happen for trans applicants through the new legal language, the US 
state would be transgressing boundaries around state investments in power 
that have been present, and continue remake themselves, since the beginning 
of the white-settler colonial nation-state.
 In conclusion, in walling off gender from gender identity and expres-
sion, the United States can receive trans applicants as gendered claimants 
because their gendered claims do not also come with the threat of the repro-
ductive body that challenges the white capitalist structure of the state. As a 
side benefit, this incorporation then allows the state to deploy rhetoric about 
itself as a leader in human rights for groups such as women and LGBT in-
dividuals in order to promote its global project of “advancing democracy” 
abroad. Meanwhile, the threat to the primacy of white America remains 
limited. Segregated and contained in a contingent and conditional category, 
cis women and their presumed-to-be reproductive bodies are buffered from 
impacting the transnational aspirations that mobilize the US nation-state.
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Chapter 9
“And Suddenly I Became a Lesbian!”
Performing Lesbian Identity in the Political Asylum Process
RACHEL A. LEWIS
They say that they don’t believe that I am a genuine lesbian. What does that 
mean? I don’t understand. How should I prove it?
—Lesbian asylum seeker, United Kingdom
 I n  A p r i l ,  2 0 1 5 ,  a  N i g e r i a n  l e s b i a n ,  A d e r o n k e  A p a t a , 
was denied political asylum in the United Kingdom on the grounds that she 
could not provide “proof ” of her homosexuality. Despite presenting evidence 
that her girlfriend, brother, and three-year-old son had been killed in vigi-
lante violence related to her lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
activism in Nigeria, the UK Home Office refused to recognize Apata’s claim 
for political asylum. In Apata, R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(2015), the judge in charge of Apata’s case argued that because she had been 
in a previous relationship with a man, she “cannot be a lesbian.” In an attempt 
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to prove her sexual orientation, Apata and her fiancée, Happiness Agboro, 
whom Apata met while in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre, 
submitted photographs and visual material documenting their sexual rela-
tionship as evidence in Apata’s case. However, the judge nonetheless pro-
ceeded to argue that while Apata had “indulged in same-sex activity,” she was 
not “part of the social group known as lesbians.” As he put it, “Lesbian is not 
a sexual choice. . . . You can’t be a heterosexual one day and a lesbian the next 
day. Just as you can’t change your race.” He even went so far as to suggest 
that Apata had “deliberately altered her appearance . . . to a lesbian stereotype” (my 
emphasis).
 The rejection of Apata’s asylum claim on the grounds that she had 
“deliberately altered her appearance . . . to a lesbian stereotype” attracted a 
significant amount of critical attention in the British tabloid media. For 
example, the Daily Mirror ran a satirical news quiz designed to educate its 
readers about the absurdity of Britain’s treatment of lesbian and gay asylum 
seekers titled “Does the Home Office think you’re gay?” (Leach 2015). Ques-
tions in the quiz range from detailed inquiries about applicants’ attendance 
at gay bars, their sexual and/or marital history, and their religious belief sys-
tems, to whether or not they have children and/or have campaigned on be-
half of gay rights. At the end of the quiz, the Daily Mirror informs its readers 
that unless they answer every question “correctly,” they are “not gay enough 
for the Home Office” (Leach 2015). In the context of the quiz, answering 
every question “correctly” means conforming to heteronormative stereotypes 
that all lesbians are butch, politically outspoken, and childless and that they 
like to hang out in lesbian bars.
 The increasingly absurd lengths to which lesbian and gay asylum seek-
ers in the United Kingdom are having to go to “prove” their sexual orienta-
tion may help to account for the growing perception among queer asylum 
applicants that the only way in which they can establish a credible claim for 
political asylum is by filming themselves having sex. Indeed, many lesbian 
asylum seekers, such as Apata, feel that immigration officials will not believe 
that they are lesbians unless they film themselves having sex with another 
woman. As Jennifer, a lesbian woman from Jamaica, remarked:
I wanted my case to be on the merit of what happened to me, not that I 
had to go and give you pictures of me and my girlfriend in bed to say “I 
am lesbian,” which is what it basically came down to, they had pictures of 
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me and my girlfriend and various partners actually, over time, not having 
sex but in pretty compromising positions to prove that I’m lesbian. (cited 
in Held 2016, 140–41)
In an interview with the BBC’s “Today” program, a lesbian asylum seeker 
from Uganda similarly stated that she was pressured by immigration offi-
cials to produce sexually explicit material as evidence in her asylum case:
I had my asylum appeals rejected twice. At one time I thought of 
committing suicide. Basically, they said I wasn’t gay. I had met my 
current partner in the detention center. We presented the gifts we were 
exchanging—birthday cards, Valentine’s cards and everything was in 
the pictures we took. And even when we were in court my partner was 
very much cross-examined about our relationship, and the questions we 
were asked, they were embarrassing. To bring home a point that we are 
really in a relationship this is what we do in bed. You can’t imagine how 
humiliating that is. (cited in Lewis 2014)
Not only does the use of pornographic material as evidence of sexual ori-
entation violate these women’s right to privacy, but it has also produced a 
catch-22 situation for lesbian asylum applicants in which they are poten-
tially damned if they fail to provide the tapes as proof of sexuality and 
damned if they do (the evidence can easily be dismissed as “fake,” as in the 
case of Apata). Within such a scenario, the political asylum system is actu-
ally responsible for creating the very system of fraud that it is attempting 
to eradicate. As a result, decision-makers still have no idea what claimants 
need to do to prove their sexual orientation, the bureaucracy has taken on a 
life of its own, and proving sexuality in order to establish credibility for the 
purposes of political asylum has become, quite literally, an impossible task 
(Lewis 2014).
 The United Kingdom’s treatment of lesbian and gay asylum seekers 
is, in many ways, symptomatic of the Kafkaesque world of contemporary 
immigration controls in which asylum seekers are either trapped in a bu-
reaucratic situation in which they cannot prove who they say they are or are 
detained in prisons operated by private security companies unconstrained 
by the rule of law. The absurd treatment of lesbian asylum applicants, in 
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particular, derives from the fact that what we are witnessing in lesbian asy-
lum cases is the point at which multiple systems of negation—including 
state-sanctioned forms of racism and compulsory heterosexuality—converge. 
If, as asylum advocates and scholars have argued, the general assumption on 
the part of immigration officials is that all asylum seekers are “bogus” until 
proven otherwise (Bohmer and Shuman 2008), then the lesbian asylum 
seeker is, in many ways, an ideal asylum applicant because her claims to au-
thenticity within heteronormative, patriarchal culture can always be denied. 
As Judith Butler (1991) reminds us, lesbian oppression frequently takes place 
through relegating the lesbian to a position of “unthinkability” within the 
dominant order. Within the kind of binary sex/gender system where gender 
is always already constituted by compulsory heterosexuality, lesbian sexual-
ity either imitates heterosexuality, functions for the benefit of the male spec-
tator, or is, quite simply, inconceivable. What feminist and lesbian theorists 
have helped us to recognize is that within compulsory heterosexuality les-
bians are frequently represented in terms of their unrepresentability—that the 
lesbian possibility, in other words, is denied (Lewis 2010). Thus, while gay 
male asylum claims are often disputed on the grounds that the applicant is 
perceived to be “faking it,” the reality of male homosexuality is rarely denied. 
For lesbian asylum seekers, however, the very possibility of female same-sex 
desire is repeatedly subject to erasure within the political asylum process. 
Marking the limits of asylum law, lesbian refugees embody an institutionally 
and culturally assigned erotic precarity.1
 Given the disproportionately negative impact of UK asylum policies 
on lesbian migrants, it is perhaps not surprising that a growing body of 
cultural activism has emerged to challenge the ways in which the political 
asylum system deprives lesbian asylum seekers of the opportunity to make 
credible asylum claims. Media and cultural productions about lesbian mi-
gration and asylum range from narrative and experimental films, documen-
taries, visual and sound art, poetry, theater, and performance art to online 
social media campaigns. During the past five years, there has been a particu-
lar growth in feminist theater and performance art devoted to documenting 
the challenges faced by lesbian refugees and asylum seekers in the United 
Kingdom.2 Recent plays and performance art focusing on lesbian asylum 
include Oreet Ashery’s Staying: Dream, Bin, Soft Stud and Other Stories (2010) 
and The World Is Flooding (2014), Cheril Clarke’s Asylum (2012), Chris Mac-
Donald’s Eye of a Needle (2014), Clare Summerskill’s Rights of Passage (2015), 
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and Carol Campbell’s The Lesbian Wannabe (2016). What interests me here 
are feminist and queer performances of asylum that grapple with the absur-
dity of having to prove one’s sexuality in the context of the political asylum 
process. To this end, I will discuss two plays—MacDonald’s Eye of a Needle 
and Campbell’s The Lesbian Wannabe—both of which represent the UK 
asylum system as a Kafkaesque nightmare for lesbian asylum seekers. As 
these plays reveal through their critique of the asylum system’s reliance on 
identity categories that only make sense from an administrative perspective, 
the UK asylum regime utilizes narratives of bureaucratic absurdity as a way 
of concealing state-sanctioned forms of racism and xenophobia.
LESBIAN ASYLUM AND THE RACIALIZED LENS  
OF SUSPICION IN EYE OF A NEEDLE
 Chris MacDonald’s play Eye of a Needle was first performed at South-
wark Playhouse in London on August 27, 2014. Sponsored by the UK 
Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group, the leading organization devoted to 
representing LGBT asylum seekers in the United Kingdom, Eye of a Needle 
revolves around the story of a Ugandan lesbian refugee, Natale Bamadi, who 
is trapped in an absurd series of exchanges with two male immigration of-
ficials in which she cannot prove her sexual orientation. Set entirely within 
the context of an immigration detention center, the action moves back and 
forth between the interview room and the men’s room where the two male 
immigration officials are seen masturbating after interrogating lesbian asy-
lum applicants about their sexual relationships with women.
 Eye of a Needle was originally inspired by the real-life asylum case of 
Ugandan lesbian Brenda Namigadde, who was denied political asylum in 
the United Kingdom on the grounds that she could not provide proof of her 
homosexuality. Upon the rejection of her asylum appeal, Namigadde was 
placed in detention, from where she was due to be deported to Uganda on 
January 28, 2011. Two days before Namigadde’s scheduled deportation, how-
ever, Ugandan gay rights activist David Kato was brutally murdered after 
he successfully took out a legal injunction against the Ugandan magazine 
Rolling Stone for its role in inciting homophobic hate crimes. In response to 
Kato’s murder, journalist Melanie Nathan of the US-based website LezGet-
Real: A Gay Girl’s View on the World launched a massive global Internet 
campaign in which she demanded that Namigadde be granted a stay of 
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deportation. LezGetReal’s online campaign subsequently attracted the at-
tention of David Bahati, the author of Uganda’s proposed antihomosexual-
ity legislation, who, after reading one of Nathan’s articles, called her directly 
and asked her to give Namigadde a “message.” Bahati informed Nathan that 
Namigadde would be welcomed back to Uganda on one condition: that she 
“abandon” her homosexual behavior (Lewis 2013). If she did not do so, he 
told her, Namigadde would be imprisoned upon her return. On the morn-
ing of Namigadde’s scheduled deportation, her story appeared on the front 
cover of Metro, a magazine distributed for free in most British cities, with 
a readership of approximately 3.5 million people. As a result of the intense 
media coverage surrounding her case, Namigadde was eventually granted a 
stay of deportation in the United Kingdom just minutes before her plane 
was scheduled to depart, despite the fact that the UK Border and Immigra-
tion Agency continued to maintain that she was not a lesbian (Lewis 2013).
 The rejection of Namigadde’s asylum case is connected to the 
United Kingdom’s 2010 Supreme Court decision to overturn the “discre-
tion” requirement—or the notion that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, 
and intersexed (LGBTI) asylum applicants can return to their country of 
origin and be “discreet” about their sexual orientation or gender identity—
which has led to the denial of lesbian and gay asylum claims on the grounds 
that the applicant’s claimed sexual orientation is disbelieved (UKLGIG 
2010 and 2013). In the 2010 Supreme Court decision HJ (Iran) and HT (Cam-
eroon), the chief judge, Lord Rodger, concluded that only those individuals 
who are “practicing homosexuals,” or who choose to “live openly,” constitute 
a particular social group for the purposes of the refugee convention. Those 
who adopt what he refers to as a “voluntary choice of discretion” do not qual-
ify as convention refugees.3 By assuming a scenario of “natural discretion” 
and “voluntary concealment,” Lord Rodger makes a distinction between 
those who are “openly gay” and those who choose to remain “discreet” about 
their sexual orientation. The result of the Supreme Court’s decision is that 
gay and lesbian applicants who cannot prove that they lived openly in their 
countries of origin must convince decision-makers that the primary reason 
they concealed their sexual orientation was because of a fear of persecution, 
rather than as a result of so-called voluntary discretion. By encouraging im-
migration officials to focus their attention on the expected future behavior 
of the applicant, the language of discretion that underwrites the Supreme 
Court decision gives adjudicators increased power to interrogate asylum 
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applicants about their sexual orientation in a way that lends itself to nega-
tive credibility assessments (Lewis 2014).
 The presumption that gay and lesbian asylum applicants are “volun-
tarily discreet” until proven otherwise is central to the challenges that Natale 
faces in attempting to prove her sexual orientation in Eye of a Needle. Despite 
the facts that Natale was a friend of David Kato and her photograph had 
been printed in a popular Kampala newspaper as well as on the Internet, 
the male immigration official in charge of her case nonetheless proceeds to 
question her as to why she cannot be “discreet” about her sexual orientation in 
Uganda. Not satisfied with Natale’s account of her persecution in Uganda, he 
chooses instead to focus on her sexual history. In act 1, scene 4, he repeatedly 
interrogates Natale about how many women she has slept with in Uganda:
Laurence: So . . . how have you, er, expressed your sexuality previously?
Natale: I have done all the things a woman can do with another woman.
Laurence: Can you give me any examples?
Natale: I have made love with women. I have kissed ladies, I have had 
sex with them. I have done it all.
Laurence: And do you have any evidence of any of these sexual 
relations or of your sexuality?
 As is evident in the above scene, the discretion logic that underwrites 
queer asylum policies in the United Kingdom has not only produced the 
expectation of visibility and an identity in the public sphere but, perhaps 
more disturbingly, has also resulted in an excessive focus on the sexuality of 
individual claimants. The distinction made by the Supreme Court between 
those who are “openly gay” and those who are “voluntarily discreet” means 
that immigration officials are increasingly relying on an individual’s par-
ticipation in specific sexual acts as the basis for proving sexual orientation. 
Indeed, a recent report produced by the UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration 
Group has documented that immigration officials frequently engage in sex-
ually explicit questioning of political asylum applicants, making decisions 
on the basis of claimants’ sexual practice and behavior (UKLGIG 2013). 
For many asylum applicants like Natale, however, living openly and freely in 
their country of origin would have been virtually impossible. Consequently 
they are subjected to an increased burden of proof to establish that they are 
living as “openly gay” in the country in which they are seeking asylum.
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 Later in act 1 of Eye of a Needle, a second male immigration official 
enters the interview with Natale and Laurence and similarly demands to 
see visual material documenting Natale’s sexuality:
Natale: I have videos of marches, of protests, there are photos of me 
at a bar we go to in Kampala. It allows gay people. There is a 
manifesto from my time in Cape Town and—
Ted: Any sex tapes?
Laurence: Um, we were talking about the documents that Miss 
Bamadi was going to submit.
Ted: I was listening. I was wondering if there was any video evidence 
of you having lesbian sex? Miss Bamadi?
Natale: I don’t have anything like that.
Ted: Any pornographic photographs of you performing sex acts with 
other women?
Natale: No.
Ted: Well, in these “documents” you talk about then, do you ever 
mention any lesbianic sex acts? What about photos from the 
gay bar, are you kissing women in them? Dancing with them?
Natale: Of course I am dancing with them, they are my friends.
Ted: I mean, dancing with them, sexually, you know? Grinding, 
twerking, kissing?
Despite the fact that Natale possesses substantial media coverage docu-
menting her career as an LGBT activist in Uganda, the male immigration 
officials in Eye of a Needle still rely on the sex tapes as primary proof of sex-
uality. In this way, MacDonald cleverly exposes the extent to which the po-
litical asylum system simultaneously treats lesbian sexuality as invisible and 
in a manner verging on the pornographic. As Eye of a Needle demonstrates, 
what drives the contradictory production of lesbian invisibility and hyper-
sexualization in the political asylum process is the heteronormative assump-
tion that it is possible for women to be “voluntarily discreet” about their 
sexual orientation—or the tired patriarchal notion that female sexuality is 
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somehow “less active” than male sexuality. Because it is difficult for many 
women to be openly gay in their countries of origin, a high burden of proof 
is placed on them to convince officials that their acts of discretion are invol-
untary. Transferring the burden of credibility to lesbian asylum applicants in 
this way opens up a loophole for negative lesbian asylum decisions because 
it permits immigration officials to interrogate applicants about specific 
sexual acts under the pretext that this will help them to establish whether 
or not the women before them desire to be “openly gay.” The result is that 
heteronormative stereotypes about lesbian sexuality based on the assump-
tion that lesbians are naturally more “discreet” about their sexual orientation 
than gay men become the basis for excluding queer female migrants from 
accessing refugee protection (Lewis 2014).
 In Eye of a Needle, Natale’s failure to conform to heteronormative 
stereotypes of lesbian identity based on visibility, hypersexualization, and 
frequent attendance at lesbian bars means that her asylum claim is denied 
and she is deported to Uganda. At the end of the play, we learn that, as a 
result of her deportation, Natale was stoned to death outside her apartment 
in Kampala. The play thus concludes with a disillusioned Laurence quitting 
his job and a pro bono lawyer named Caroline informing Ted that Natale 
has been murdered. Ted’s final response to the news of Natale’s murder is 
“We can’t run the place like this. . . . We cannot do this properly. We aren’t 
coping. We can’t cope.” In this way, the play ends in a fittingly dystopian 
manner with the poignant image of a failing, dysfunctional bureaucratic sys-
tem. The fact that the scene concludes in the men’s restroom only heightens 
the sense of absurdity and abjection. As Chris Macdonald has commented 
regarding the Kafkaesque nature of his play, “The impression that we get of 
the detention center is that it is in chaos. The chaos of the system is unfath-
omable from the outside” (MacDonald 2014).
 By showing the absurdity—and ultimate impossibility—of success-
fully performing lesbian sexuality in the context of the political asylum 
process, MacDonald’s play illustrates how gendered and racialized notions 
of credibility have a disproportionately negative impact on the treatment 
of queer female migrants of color. In doing so, Eye of a Needle unveils how 
gendered, racialized, and heteronormative discourses of suspicion in the po-
litical asylum system work to produce lesbian migrants as precarious popu-
lations through differentially exposing them to deportation and, in the case 
of MacDonald’s protagonist, premature death.
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SEXUAL CITIZENSHIP, ASYLUM, AND HOMONORMATIVITY  
IN THE LESBIAN WANNABE
 It is the racialized, classed, and gendered stereotypes of lesbian identity 
at work in the political asylum process that are similarly rendered absurd in 
Carol Campbell’s new play, The Lesbian Wannabe (2016). Moving back and 
forth between the immigration office and a local lesbian bar, The Lesbian 
Wannabe exposes the racist and heteronormative policing of black lesbian 
migrant and femme identities across multiple institutional and cultural 
sites—queer and nonqueer alike. The play centers upon the story of Jacqui 
Kabumba, a Ugandan lesbian seeking asylum in the United Kingdom. Jac-
qui’s claim for asylum is initially denied on the basis that she cannot prove 
her homosexuality. After being put in touch with a visibly “out” lesbian pro 
bono asylum lawyer, Jacqui is encouraged to make a film of herself having 
sex with another woman, which ultimately leads to her being granted asy-
lum in the United Kingdom.
 The Lesbian Wannabe opens with a scene between an unnamed male 
immigration official and Jacqui, who cannot prove her sexual orientation. 
In act 1, scene 1, the dialogue revolves around the absurdity of how lesbian 
asylum cases such as Jacqui’s are evaluated, including the imperative that 
lesbian asylum seekers read lesbian magazines, watch lesbian shows, use sex 
toys, and listen to lesbian musicians:
Immigration Officer: What sex toys do you use?
Jacqui: What sex toys do I use? What kind of question is that?
Immigration Officer: Okay, you are definitely becoming overwrought. 
These are straight-forward questions to help streamline the 
process of naturalization. Answer yes or no, do you read Oscar 
Wilde?
Jacqui: No.
Immigration Officer: Do you attend pride marches?
Jacqui: No.
Immigration Officer: Do you listen to Melissa Etheridge?
Jacqui: Yes.
Immigration Officer: When did you first think you were a lesbian?
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Jacqui: When I was a little girl . . .
Immigration Officer: You must tell me about every sexual relationship 
you’ve ever had with a woman, every feeling or thought about 
any woman you’ve ever liked.
 Remarkably, much of the dialogue in this opening scene is taken from 
actual interviews with lesbian asylum seekers, as reported by the UK Les-
bian and Gay Immigration Group, the charity Stonewall, and official legal 
transcripts. Indeed, as Human Rights Watch has observed, immigration 
officials’ questioning about specific sexual acts can be especially common 
in lesbian asylum cases (Human Rights Watch 2010). As recently as 2013, 
questions posed by UK judges to lesbian asylum applicants under the pre-
text of establishing claimants’ sexual orientation included “Was it loving sex 
or rough?,’’ “How many sexual encounters have you had with your partner?,” 
and “You have never had a relationship with a man. How do you know you 
are a lesbian?’’ (UKLGIG 2013, 20). Lesbian asylum seekers in the United 
Kingdom have also been interrogated about whether or not they “use sex 
toys,” which sexual positions they like to adopt in bed, the novels of Oscar 
Wilde, and which (lesbian) shows they watch (Bennett 2013). Additionally, 
judges have told women that they do not “look like” lesbians, that lesbians 
“don’t have children,” and that all lesbians “enjoy the gay scene” and like to 
attend gay pride marches (Bennett 2013). Indeed, the final line in act 1, scene 
1 of The Lesbian Wannabe—“A homosexual lesbian can avoid the risk of harm 
by being discreet in her conduct”—is extracted from a lesbian asylum case 
discussed by Alice Miller, one she refers to as that of the “Discreet Chinese 
Lesbian Wannabe,” who was denied political asylum in Australia on the 
grounds that she was not a “practicing lesbian” (Miller 2005).
 During the reading of this opening scene from The Lesbian Wannabe 
at the symposium Crisis, Migration and Performance at the National Uni-
versity of Ireland in Galway in 2016, audience reactions ranged from mild 
discomfort and muted laughter to complete shock when Carol Campbell 
revealed that a good portion of the scene’s dialogue was taken from actual 
lesbian asylum cases. Arguably, much of the comic absurdity in the ini-
tial scene of The Lesbian Wannabe derives from the imperative that queer 
asylum applicants be “openly gay” in order to be granted refugee protec-
tion. As discussed earlier, while the claim to refugee protection is based 
on sexual orientation, the imperative to be openly gay—to be a sexual 
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citizen—is the product of neoliberal ideologies of sexual citizenship that 
are racialized, classed, and gendered. In her ethnographic study of lesbian 
asylum seekers navigating the UK asylum process and lesbian bar spaces 
in Manchester, Nina Held examines how the 2010 Supreme Court deci-
sion reproduces racialized, classed, and gendered norms of lesbian iden-
tity. As she rightly notes,
By dividing the group of gay and lesbian asylum seekers into two 
categories, those who live their sexuality openly and those who do not, 
it draws on a Western model of sexuality that requires public expression 
of sexual behavior. . . . Part of this is to produce evidence of a (white) 
gay lifestyle. In the asylum system, proof of “belonging to a particular 
social group” is based on normative and racialized notions of the genuine 
lesbian. (Held 2016, 145)
A crucial part of how asylum applicants produce evidence of the “white gay 
lifestyle” to which Held refers is by attending gay bars. And yet the kinds 
of racialized and classed sexual citizenship norms that get codified in the 
immigration process also emerge in lesbian and queer bar spaces, many of 
which similarly reproduce racialized standards of lesbian identity and be-
havior (Held 2016). Not only have immigration officials been known to tele-
phone gay bars to inquire about the presence of queer asylum applicants, but 
the lesbian bar spaces themselves often generate the same kinds of norma-
tive racial and gender stereotypes of lesbian identity that are oppressive to 
queer female refugees when they seek political asylum. In this way, lesbian 
migrants frequently find themselves caught between heteronormative nar-
ratives of lesbian identity in the political asylum process and homonorma-
tive forms of gate-keeping in lesbian bar spaces, all of which prevent queer 
women of color from exercising the kind of “consumer citizenship” needed 
to support their claim to be “openly gay.”
 In act 1, scene 2 of The Lesbian Wannabe, Campbell offers a stinging 
critique of the catch-22 situation facing queer women of color as they at-
tempt to prove their sexual orientation in the political asylum process. In 
this scene, we are introduced to butch-femme lesbian couple, Diesel Sheila 
(DD) and Felicia, whose relationship conforms to heteronormative stereo-
types of lesbian sexuality and behavior. In a lesbian bar, Babe’s, the butch 
lesbian DD, like the male immigration official before her, is similarly critical 
of Jacqui’s claim to be a “real lesbian”:
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DD: You don’t look like a gay girl.
Jacqui: No?
DD: Have you ever slept with a guy?
Felicia: DD!
DD: Have you ever kissed a guy?
Jacqui: Not willingly.
DD: You do know this is a lesbian bar, don’t you?
Felicia: DD, stop it. (To Jacqui) Sorry, my girlfriend gets a little 
concerned for my welfare. (To DD) Back off. Jacqueline here was 
just telling me that she’s about to leave the country because she 
applied for asylum for being queer and they denied her claim.
DD: That’s because you don’t look lesbian enough.
Jacqui: Why am I continually having this conversation?
DD: Doesn’t matter. You could appeal it.
Jacqui: Really?
DD: They didn’t tell you that?
Jacqui: No.
DD: Of course not. Where are you from?
Jacqui: Uganda.
DD: Yeah, they’re still pretty ruthless to gays over there.
Jacqui: You could say that.
DD: Parading gays naked out in the street. It’s barbaric.
Jacqui: I prefer not to use the term barbaric. But it is certainly an 
abusive practice. And my girlfriend was killed two years ago.
DD: Yeah, you should totally fight this. You just need some pointers 
on how to dress more butch.
Jacqui: That’s not who I am. It just plays into stereotypes.
DD: If you’re a femme lesbian, everybody knows it’s just a matter of 
time before you’re tempted by a guy.
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In this scene, the femmephobia and racialized exoticism directed by DD 
toward Jacqui mimics the kinds of heteronormative and colonialist narra-
tives of lesbian identity that are typically reproduced in the political asylum 
process. As with women’s asylum narratives more generally, lesbian identity 
is frequently constituted through the invocation of a colonialist narrative 
of oppression, according to which the victimized “third world lesbian” es-
capes from a “barbaric” Africa (in this case, Uganda) to find sexual maturity 
and self-knowledge in a supposedly enlightened and liberal West (i.e., the 
United Kingdom). Indeed, queer refugee law as it is interpreted in the vast 
majority of asylum cases is little more than a continuation of the Western 
colonizing project, whereby the West constructs the body of the Other in its 
own image, which in the case of the lesbian asylum seeker means passing as 
visibly and stereotypically lesbian as possible (Lewis 2010).
 Through the critique of racism and xenophobia in lesbian bar spaces, 
The Lesbian Wannabe directs our attention to the kinds of racist stereotypes 
about the sexuality of African women that contribute to the erasure of 
queer women of color in the political asylum process. As Tracy Reynolds 
observes in her work on the sexuality of black female migrants in the United 
Kingdom, colonialist myths of black women as either hypersexual hetero-
sexuals or asexual mammies foreclose the possibility of a nonnormative or 
queer black female sexuality (Reynolds 2016, 101). In The Lesbian Wannabe, 
the dialogue between DD and Jacqui similarly encourages us to see how 
race is implicated in the sexual citizenship norms to which black lesbian 
migrants in the United Kingdom are subjected. As LGBT rights and the 
concept of sexual democracy in Europe have acquired increasingly nation-
alist and racist undertones (El-Tayeb 2011), black queer migrants have be-
come impossible subjects. In the ideology of racelessness that frequently 
underwrites mainstream LGBT human rights advocacy, “the African” is 
marked as black through his or her lack of gay rights, as a homonormative 
notion of “gay rights” emerges “as a single-issue and race-free mode of dif-
ference” (Agathangelou 2013, 454). The result of this redacting of race in 
LGBT human rights and sexual citizenship discourses is the creation of 
a politics of black queer impossibility, whereby one cannot be both queer 
and black. As Agatha Agathangelou argues, “In the narrative wherein an 
imperial global structure of white supremacy protects ‘the gays’ from ‘the 
blacks’, . . . the displacement of racialized gays and lesbians becomes visible” 
(Agathangelou 2013, 472).
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 In The Lesbian Wannabe, Carol Campbell parodies the kinds of ra-
cialized and homonormative stereotypes of queer identity and sexual citi-
zenship that render black lesbian identity invisible. In act 1, scene 4, Jacqui 
meets with a butch immigration lawyer, Germaine Finch, who, we learn, 
is a “Jane Lynch type lawyer.” While Germaine acknowledges the problems 
with the immigration system’s treatment of gay and lesbian asylum claims, 
she nonetheless encourages her client to reproduce these norms anyway, 
handing her a brochure titled “How to Be a Lesbian.” The brochure contains 
questions such as “Do I feel nervous or out of place with friends who are 
girls?” and “Do I read lesbian magazines?” By encouraging Jacqui to perform 
lesbian stereotypes in order to prove her sexual orientation, this scene mocks 
the extent to which the political asylum process urges applicants to become 
reflexive and responsible “entrepreneurs of the self ” or the kinds of individ-
uals who are encouraged to represent themselves in their own immigration 
hearings (Conlon and Gill 2013, 245).4
 In The Lesbian Wannabe, the absurdity of the kind of personal re-
sponsibility that Jacqui must exercise in order to prove her sexual ori-
entation is illustrated in the filming of the sex scene between Jacqui and 
Felicia for the benefit of the male immigration official. Parodying the tired 
sexual predilections of the male heteropornographic imaginary, Germaine 
humorously opines regarding the rationale for having another femme les-
bian “act” in the film alongside Jacqui that “a butch-femme portrayal only 
reproduces heteronormative stereotypes, or in this case homonormative 
ones. And it’ll turn the guy off. No, we need a more delicate representa-
tion.” In this way, The Lesbian Wannabe offers an astute parody of the extent 
to which lesbian sexuality is repeatedly treated in a manner verging on the 
pornographic in the political asylum process. The character of Germaine 
knowingly mocks such heteronormative stereotypes, insisting, “Your last 
rehearsal didn’t cut it for the level of passion I’m asking for. It was not 
loving enough.” As she comments to Felicia, who plays Jacqui’s lover, “You 
looked like a call girl,” and, to Jacqui, “You were acting like some sort of 
blind dental hygienist.”
 The absurdity of Germaine’s running commentary on Felicia and 
Jacqui’s sexual performance is not as far removed as one might think from 
the ways in which gay and lesbian asylum cases are evaluated. Immigra-
tion officials often “view” sex tapes and evaluate applicants’ performance(s) 
therein as to establish whether or not they demonstrate a “credible” gay 
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identity. In her work on sexuality and asylum law, Jenni Millbank (2009) 
discusses two asylum cases in Canada and Australia in which courts viewed 
sex tapes produced by gay male asylum applicants but ultimately rejected 
the tapes as evidence of sexual orientation. While in the Australian case the 
tape was discredited on the basis that the oral evidence “lacked important 
detail” about “the nature and type of sexual activity in the video” (22), in the 
Canadian case the tape was rejected because the court held that it did not 
involve the applicant’s claimed partner. As the judge argued, “The sex acts 
appear so mechanical it looks more like an encounter between a “John and 
a male prostitute, rather than two men very much in love with each other” 
(Millbank 2009, 22).
 From the bizarre scenes in the immigration office to the racism in 
Babe’s to the play’s ultimate conclusion with the sleazy male official lurch-
ing for the sex tape as Jacqui is granted refugee status, The Lesbian Wannabe 
offers a powerful comic critique of the absurdity of having to prove one’s 
sexual orientation in the context of the political asylum process. As The 
Lesbian Wannabe illustrates through its strategies of parody and disidenti-
fication, practices of credibility assessment in the political asylum process 
produce racialized forms of sexual citizenship and belonging that consti-
tute queer migrants as unfit for citizenship and thus subject to deportation. 
Such sexual citizenship ideologies, according to which rights are defined 
primarily in relation to consumption (Duggan 2004), create an impossible 
burden of proof and a narrative that so few queer female refugees are able 
to reproduce due to lack of access to legal representation, detention, and 
extreme poverty. Thus, as The Lesbian Wannabe suggests, while gay and 
lesbian claims for asylum are not explicitly prohibited in countries such 
as the United Kingdom, black lesbian migrants are frequently excluded 
from accessing such rights through their failure to achieve the status of 
“consumer citizen” (Lewis 2014).
 By showing how the burden of proof is discharged within the politi-
cal asylum process in a way that renders black lesbian migrants deportable 
subjects, both Eye of a Needle and The Lesbian Wannabe call attention to 
how the political asylum system operates as a site of legalized violence by 
which queer female migrants of color are differentially deprived of the re-
sources needed to make credible asylum claims. Successfully demonstrat-
ing how the political asylum system seeks to make racism and its effects 
invisible, these plays reveal the urgency of tackling practices of credibility 
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determination in the political asylum process from feminist, queer, and an-
tiracist perspectives. Indeed, both plays point toward the need for greater 
coalitions between feminist, queer, immigrant, and antiracist activists in 
advocacy for LGBT refugees and asylum seekers. In doing so, they illus-
trate how feminist and queer performances can become part of the solu-
tion to the problems of black lesbian invisibility and representation in the 
asylum process that they portray.
 In response to the dominant role played by assessments of credibility 
in LGBT asylum claims, asylum advocates have suggested that immigra-
tion adjudicators need to be sensitive to the difficulties of proving sexual 
orientation and gender identity and to focus instead on narratives that help 
individuals articulate their sexual histories. Such an approach to LGBT asy-
lum cases on the part of officials would require open-ended questions about 
sexuality that would enable applicants to carefully narrate their sexual his-
tories rather than solely respond to intrusive questions about specific sexual 
practices. In the case of lesbian asylum claims, there is a need for greater 
self-awareness on the part of asylum adjudicators about the obstacles to es-
tablishing credibility. To more accurately assess lesbian applications, asylum 
officials need to acknowledge the intersectional challenges to narrativizing 
lesbian visibility. Recognizing the challenges to narrativizing visibility in les-
bian asylum claims will require immigration officials to address the ways 
that previous experiences of passing or of concealment of sexual identity 
can produce a credibility gap for lesbian asylum applicants. As I have argued 
elsewhere, ensuring that asylum adjudicators are able to adequately engage 
with the gender-specific dimensions of women’s asylum narratives is also 
crucial if the United Nations refugee convention is to be appropriately ap-
plied to lesbian asylum claims (Lewis 2013).
 What is clear from the feminist and queer performances of asylum 
examined here is the importance of media and cultural advocacy for concep-
tualizing the relationship between sexuality and political asylum narratives. 
In the context of LGBT asylum cases, the challenges of representation and 
(in)visibility that are specific to lesbian asylum claims suggest that media 
and cultural production will continue to function as a powerful site of ac-
tivism and resistance for lesbian migrants for some time to come. As I have 
argued here, feminist and queer performances of asylum not only offer a 
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fascinating and unique perspective on the intersections between bureau-
cratic performance and theatrical performance—they also show how the-
ater and performance can become part of the solution to the social problems 
that it portrays.
NOTES
1. For a more detailed discussion of lesbian invisibility and erasure in the political 
asylum process, see Lewis 2010, 2013, and 2014.
2. Since the early 1990s, there has been a significant growth in arts and cultural 
activities in the United Kingdom devoted to addressing the challenges faced by refugee 
populations more generally in navigating the political asylum bureaucracy. For a discussion 
of theater forms by, for, and about refugees and asylum seekers, see the special issue of Re-
search in Drama Education, Gilbert and Nield 2008; Balfour 2013; and Jeffers 2012.
3. Lord Rodger uses “a trivial example” from “the Western context” to illustrate his 
rationale behind the need for refugee protection for those who are “openly gay”: “Just as 
straight men are free to enjoy themselves playing rugby, drinking beer and talking about 
girls with their mates, so male homosexuals are to be free to enjoy themselves going to Kylie 
concerts, drinking exotically colored cocktails and talking about boys with their straight 
female mates” (cited in Keenan 2011, 35).
4. In their work on political asylum in the United Kingdom, Deirdre Conlon and 
Nick Gill discuss how asylum seekers placed in detention are provided with an educational 
program that encourages them to become familiar with self-representation notebooks that 
can serve as a legal-orientation tool in the asylum process. These notebooks are designed, 
first and foremost, to allow asylum seekers to represent themselves at their immigration 
hearings. What the notebooks aim to do is to teach asylum seekers about appropriate forms 
of demeanor and self-expression in the political asylum process so that they may become 
reflexive and responsible “entrepreneurs of the self ” (Conlon and Gill 2013, 245). In this con-
text, as I have discussed elsewhere, proving sexual orientation or credibility as a member of 
a particular social group becomes, quite literally, the personal responsibility of the applicant 
(Lewis 2014).
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Political Asylum Narratives and the  
Construction of Suspicious Subjects
AMY SHUMAN AND CAROL BOHMER
 P o l i t i c a l  a s y l u m  h e a r i n g s  a r e  b o t h  i n t e r r o g a t i o n s  a n d 
narrative performances. Lacking any other documentation of the atroci-
ties they suffered or any proof of their identity, asylum applicants rely on 
their narratives of their experiences. The immigration officials scrutinize 
those narratives for inconsistencies and missing details. Interrogation and 
trauma narrative are incompatible in themselves, but cultural expectations 
exacerbate these incompatibilities. Some of the experiences reported by the 
asylum applicants are unfathomable; others are overly familiar. The immi-
gration officials often regard what they perceive as unfathomable to be not 
credible, and often they view commonly heard reports as fraudulent. In our 
work, we have described some of the narrative failures in the asylum process. 
Using examples from cases in the United States and United Kingdom, we 
observe how interrogations and narrations conflict. We pay particular at-
tention to the problem that asylum seekers’ experiences are saturated with 
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contradictions. Of necessity, they often have occupied multiple and contra-
dictory subject positions to survive, and they must create a coherent narra-
tive to persuade the asylum officials of their credibility. The goal of our work 
is both scholarly and applied; in addition to research, we instruct asylum 
applicants in the intricacies of the system and help them to understand the 
complexities of the narrative performances required of them.
 Many scholars have observed the significance of narrative in the po-
litical asylum process—for example, by attending to the complexities of 
tellability and detail, especially misinterpretations on the part of the asy-
lum officials (Bloomaert 2001; Bohmer and Shuman 2007b; Jackson 2002; 
Jacquemet 2009, 2011; Malkki 2007; Ranger, 2005; Shuman and Bohmer 
2004). Like other narratives produced in courtroom settings, the political 
asylum narratives are a coproduction that is primarily controlled by the im-
migration officials. Some asylum applicants or their advocates attempt to 
wrest control from the officials and to reclaim ownership, but the applicants 
often have a tenuous hold on their stories either because they did not know 
the details of who was harming them and why or because they cannot bring 
themselves to retell the atrocities they experienced ( Jackson 2002; Jacque-
met 2009, 2011; Shuman and Bohmer 2004).
 Considerations of credibility have always been a cornerstone of the 
political asylum process. Applicants are interrogated throughout the hear-
ing process to determine whether they are who they say they are and to 
assess whether their narratives are accurate accounts of what they say they 
endured. Until recently, those considered not credible were most often sus-
pected of being economic migrants. In recent years, the discourses of credi-
bility in the asylum process have shifted to include the question of whether 
an asylum applicant might be a terrorist.
 Differentiating between economic migrants and legitimate asylum 
seekers is never simple, especially since violent conflict produces economic 
migrants: people who cannot sustain a livelihood because their homes have 
been destroyed, because warfare has destroyed crops, or because ordinary life 
is no longer safe. For the asylum official, the question of this differentiation 
is a matter of first determining whether the person’s narrative is credible and, 
second, assessing whether the atrocities experienced fall within one of the five 
categories of political asylum. Differentiating between asylum seekers and 
terrorists raises different questions, not only about the credibility of the nar-
rative but also about the categories of victim and perpetrator. The political 
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asylum process has always sought to determine whether an asylum appli-
cant was engaged in armed conflict, but in the current climate of suspicion 
about terrorism, every asylum applicant is potentially under suspicion. This 
represents a paradigm shift in the discourses of political asylum and intensi-
fies the conflicting discourses of protecting people who fear to return to their 
home countries and maintaining safety and security in the receiving country.
 Although the categories of perpetrator and victim are sometimes clearly 
defined, they easily blur, especially in conflicts arising between neighbors or 
closely associated groups. Further, in addition to perpetrator and victim, in-
dividuals can occupy many other categories, including bystanders who do not 
engage, providers of refuge, providers of assistance, people who look the other 
way, informers, betrayers, and protectors, among others.1 Each of these posi-
tions requires complex narrative discourses that position individuals in relation 
to each other, often in complex compromised relationships in which people 
sometimes explain limited choices between equally impossible situations.
 In a particularly dramatic example of impossible choices that position 
individuals in contradictory categories, survivors of the Holocaust describe 
the role of the designated survivor, a member of a community or family 
appointed to do anything necessary to survive to be able to tell the story of 
what happened. Letty Cottin Pogrebin (1991) describes her Uncle Isaac:
I remember especially my mother’s cousin Isaac, who came to New York 
immediately after the war and lived with us for several months. Isaac is 
my connection to dozens of other family members who were murdered 
in the concentration camps. Because he was blond and blue-eyed, he 
had been chosen as the “designated survivor” of his town; that is, the 
Jewish councils had instructed him to do anything to stay alive and tell 
the story. For Isaac, “anything” turned out to mean this: the Germans 
suspected his forged Aryan papers and decided he would have to prove 
by his actions that he was not a Jew. They put him on a transport train 
with the Jews of his town and then gave him the task of herding into the 
gas chambers everyone in his trainload. After he fulfilled that assignment 
with patriotic Germanic efficiency, the Nazis accepted the authenticity 
of his identity papers and let him go.
 Among those whom Isaac packed into the gas chamber that day, 
dispassionately, as if shoving a few more items into an overstuffed closet, 
were his wife and two children.
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 The “designated survivor” arrived in America at about age forty, with 
prematurely white hair and a dead gaze within the sky-blue eyes that 
had helped save his life. As promised, he told his story to dozens of 
Jewish agencies and community leaders, and to groups of family and 
friends. . . . For months he talked, speaking the unspeakable, describing 
a horror that American Jews had suspected but could not conceive, a 
monstrous tale that dwarfed the demonology of legend and gave me 
the nightmare I still dream to this day. And as he talked, Isaac seemed 
to grow older and older until one night a few months later, when he 
finished telling everything he knew, he died. (304–5)
Pogrebin’s Uncle Isaac committed many atrocities to disprove the suspicions 
about his forged papers. Today, if he faced an asylum hearing, the category 
of “designated survivor” might not be credible and, having admitted to being 
a forger and a perpetrator, he might see his case discredited.
 After the Holocaust, Jews did not need to prove their credibility, a 
situation that also permitted perpetrators such as John Demjanjuk to re-
settle in the United States and other countries. After moving to Cleveland, 
Ohio, and living “quietly,” for decades, Demjanjuk was convicted at the age 
of ninety-one of having been a concentration camp guard. A New York Times 
article asks, “Had he been, as he and his family claimed, a Ukrainian pris-
oner of war in Germany and Poland who made his way to America and be-
came a victim of mistaken identity? Or had he been, as prosecutors charged, 
a collaborating guard who willingly participated in the killing of Jews at the 
Treblinka, Majdanek and Sobibor death camps?” (McFadden 2012).
 The discovery and prosecution of Nazi perpetrators who masquer-
aded as refugees was undertaken not by governmental offices, which have 
not had the funds for such detective work, but by individual associations. 
The pursuit of Demjanjuk was funded by the Simon Wiesenthal Center, 
established in part to “bring Nazi War Criminals to justice.”2
 The categories of victim and perpetrator initially are blurred by vio-
lence that turns neighbors into enemies and that forces people who do not 
trust each other to rely upon each other, sometimes briefly and sometimes 
over extended periods of time, whether linked by bribery or temporary al-
liances against a third, worse group. Further, these blurred alliances, forged 
for some mutual benefit between individuals who otherwise either distrust 
each other, create the possibility of available narratives, in which people can 
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cross enemy lines and position themselves as allies of the victims, rather 
than perpetrators, in asylum applications.
 The Rwandan genocide provides one example of these blurred cate-
gories and the available narratives produced in the aftermath. The genocide 
itself was the result of decades of tension, most likely fostered by the Belgian 
colonizers who had initiated the idea of identity cards differentiating the 
Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa ethnic groups and who replaced the Tutsi leadership 
with Hutu rulers, who were more amenable. Even during these years of ten-
sion, various forms of alliance, including intermarriage, were not uncommon 
between Tutsis and Hutus. When the genocide erupted, many Tutsis relied 
on these alliances when seeking protection from Hutus. In the aftermath of 
the genocide, offering protection became one available narrative for Hutus 
seeking to resettle in asylee-receiving countries.
 Edouard Kayihura and Kerry Zukus (2014) documented the com-
plexity of these alliances in their book Inside Hotel Rwanda, written from the 
perspective of survivor Kayihura and as a response to what they argue were 
misleading and false representations in the film Hotel Rwanda. Kayihura relied 
on a Hutu friend to help him cross militia barriers and checkpoints as he fled 
to get to the Hôtel des Milles Collines (called Hotel Rwanda in the film), 
where Tutsis were seeking refuge. The film, the book, discussions of the con-
troversies the book addresses, and conversations with Kayihura (who is a col-
league of Amy Shuman), provide a rich opportunity to explore the complex 
available positions produced in violent conflict. We discuss these at length 
before returning to how they are considered in a political asylum hearing.
 Paul Rusesabagina was the protagonist of the film Hotel Rwanda, pro-
duced in 2004, a decade after the Rwandan genocide. According to one 
description, “the 2004 film Hotel Rwanda told the story of how Mr Ruse-
sabagina, a middle-class Hutu married to a Tutsi, used his influence—and 
bribes—to convince military officials to secure a safe escape for the esti-
mated 1,200 people who sought shelter at the Mille Collines Hotel in Kigali” 
(BBC 2011).
 Many newspaper articles, blogs, and books have criticized the veracity 
of the film, with a few articles defending it. Kayihura and Zukus’s book 
both tells Kayihura’s own story and denounces Rusesabinga’s claims to her-
oism. In response to the film’s claim to portray “the quiet heroism of one 
man, Paul Rusesabagina, during the Rwandan Genocide,” they write that all 
of the people who stayed at the hotel during the genocide would describe 
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Rusesabagina as “the furthest from a hero any of us could imagine. Rusesa-
bagina had been a war profiteer, a friend to the architects of the genocide, 
a man willing to starve those without money while hoarding piles of food, 
drink, and riches for himself and his friends” (Kayihura and Zukus 2014, 11).
 The stories of heroic protectors are one kind of available narrative, a 
category that in Rusesabagina’s case (and the stories of many others) ex-
isted prior his occupying that position in the chronicles of the genocide. 
Terry George, the filmmaker, describes having done extensive research to 
find people who had experienced the horrors of the genocide. One person 
led to another, and another to Rusesabagina, who was at that point driving 
a cab in Brussels. George defends his efforts to substantiate the accuracy of 
Rusesabagina’s story, but such substantiation would not have been necessary 
if people had not made such efforts to discredit the account. Roger Ebert’s 
2004 review of the film, before the controversy took hold, provides as good 
a justification as any for George’s choice:
I have known a few hotel managers fairly well, and I think if I were 
hiring diplomats, they would make excellent candidates. They speak 
several languages. They are discreet. They know how to function 
appropriately in different cultures. They know when a bottle of scotch 
will repay itself six times over. They know how to handle complaints. 
And they know everything that happens under their roof, from the 
millionaire in the penthouse to the bellboy who can get you a girl.
 Paul is such a hotel manager. He is a Hutu, married to a Tutsi 
named Tatiana (Sophie Okonedo). He has been trained in Belgium 
and runs the four-star Hotel Des Milles Collines in the capital city of 
Kigali. He does his job very well. He understands that when a general’s 
briefcase is taken for safekeeping, it contains bottles of good scotch when 
it is returned. He understands that to get the imported beer he needs, 
a bribe must take place. He understands that his guests are accustomed 
to luxury, which must be supplied even here in a tiny central African 
nation wedged against Tanzania, Uganda and the Congo. Do these 
understandings make him a bad man? Just the opposite. They make him 
an expert on situational ethics. The result of all the things he knows is 
that the hotel runs well and everyone is happy. (Ebert 2004)
Here Ebert articulates a dominant narrative of hotel managers, good ones, 
who are experts on situational ethics. Rusesabagina does seem to have been 
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such a manager. The problem is that although these skills, as portrayed in 
the film, support the idea that, as hotel manager, Rusesabagina was also in 
a position to maintain the safety of the refugees, and the skills he deployed 
are also the skills of the opportunist, the label given by many of the people 
who repudiate Rusesabagina’s heroism. Situational ethics is one thing, and 
opportunism is another. The repudiators focus on the disparities and con-
tradictions between heroes and opportunist and then charge Rusesabagina 
as a false hero.
 Kayihura, Zukus, and others complain that Rusesabagina has been 
compared to Oskar Schindler, but Schindler, too, was an opportunist. How 
the skills of the manager are described, whether as skillful diplomat or as 
opportunist, make a big difference narratively. Positioning Rusesabagina as 
an opportunist during the genocide is important for those who wish to de-
prive him of a credible platform for how he portrays himself afterward. As 
George (2015) points out, in the end most, if not all, of his detractors are 
motivated not as much by the question of his role as opportunist or hero 
during the genocide but by the ways he took advantage of his celebrity as the 
hero depicted in the film to later mount a political platform in opposition to 
the current government.
 Paul Rusesabagina has been acclaimed as a hero, receiving the Wallen-
berg Medal from the University of Michigan and the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom from President George W. Bush, among other accolades. Accord-
ing to Kayihura and Zukus,
in speech after speech before audiences around the world, Rusesabagina 
has used his influence to champion “Hutu Power” politics (an ethnic 
hatemongering against the Tutsi), raising money for causes that have less 
to do with peace than with revenge against current Rwandan President 
Paul Kagame. Most flagrant of the words Rusesabagina speaks are his 
attempts to paint the murderous actions of the Hutu Power extremists 
during what we came to call The 100 Days as a natural byproduct of 
civil war and not genocide. Rusesabagina even testifies at trials on behalf 
of those who took up machetes against the unarmed, all the while 
blaming the victims and claiming they were the true murderers. As one 
of the most famous men in Rwanda today, Rusesabagina is the smiling 
public face of the murderous opposition groups who were driven out of 
Rwanda to end the genocide (Kayihura and Zukus 2014, 15).
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What is at stake here is an ongoing disputed cultural memory that invokes 
events before the genocide and is central to contemporary claims to justice 
and power. The Hutu narrative—and Rusesabagina is a Hutu—is that the 
Tutsis were not native to the area but came four hundred years before. What 
is at stake are questions of the legitimacy of rulers and the history of sub-
jugation. Thus, for Rusesabagina, the genocide was part of a larger histori-
cal struggle. Many survival narratives recount the moment when the Hutu 
Rwandan president’s plane was shot down as the moment when the violence 
began, and in ongoing discussions (published and online), scholars, activists, 
and survivors debate whether or not the Tutsi rebels were responsible for the 
plane crash.
 In the film, Rusesabagina is positioned as the person responsible for 
preventing the Hutu soldiers from killing the refugees seeking haven in the 
hotel. He is portrayed as clever and manipulative, as someone who is play-
ing both sides at the same time. In one scene, he complains to the United 
Nations (UN) commander that he is being overwhelmed by refugees and 
that the hotel “is not a refugee camp; can you not take them with you to your 
facilities?” The UN commander explains that he cannot, saying, “When we 
stabilize the situation; then I’ll take them.” In almost the next scene, Rus-
esabagina calls the hotel owner in Belgium and persuades him to keep the 
hotel open. Paul lies, saying, “The hotel is an oasis of calm for all our loyal 
customers. . . . I assure you the United Nation has everything under con-
trol.” Rusesabagina is portrayed as genuinely caring for the refugees in his 
charge. When told that the UN will evacuate only the Westerners, leaving 
the Rwandans almost unprotected, he confesses to his wife that he has 
been taken for a fool, made to believe he would be protected along with 
the Westerners. His wife responds, “You are no fool. I know who you are” 
(George 2004).
 In the film, Rusesabagina is positioned as strategically managing dif-
ferent interests. In the film, he is a credible, coherent player who says differ-
ent things to the UN commander and the hotel owners not as a lie but as a 
strategy. His self-portrayal as a fool makes him even more sympathetic and 
more credible; his wife, someone who knows him well, serves as a witness.
 The central criticism of Rusesabagina that most seriously under-
mines his credibility as a heroic protector of refugees is the report that he 
demanded money from the refugees and threatened to force them to leave 
if they did not pay. Narratively, this is the moment at which his heroism is 
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questionable, in which he is depicted as a profiteer. In the film, he asks the 
refugees to pay as a strategy to persuade the Hutu militia personnel that 
they are guests of the hotel, not refugees. In the film, it is all part of his effort 
to protect them. Rusesabagina’s strategy is consistent with his role as hotel 
manager, especially the skills of the diplomat described by Roger Ebert. The 
exchange of money is the gray area of heroism that separates the hero from 
the profiteer, the term the critics use for Rusesabagina.
 Edouard Kayihura and others particularly condemn Rusesabagina’s 
demands for money from the refugees. Filmmaker Terry George (2015) re-
ports, “On Oct. 28 a reporter for the Rwandan daily newspaper the New 
Times ran a long story on the ‘true nature’ of Rusesabagina, which quoted 
a former receptionist at the hotel as saying that he had saved only his few 
friends, and that he had charged people to stay in the rooms (a fact we had 
highlighted and explained in the film).”
 The exchange of money occurs several times in the film, primarily in 
instances in which Rusesabagina greases the palm of someone in power. At 
one point, when the journalists and other white people are evacuated, leav-
ing the African refugees behind, one of the journalists gives Rusesabagina 
money to take care of his African woman friend. Rusesabagina refuses the 
money and says, “That’s not necessary.” Rusesabagina explains, “This cannot 
be a refugee camp. The Interahamwe [a Hutu militia] believe that the Mille 
Collines is a four-star hotel. That is the only thing that is keeping us alive.”
 Rusesabagina defends his request for money by positioning himself as 
holding up the façade of the four-star hotel against the militia’s suspicions 
that it had become a refugee camp. It is here that his heroism is most 
contested.
 One of the primary complaints against him is that he required the 
Tutsis seeking refuge and his employees to pay for their stay and for their 
food (including food he received free from the Red Cross) and that the 
employees were no longer being paid for their work. From Kayihura and 
Zukus’s (2014) book:
He [Rusesabagina] told everyone working in the restaurant to start 
making all the people pay. We told him that we couldn’t. That makes 
no sense, making people pay. They are in the hotel to save their lives. 
Nobody really thought about bringing any money. . . . For the next few 
meals over the next few days, those who had money—and there were 
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indeed some who still did—shared graciously with those of us who 
did not. I [Kayihura] got to see the greatest demonstrations of man’s 
humanity toward his fellow man. I thought about Christophe’s story 
of how he had begged a French journalist for assistance to protect a 
two-year-old child from slaughter and was turned down. Here in the 
hotel, everyone—Westerners, Hutu, Tutsi, refugees, guests, employees, 
UN soldiers—faced each new struggle together, living communally, 
living with love. I will never forget it so long as I live. Our fear, though, 
was over how long this situation would last. What would happen when 
everyone’s money ran out? What would the hotel manager do then? And 
who could we appeal to positioned above him? (82–84)
Kayihura and Zukus’s narrative of desperation counters the portrayal of 
Rusesabagina as protector. Instead, in their portrayal, Rusesabagina is an 
opportunist whose demand that people pay for food and shelter contradicts 
his beneficence as someone interested in saving lives. Kayihura and Zukus 
(2014) write:
As for the food from the Red Cross, Paul insisted the hotel kitchen 
staff cook that. And because the hotel staff cooked it, Paul charged the 
refugees for it. He turned it into a profit center. If you could not afford to 
pay, you did not get cooked corn and beans that the Red Cross had given 
to the hotel for free. (89)
 In response to these criticisms, Rusesabagina says that he killed no one 
and that if he had wanted to kill someone, he would have. This is the heart 
of the contested narrative. Was Rusesabagina the expert diplomat, canny, 
always one step ahead of his aggressors, successfully warding off the killers, 
or was he protecting only himself, profiting from his position? He is true to 
no one, not even his wife, who only discovers at the last moment that he was 
not leaving with her and the children on a UN truck for the airport. Ruses-
abagina and his wife say that this was changed for the film; in fact, they had 
agreed that she would leave without him. As portrayed in the film, however, 
it makes Rusesabagina duplicitous with everyone. And yet the film audience 
does not discredit him. Instead, he is quite credible as the masterful hotel 
manager with a good heart. In contrast, the critics say, he was closely allied 
with the Hutus, during and after the genocide, and he currently is a “geno-
cide denier.”3
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 Like many people involved in violent conflict, Rusesabagina is a strate-
gic actor who plays one side against the other. He is part of a complex moral 
geography that brings the rescued and rescuer together and often exposes 
the fault lines of their temporary interdependence (Modan 2008, 90). The 
Tutsi survivors’ testimonies describe a moral geography of havens (especially 
homes) that become unsafe and of marginal spaces that become spaces for 
hiding.4 Within the shifting moral geographies of conflict and survival, the 
positions of conspirator, spy, persecutor, and victim are understandably con-
tradictory. Rusesabagina is, at best, a stand-in for these contradictions: he is 
vulnerable to conflicts larger than his own story.
 Rusesabagina is accused of being an opportunist when he has claimed 
to be a protector; he is not accused of being a genocidal murderer. We have 
discussed his case at length in part because the gray area separating the vic-
tim of persecution, deserving of asylum, and the fraudulent applicant often 
involves opportunism, whether in the case of economic migrants or in recent 
cases of migrants who claim to have been forced to pilot dinghies across the 
Mediterranean.
 Narratives create, rather than merely refer to, the events they describe. 
What is at stake in the competing narratives about the Rwandan genocide, 
told retrospectively, is not only the accuracy of reports of what happened 
in the past but also the consequences of those narrators for present and 
future relationships among the participants. For example, in truth and 
reconciliation events, some narrators describe positive interactions between 
Tutsis and Hutus before and during the violence as signs pointing to the 
possibility of a peaceful future.5
 Political asylum hearings, designed to determine the legitimacy of an 
applicant’s narrative, place more emphasis on the consistency of the facts 
represented than on the way that narrators position themselves in relation 
to others. This positioning is crucial to differentiating between victims and 
persecutors, categories that, as we have discussed in the cases of both Ho-
locaust designated survivors and the Rwandan genocide, can be blurred. In 
the remainder of this essay, we discuss three dimensions of narrative, orien-
tation, positioning, and narrative logics that, we argue, are more precise tools 
than comparisons of consistency in the determination of the credibility of 
an applicant’s narrative.6
 Narrative scholars use the term “orientation” to refer to information 
about places, the people relevant to the story, the activities described, or 
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the larger situation or cultural context.7 Unlike conversational narrative ex-
changes, in legal proceedings lawyers or other officials ask questions to elicit 
orienting details. In asylum hearings the official is then able to control what 
counts as relevant details; in doing so, the hearing officer also can pro-
pose alternative narrative logics that contradict the applicant’s narrative. 
These narrative logics can establish or discredit the narrator’s authority and 
credibility. We doubt that the hearing officers are aware of these narrative 
strategies or of the ways that interrogations and interviews place control of 
orientation, positioning, and narrative logics in the hands of the interrogator.
 To demonstrate how these narrative strategies work, we now turn to a 
close reading of one hearing, observed by Carol Bohmer in the United King-
dom in 2014. The applicant, an eighteen-year-old Albanian man who arrived 
in 2012, claimed to be a potential victim of a blood feud over water rights 
in which the applicant’s father or uncle (this is unclear) killed his neighbor, 
named Murati. According the Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit, a set of traditional 
Albanian laws often referred to more simply as Kanun law, revenge can be 
extracted from males over sixteen. The applicant says that the family was 
threatened and in particular that the Murati family said they would kill the 
applicant. The issue at stake in the hearing was whether or not the appli-
cant had actually been targeted for revenge and whether his fear warranted 
asylum. The following exchange, establishing some of the orienting details, 
provides a typical example of how a hearing officer probes the details of 
background information in search of inconsistencies or inaccuracies. “HO” 
indicates the Home Office representative (in this case, a lawyer hired to take 
the case), “J” indicates the judge, “R” indicates the applicant’s representative, 
and “AP” indicates the applicant:
HO: The Murati family lived in the same village as yours?
AP: Yes, the same village
HO: How close to home did they live?
AP: Near. It is a small village.
J: When you came this morning, did you see the Tesco’s shop? Are we 
talking the same distance?
AP: About the same, maybe a bit further.
HO: Were there other houses in between?
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AP: No. It is our house and then Murati’s house in front of ours.
HO: Were they one of your neighbours?
AP: Yes.
In narrative studies, orientation has been regarded as a relatively neutral 
part of the narrative—it sets the stage and provides background. Interroga-
tors, then, often appear to motivated by a desire to create an accurate record 
rather than to manipulate the narrative. In this narrative, the interrogator 
poses seemingly neutral questions by focusing orientation questions on the 
distance between the applicant’s house and the house of the person who, he 
says, will kill him as an act of revenge.
 However, questions about location become important for establishing 
credibility when the Home Office lawyer asks, “If Akrim’s brother lives in 
another country and your father was around 60 years old, who exactly was 
threatening to kill you and/or your father?” The applicant responds, “So it 
is usually Akrim’s family and they’ve got cousins so their own people.” This 
seemingly neutral question, requesting information about geography and 
age, becomes crucial in the judge’s skepticism about the case. The problem 
could be seen as a matter of cultural misunderstandings regarding the ap-
plication of Kanun law: the hearing officer does not know that relatives will 
cross geographic distances to seek revenge. However, as Marco Jacquemet 
(2011) argues, “We need to consider asylum hearings through a paradigm 
that goes beyond the dominance/difference divide. In the power-saturated 
environments of these hearings, we are not dealing with intercultural in-
teractions between equal partners holding ‘different cultural assumptions,’ 
etc. (as we can find in an international business meeting), but with clearly 
asymmetrical encounters, in which one side seeks help and provides per-
sonal information and the other listens and adjudicates” (493).
 Significantly, the Home Office lawyer has not asked about Kanun law 
but about the location of Akrim’s brother and the age of the applicant’s fa-
ther. These questions reposition the applicant’s narrative within the Home 
Office lawyer’s narrative logic; within that logic, the lawyer mobilizes suspi-
cion of the applicant’s account of his fear of revenge.
 The issue at stake is whether the applicant is a legitimate asylum seeker 
who fears return to his own country where he would be the victim of ven-
geance or is an economic migrant masquerading as an asylum seeker. These 
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positions are constructed narratively (De Fina, Schiffrin, and Bamberg 2006). 
People seeking political asylum often have to negotiate complex and seem-
ingly contradictory positions as victims of persecution who, for example, may 
have bribed or made bargains with their enemies to escape (Bohmer and Shu-
man 2010). Further, an individual case is often evaluated within the context of 
more general assumptions about people from a particular country. At the time 
this case was heard, increasing numbers of Albanians were seeking asylum, 
and many were suspected of being economic migrants. In a political asylum 
hearing, positioning is not only, or even primarily, about the construction of 
identity. Applicants do need to prove that they are who they claim to be, but 
beyond that they need to satisfy the requirement of a well-founded fear of 
return. Narratively, they have to establish not only that past events occurred 
but also that future protection is warranted. Many asylum cases have failed 
because the hearing officers determined that the future fear was too nebulous.8
 In the Albanian case, the credibility of the applicant’s position as a 
victim depends on his assertion that the Murati family will seek revenge 
according to Kanun law. The interrogator asks about the fact that the appli-
cant was under the age permitted as a target for such revenge. Interestingly, 
here, in response to an orientation question, the applicant offers a narrative 
and further orientation information:
AP: I was 15 years old at the time, and if they wanted to kill me they 
would incur a huge pain among my family.
J: Do you know why they were going outside ordinary principles and 
targeting you even though you were not 16?
AP: They were very sad and grieving and wanted to take revenge as soon 
as possible and sometimes they don’t look at the Kanun law.
The Home Office lawyer seems somewhat satisfied by the possibility that 
the applicant might be the victim of revenge, but his credibility is nonethe-
less suspect.
 Later in the interrogation, following detailed discussion of the fact 
that when the applicant arrived in the United Kingdom he stayed with a 
friend of his uncle, he says that he cannot provide the friend’s name and 
did not have a contact number for him. This line of questioning, seemingly 
peripheral to the question of the applicant’s fear of being killed, is typical 
of asylum hearings. Perplexed by the applicant’s lack of information about 
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names and phone numbers, the judge offers his own narrative: “I’m trying 
to put myself in the position you must have been in. You’re going to leave 
everything you know, going to somewhere far away and very different, you 
could have had a number and you’re refusing to take it.” The judge refers to 
the applicant’s position hypothetically. The judge positions the applicant as 
someone who refuses to take a phone number he could have had. Follow-
ing this hearing, Carol Bohmer spoke to the judge who, she says, was quite 
open about assuming someone of a different culture would behave as he 
himself would. Note that the “you” in the judge’s hypothetical narrative is 
a generalized “you,” implying something that anyone would have done. The 
judge has created an alternative narrative logic based on his own cultural 
assumptions. This logic supersedes that of the applicant, and it is in this 
sense that identifying cultural misunderstanding is insufficient to under-
standing the obstacles applicants face in political asylum hearings.
 Narrative logics, or morphologies, refer to the cultural scripts imposed 
on narratives. We are not suggesting that these scripts exist prior to the 
narrative exchange.9 To the contrary, they are produced as part of the inter-
rogation. Like other political asylum scholars, we have been interested in 
the problems asylum applicants face in telling their stories at all (Shuman 
and Bohmer 2004; Jackson 2002), and we are not disputing that here. In 
addition to the paramount problems of tellability, we are suggesting that 
these narrative dimensions also play a significant role in the political asylum 
interrogations by asserting an alternative, hypothetical narrative that casts 
doubt on the applicant’s narrative.10
 The Albanian applicant must prove that he would be targeted for 
harm if he were to return home. He acknowledged that the law would be 
loosely interpreted to permit a fifteen-year-old to be killed, and the inter-
rogator asks whether that assertion is based on information or conjecture: 
“You’ve been asked about something in someone’s mind to which you say I 
don’t know what was in their mind. . . . I’m trying to understand if this was 
a guess or if you had positive information.” This move on the part of the in-
terrogator is crucial for establishing an alternative narrative logic. From the 
interrogator’s perspective, the idea of revenge is hypothetical, a conjecture, 
not based on facts. For the Albanian applicant, revenge is not only a fact but 
also a law in which a killing may be avenged by another killing.11
 The applicant’s claim rests on the narrative logic in which he is in 
danger of being killed as an act of revenge against his family. The judge 
260 Amy Shuman and Carol Bohmer
questions both the logic of the revenge killing and the applicant’s narrative 
about his arrival in the United Kingdom. For the judge, the credibility of 
these two narratives is linked.
 Later in the interrogation, the judge asks, “None of that answers the 
question I asked. Why when you were saying goodbye to your uncle, and 
you haven’t got your mother and father’s number, you don’t ask him, when 
you’re going to a strange place?”
 The judge offers a hypothetical narrative, familiar to him, in which 
people ask for phone numbers when they go to strange places. Responding 
also to the hypothetical narrative, the applicant says, “If I contacted my 
family, something would come out and people would learn I am in England.” 
Additionally, the applicant explains, “In Albania, if you change places from 
one to another, you need to get registered. The Murati family for a bit of 
money, giving bribes, they could find me.”
 The case hinges on the narrative logic of the applicant’s failure to get 
the phone number and to contact his family. It is possible that the applicant 
did not think to ask for the phone number. It is possible that as he says, 
contacting his family would put him in jeopardy. It is also surprising that the 
judge did not consider these possibilities. At the same time, it is also possible 
that the whole story is a ruse and that the applicant is an economic migrant.
 The judge persists in his skepticism that the applicant would be dis-
covered by the Murati family. He asks, “How could they know you were 
there?” The applicant replies, “With a bit of money.” The judge then offers 
another narrative logic and reframes the applicant’s statement and says, “Are 
you saying that since you left the Murati family have been throwing their 
money away finding where you are?”
 This reframing of the narrative “throwing money away” is based on the 
judge’s idea that such an act would be a waste of money. It might be “throw-
ing money away” according to the narrative logic of the United Kingdom. 
The interrogation pits one narrative logic against another, but these logics 
are naturalized by both sides. The idea that the Murati family would spend 
money to find the applicant is unfathomable to the judge, who, as we noted 
earlier, acknowledged his ethnocentrism.
 People fleeing atrocities in their home countries have experienced un-
fathomable losses and violence, and often they cannot find the words to nar-
rate their experiences. The Albanian applicant anticipates being murdered 
according to a cultural system of revenge, but even though he provides a 
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potentially legitimate narrative that he might be killed were he to return 
to his home, he is discredited by his failure to obtain a phone number, an 
act that seems unfathomable to the judge. The judge and lawyer represent-
ing the Home Office employ narrative logics focused primarily on orienting 
details to discredit the position of the applicant as a victim. By offering his 
own hypothetical narrative from narrative logics familiar to him, the judge 
contradicts and rejects the applicant’s story.
 Like many failed asylum cases, this case could be attributed to cul-
tural ethnocentrism in political asylum hearings. Although cultural mis-
understanding plays a role in producing suspicion, here we have attempted 
to demonstrate how the interrogation process produces hypothetical narra-
tive logics through control of the orienting details. These narrative logics are 
used either to confirm the applicant’s claim to be a victim or to reject that 
position and instead assign a different one—for example, economic migrant 
or persecutor. How Rusesabagina is seen—whether as an opportunist or as 
a participant in genocide—depends on narrative logics, as does the story of 
Letty Cottin Pogrebin’s Uncle Isaac, the designated survivor.
 Many asylum cases are based on culturally specific narrative logics—
for example, the logics of bribery, of managing family responsibilities, and of 
discretion regarding stigmatized sexual minorities. How an asylum seeker 
is positioned as a credible narrator depends on the credibility of these nar-
rative logics. Although on the surface political asylum hearings often focus 
on discrepancies in background, or orienting, details, often the motivation 
for finding these discrepancies is related to suspicion of the narrative logic 
of the applicant’s claim. By challenging an applicant’s narrative logic, the asy-
lum hearing officer produces a suspicious subject.
 Assessments of the credibility of asylum applicants occur within ideo-
logical, politically motivated discourses. Here we have described the moral 
geographies that differentiate between, for example, opportunism and situ-
ational ethics. Each of these operates according to narrative logics. Pogre-
bin’s cousin Isaac, the designated survivor, is a case of situational ethics; if 
we accept Pogrebin’s account, we understand the necessity of what he did, 
however horrendous. In contrast, according to Kayihura and Zukus, Rus-
esabagina, the hotel manager featured in the film Hotel Rwanda, was an op-
portunist, and he should not be seen not as a hero. Narrative logics can 
easily falter and fall under the lens of suspicion. Finding fault with details, 
although primary to the interrogation process in a hearing, occurs within 
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the larger context of these moral geographies that position a narrator as 
victim, perpetrator, or opportunist and that are crucial for considering a 
person as deserving of asylum.
NOTES
1. For example, Peter Tinti and Tuesday Reitano discuss a continuum for the cate-
gory of smuggler, from trafficker to ad hoc alliances of small businesses providing transport 
(2016, 32).
2. “John Demjanjuk’s Nazi War Criminal Trial in Germany,” Simon Wiesenthal Cen-
ter, http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/pp.asp?c=lsKWLbPJLnF&b=5648009, accessed 
August 21, 2018. We discuss the role of nongovernmental organizations in pursuing war 
criminals in Bohmer and Shuman 2007b.
3. Rwandan ambassador to the Netherlands Immaculee Uwanyiligira claims that 
Rusesabagina is a genocide denier and that “there is a far more sinister connection that 
warrants exposing. Rusesabagina is also accused of sponsoring militia, military, and para-
military forces that committed the genocide in Rwanda. These days, they operate in eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo under their new name Democratic Forces for the Lib-
eration of Rwanda (FDLR (Houttui 2012).
4. See Kate Parker Horigan’s discussion of the competing narratives produced by the 
changing status of Hurricane Katrina victims as they lost their homes, sought protection, 
and were characterized as villains or victims (2018).
5. As Mark Freeman (2002) points out, one of the things at stake in counternarra-
tives about public politicized events is the possibility of a collective narrative. He describes 
counternarratives as “culturally-rooted aspects of one’s history that have not yet become part 
of one’s story” (202). See also Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006.
6. Marisa Cianciarulo argues that the identification of inconsistencies is an ineffective 
means of assessing asylum claims. She writes, “The focus on minor inconsistencies would 
be an ineffective means” of perfecting the asylum system. “A terrorist bent on gaining access 
to lawful immigration status will likely not make mistakes on his or her asylum proceedings 
but rather will be well-rehearsed and thoroughly coached” (2006, 131).
7. As defined by William Labov and Joshua Waletsky (1967), orientation “orients the 
listener in respect to person, place, time, and behavioral situation” (32).
8. For example, the officer considering the case of a North African applicant in the 
film A Well-Founded Fear accepts her assertion that she was raped by a soldier and the as-
sertion that such attacks are common but does not consider her to be sufficiently afraid of 
being personally targeted. As we have discussed elsewhere, publicity can have an effect on 
the determination of applicants’vulnerability; they may be regarded as more likely to be 
harmed were they to return (Bohmer and Shuman, 2007b).
9. See Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein’s (1998) discussion of the production 
of scripts as part of narrative exchange.
10. Our discussion of tellability builds on work by Neal Norrick (2005), Anna De 
Fina and Alexandra Georgakopoulou (2011), and Shuman (2006).
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11. We have been especially interested in political asylum cases that depend on re-
garding a non-Western cultural practice as anathema. In other work, we have discussed 
how the narrative logics of fear and bribery are central to many political asylum narratives 
(Bohmer and Shuman, 2007a).
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 I n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h i s  v o l u m e ,  w e  o b s e r v e d  h o w 
media attention to the death by drowning of three-year-old Alan Kurdi 
quickly shifted to accounts of refugees turned away in one European coun-
try after another, followed by new policies of closed borders and deported 
asylum seekers. His story is a story of a refugee who died in transit. As we 
conclude this book, we observe that the discourse about asylum increasingly 
includes not only the persecution refugees experienced in their homelands 
but also the violence that they experienced at the hands of smugglers or in 
the harsh conditions of transit (Squire 2017). Notwithstanding the fact that 
the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that asylum 
seekers cannot be penalized for illegal entry, the illegality of their border 
crossings often marks them as suspicious, blurring the asylum seeker with 
the smuggler and the person who is a victim of violence with the person 
who has, or might, perpetrate violence. Asylum seekers have always been 
multiply vulnerable; today their vulnerability translates not necessarily into 
an obligation to provide protection but instead into a warrant for suspicion.
 Until recently, the suspicion driving assessments of credibility focused 
primarily on whether applicants were who they claimed to be, and appli-
cants who could not satisfy credibility assessments were suspected of being 
economic migrants or opportunists of other sorts. Many still are accused of 
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trying to game the system. Applicants have also been suspected of nefarious 
identities, especially of being threats to national security, as when President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt suspected Jewish refugees of being spies (Bohmer and 
Shuman 2018). Contradicting this suspicion, however, following World War 
II, some countries knowingly harbored Nazis. The discourses about discov-
ered Nazis rarely characterize them as present dangers and instead portray 
them as living ordinary lives, blending into their new communities and even 
becoming model citizens. In contrast, suspicions of contemporary refugees 
and immigrants have widened, and many asylum seekers are suspected of 
being not only spies but also criminals, gang members, or traffickers. The 
discourse of people fleeing violence and seeking safety competes with the dis-
course of people who bring violence from elsewhere with them. To be sure, 
Lynn Stephen (2017) has asserted that particular populations of migrants 
are constructed as “preemptive suspects”—those that are perceived as always 
already dangerous. This marking of people as “preemptive suspects”—iron-
ically, as Seth M. Holmes (2017) notes, in the name of “security”—serves to 
justify their exclusion and exploitation. The essays in this volume critically 
consider how migrants are marked and labeled both outside of and inside of 
political-legal arenas, as well as the relationships between these two fields.
 To better understand the political asylum process and the contempo-
rary public discourses of fear and suspicion, the contributors to this volume 
have turned to culturally specific understandings of the circumstances of 
political asylum hearings and asylum seekers. Our goal has been to engage 
in rigorous and thoughtful inquiry that might challenge some of the unin-
formed assumptions that often drive these suspicions.
 The universal application of political asylum policy and law is rela-
tively recent, dating to the 1951 creation of the UN refugee convention. 
Before then, individual regulations applied to particular situations. Article 
14 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, accepted in 1948, 
“recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other 
countries.1 Initially, the 1951 refugee convention applied to European refu-
gees from World War II; the 1967 protocol expanded the right to asylum to 
anyone fleeing persecution. Individuals have the right to seek asylum, but 
states do not have the obligation to provide it. However, states are obligated 
to consider applicants “without discrimination as to race, religion or coun-
try of origin” (UN General Assembly 1967). In addition to the policies that 
restrict states from penalizing individuals for illegal entry, according to the 
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policy of nonrefoulement, states are also restricted from returning people to 
the country they are fleeing if they would be subject to persecution.2 At the 
same time, according to article 3 of the convention, states can refuse to grant 
asylum to someone deemed to be a threat to national security.
 The 1951 refugee convention’s policies did not anticipate the great va-
riety of violent situations that have created today’s population of 65 million 
displaced people, including 22 million refugees and asylum seekers. Unlike 
refugees, asylum seekers make their way to a country of refuge as individ-
uals. To gain asylum, individual asylum seekers need to be recognized as 
belonging to one of the categories that warrants asylum as stipulated by the 
convention. This crucial recognition, applied to people fleeing quite differ-
ent circumstances, requires knowledge of cultural differences, the kind of 
knowledge described by the authors of these essays.
 Each of the authors in this volume describes and draws insights from 
particular cultural or political situations that have significance or serve as 
obstacles to assessments of credibility in the political asylum process. Po-
litical asylum procedures and policies not only operate in but also foster the 
tension between universal principles and culturally specific situations. The 
policy is, necessarily, designed to apply equally to individuals from a variety 
of circumstances, but the question of whether individual cases conform to 
the policy’s requirements inevitably depends on particular circumstances.
 As ethnographers and cultural theorists, the authors of these essays 
are attuned to how people use cultural resources to negotiate their flight 
from atrocities and to attempt to find refuge elsewhere. Additionally, we 
recognize the ways that our voices are used often in the place of the voices 
of the asylum applicants. John Haviland describes how his voice of exper-
tise did not necessarily contribute to justice but instead served “to lubricate 
and legitimize the wheels of bureaucracy itself, including its systematic and 
structural injustices.” As scholars, we are often peripheral to political asylum 
policymaking and to the hearing processes that determine whether someone 
is given refuge or deported. Some of us have had firsthand experience with 
the political asylum process, whether serving as translators, assisting as ad-
vocates of other kinds, or documenting the experiences of refugees; all of us 
undertake our work with deep respect for the struggles of refugees.
 The essays in this book attend to the cultural misunderstandings, 
faulty translations, and unchallenged assumptions that often serve as obstacles 
in the political asylum process. Neither cultural differences nor differences 
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in forms of violence and persecution sufficiently account for the difficul-
ties asylum seekers face. As several of the authors discuss, asylum seekers 
become suspect in a variety of ways, whether because they are assumed to 
be liars, whether they are feared to be terrorists, or whether they or the per-
secution they describe are not legible to the immigration officials. The as-
sessment of credibility can falter in many ways and at many different points 
in the assessment process. The authors of these essays are not arguing that 
more knowledge, more accurate translations, greater attention to particular 
circumstances, or better evidence alone would be a remedy for overcoming 
those obstacles. Instead, we are interested in how suspicion fills in the lack 
of specificity or verification, and we discuss the institutional discourses and 
practices that are served by maintaining those obstacles.
 In discussions that bring together technologies of truth and technol-
ogies of suspicion, these essays discuss how the political asylum process is 
often undermined by ongoing tensions between states’ understandings of 
(or refusal to comply with) obligations and the question of who deserves 
asylum. Many scholars studying political asylum (including lawyers who 
describe the complexity of particular cases) have identified how success or 
failure hinged on assessments of credibility, and not surprisingly discussions 
of credibility have dominated political asylum discourse. These discussions 
and documentations are important and continue to shed light on fault lines 
in the system.
 As both Benjamin N. Lawrance and John B. Haviland demonstrate, 
the vernacularization of knowledge and the attention to the particular cul-
tural circumstances that could help explain a case do not necessarily lead 
to success for the applicant. To the contrary, such details can make the case 
seem even more incomprehensible and less credible when the cultural spe-
cifics do not conform to officials’ expected categories.
 Earlier work in political asylum research explored the centrality of 
assessments of credibility in political asylum hearings and, for example, 
discussed how minute and seemingly irrelevant discrepancies in an appli-
cant’s account led to refusals. Recognizing that the asylum officials were 
surely aware of the flaws in the system, scholars increasingly turned to an 
examination of how those practices might support shifts in policy and 
serve as rationales for rejecting the majority of asylum seekers. As several 
of the authors point out, the judgments of asylum officers are known to 
vary widely from one adjudicator to the next. Bridget M. Haas considers 
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the relationship between credibility and deservingness and, based on her 
interviews with asylum officers, observes how applicants are positioned as 
deserving and entitled and how the officials position themselves either as 
saving lives or as distancing themselves from the geographically distant vi-
olence and persecution described by the applicants. She demonstrates how 
credibility is cocreated and notes, “It is in the breakdowns of knowledge and 
decision-making that we can better understand the (often invisible) power 
of technologies of truth—even if enacted and reproduced ambivalently—
and the symbolic violence that these technologies effect.”
 Marco Jacquemet writes that “credibility is gained incrementally but is 
lost catastrophically.” A single error can have huge consequences. The fault 
lines in the system are clear in the use of digital information sources. In his 
analysis of the uses of digital technologies, Jacquemet finds that digitization 
can offer speed in finding information, but at the same time, using digital 
sources accurately depends on understanding how they work, where they 
are limited, and where they are useful. The technologies themselves inevita-
bly create distortions, whether in the form of faulty or imprecise translations 
or assumptions about proper names for people and places.
 Jacquemet describes the case of a Yazidi applicant who produced an 
image on his cell phone to establish his credibility. In Jacquemet’s terms, 
the case depended on two different systems of technology, both technolo-
gies available to the official in the form of “sedimented knowledge encoded 
into court records, prior cases, and archived materials” and the “storable, 
transmissible, and portable” knowledge stored on a cell phone. Contrasting 
the sedentary and the mobile, Jacquemet suggests the concept of the “trans-
idiomatic environment of the asylum hearing, allowing people to reach a 
mutual understanding without relying on a common language or forcing a 
recalcitrant interpreter into cooperating.”
 Questions of proof take a different turn in the cases documented by 
Rachel Lewis. Applicants fleeing persecution as sexual minorities are re-
quired to demonstrate that they are openly gay according to the officials’ 
stereotypical expectations of what gay behavior should look like. Lacking 
visibility, these applicants are not legible to the officials. Lewis pushed the 
point further, describing them as “unthinkable” and “unrepresentable.” Sara 
McKinnon similarly discusses how Euro-American concepts of sexual iden-
tity used by immigration officials privilege Western concepts of public vis-
ibility. As Haas, Amy Shuman, and Carol Bohmer point out, these cases, 
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like many others, lack evidence and rely instead on the applicant’s narratives. 
Here, we want to observe that the demand for evidence is intricately con-
nected to the legibility of applicants.
 Connecting legibility and credibility can be helpful for understand-
ing what might appear to be quite separate conversations about the credi-
bility of a particular applicant and the larger suspicion of political asylum 
applicants generally as fraudulent, dangerous, or needy, or all three. Charles 
Watters describes the how the receiving country’s possible compassion and 
the applicant’s desire for a better life can constitute contradictory aspira-
tions. McKinnon similarly points to how aspirations and anxieties become 
connected in political asylum discourses. Ilil Benjamin’s study of volunteers 
working at an immigration nongovernmental organization in Tel Aviv pro-
vides a particularly clear example of discourses caught in the crossroads be-
tween compassion for desperate refugees and disillusionment. The fact that 
some of the refugees were economic migrants taking advantage of the system 
challenged the volunteers’ trust more generally and thus their willingness to 
advocate on behalf of asylum seekers. Further describing mutual suspicion 
in the asylum process, Haas points out that not only the asylum seekers 
but also the adjudicators have become figures of mistrust. Like the cynical 
volunteers Benjamin observed, the adjudicators studied by Haas brought 
their own moral conceptions, both subtle and overt, to their assessments. 
Often, situational ethics and judgments about opportunism motivate the 
assessment process.
 In the introduction to this volume, we proposed that current suspi-
cions of asylum seekers are rooted in the complex relationships between the 
obligation to accept and assess asylum seekers and the question of who is 
deserving of asylum. Many of the essays tied these assessments to the ques-
tion of how an applicant becomes legible. Often applicants who were able to 
establish that they had experienced persecution and violence in their home-
lands were nonetheless unable to qualify for asylum because they were not 
legible within recognizable categories. The categories that warrant asylum—
political opinion, race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular 
social group—are all potentially complex, but the category of social group is 
particularly subject to interpretation. Several of the authors of these essays 
discussed instabilities in the category of social group, whether because the 
group itself is newly recognized in asylum law (in the case of gender) or be-
cause the group requires the officials to look beyond their own recognizable 
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categories of victim and participant in violence, a topic discussed by Shu-
man and Bohmer.
 The political asylum hearing process is extensive and constantly 
changing, in part because new categories, such as gender violence, are de-
termined to warrant asylum; some kinds of violence and persecution were 
not originally anticipated in the UN doctrine (especially, but not exclusively, 
gender-based violence, including persecution of sexual minorities, domestic 
violence, and rape).3 McKinnon points out that immigration officials alter 
categories of gender by separating gender-based and sexuality-related perse-
cution. Some applicants are more legible than others. Applicants’ stories of 
persecution might be credible, but they still might be disqualified for asylum 
if they are not considered to belong to one of the recognized categories for 
political asylum. They are reinscribed as victims of criminal acts rather than 
victims of recognizable categories of persecution. The question of who de-
serves asylum is not only a question of credibility (as important as that is, es-
pecially when proof is impossible) but also, and perhaps more significantly, a 
question of whether the applicant is legible within the system. Some appli-
cants were determined to be deserving but only when they were reassigned 
to a category considered more legitimate. McKinnon points out that immi-
gration officials alter categories of gender by separating gender-based and 
sexuality-related persecution.
 Questions of social group membership raise new credibility issues 
and prompt new forms of suspicion. Some categories seem to be completely 
unfamiliar to the immigration officials, who do not seem to recognize the 
possibility of the forced migration documented by Haviland or the super-
natural claims discussed by Lawrance. Lawrance describes how the use of 
country of origin information (COI) can result in “bureaucratic erasure” 
based on narrow understandings of the cultural complexity of the situations 
asylum seekers flee and the means they use to escape. Without this greater 
complexity, assessments are likely to be inaccurate.
 Lawrance discusses how COI is considered in deliberations about in-
dividuals who claim to be persecuted on account of witchcraft. The country 
of origin has long been a consideration in political asylum deliberation, and 
both lawyers and others who assist asylum seekers are aware that the success 
of an application can hinge on attitudes toward the country of origin. If the 
country of origin is regarded as an ally of the nation of refuge, the asylum 
seeker will likely face more scrutiny. These attitudes can have exponentially 
272 Amy Shuman and Bridget M. Haas
important consequences if particular populations are suspected as poten-
tially dangerous (for example, in current anti-Muslim discourses). Lawrance 
described a case in which a young woman was married to and sent to live in 
London with an older man, a mystic, who died shortly after she arrived. She 
was accused by her community of causing his death by witchcraft, and she 
feared retribution if she were to return. However, the asylum adjudicators 
considered her to be a trafficked young woman rather than a woman flee-
ing retribution for allegedly using witchcraft. The adjudicators were familiar 
with trafficking but not with witchcraft.
 In many of the examples described in these essays, we see how catego-
ries can easily be reassigned. In particular, the categories of trafficking, forced 
marriage, and other forms of coercion require complex understandings of 
who is protecting whom. In his chapter on Chiapan asylum seekers, Haviland 
asks whether removing children for their protection might be itself a form of 
trafficking and urge us to carefully consider who counts as a protected indi-
vidual. As his story of “R” illustrates, the designation of protection is attached 
to particular narratives. As the victim of child abuse, R was deemed eligible 
for protection. Her more complicated narrative, including her story of fleeing 
because her parents did not approve of her relationship with her boyfriend, 
and the even more complicated relationships of people who exploited her 
would not necessarily be so successful in asylum hearings.
 The very local circumstances that Haviland describes occur in the 
context of larger, geopolitical questions. In her chapter, Nadia El-Shaarawi 
argues “for an anthropological approach . . . that pays attention to the ways in 
which these larger geopolitical questions are made and remade in everyday 
encounters during the resettlement process.” As the essays in this volume 
demonstrate, intersections and contradictions among local circumstances 
and global policies intensify in the political asylum process.
 The political asylum process is not only complex and cumbersome—it 
also suffers from misleading, if not erroneous, discourses that confuse credibil-
ity about an applicant’s case with other sorts of suspicion, such as whether the 
applicant is actually an economic migrant attempting to gain the system or is 
a terrorist. Misleading assumptions and associations create a false dichotomy 
between secure borders and protecting refugees and obscure the more difficult 
questions of what are the obligations of states toward people fleeing violence 
and who is deserving of protection. How is it that narratives of violence, per-
secution, and desperation are translated into narratives of opportunism?
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 As we send this book to press, the situation for the world’s refugees has 
worsened. The discourses of obligation discussed by El-Shaarawi compete 
with discourses of fear and restriction, and even individuals whose vulnera-
bility is directly attached to assisting Western military campaigns (transla-
tors, for example) are frequently denied the protection that political asylum 
was designed to afford. The seemingly quixotic suspicions, not tied to veri-
fiable dangers, combined with the equally random-seeming methods of as-
sessing asylum seekers lead some scholars and policymakers to ask whether 
the suspicions and methods serve as a quasi-rationale for limiting asylum. 
Are the limits motivated by the fear of immigrants more generally? We have 
tried to address some of the central fault lines in the political asylum process 
within the larger context of discourses about what is posed as a contradic-
tion between protecting borders and protecting refugees. How is it that the 
politics of protection, as outlined in the 1951 convention, have become so 
intertwined with a politics of suspicion? The essays in this volume suggest 
that we can begin to untangle unwarranted suspicion by understanding that 
the technologies of truth and the technologies of suspicion are intricately 
connected. The technologies for assessing credibility are part of institutional 
frameworks and are never neutral. The legal categories of asylum are nec-
essarily malleable, subject to interpretation, and open to application to un-
fortunately new forms of persecution. In a changing system, responsive to 
new situations, assessments of credibility will always be partial and always 
will be subject to questions of what makes an asylum seeker recognizable. 
Without that recognition, an asylum seeker becomes suspect. The slippage 
from protection to suspicion rests at least in part on recognition.
 Driven by fear of violence and often desperate to escape, asylum seek-
ers endure extraordinary difficulties to arrive in a country of possible refuge, 
only to face suspicion that they are not who they say they are, that their 
stories are untrue, that they are economic rather than political migrants, or 
that they are terrorists. To be granted asylum, asylum seekers must prove 
that they have a “well-founded fear” of returning to their home countries. 
However, fleeing fear, they sometimes find that they are themselves feared.
NOTES
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, www.un.org/en/universal-declaration 
-human-rights/.
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2. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, article 33(1), 1954, 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, http://www.unesco 
.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary 
/refoulement/.
3. Sara McKinnon (2016) recounts the history of asylum refusals of individuals 
whose persecution on account of gender did not qualify (2) and provides a detailed account 
of how determinations about gender align with state interests (25).
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